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ABSTRACT 
 
My thesis presents India as an active intellectual agent rather than a passive sociological 
referent in the global intellectual history of constituent power. It does so by exploring the 
hitherto undertheorized field of its constitutional imagination. It was commonly recognized 
during the anticolonial movement and the emerging postcolonial context that constituent 
power, or the power of constitution making, ultimately vested in the people. But this did not 
imply a purely diffusionist reception of either the revolutionary or the constitutionalist tradition 
of imagining the concept, both of which had been in wide circulation across the globe since the 
late eighteenth century. I highlight the ruptures, breaks and discontinuities of the Indian 
political sensibility in respect of the global, and make a case for situating swaraj as a distinct 
indigenous expression for collective self rule within a non-Europeanist and non-globalist 
relational approach to constituent power. 
 
The objective of this thesis however, is not to present a celebratory juridical account of an 
authentic nationalist self realization. Rather, it seeks to decentre formal constitutional 
principles and inter-institutional relations from discussions of constituent power, and anchors 
them instead in two fundamentally incompatible legal languages drawn from a philosophical 
history of the Indian political. It argues that the imaginary institution of society in modern India 
was marked by a constitutive dissensus between the social law of dharma and the political law 
of dhamma, and goes on to show how its development has been underpinned in the 
contemporary domain of constitutional thought in action by the mutual antagonism between 
these two symbolic lifeworlds. The thesis seeks to demonstrate that the persistent hegemony 
of a nationalist dharma threatens the very autonomy of the political, and it argues that only 
where this is effectively interrupted by the counter hegemony of a non-nationalist dhamma has 
the Indian political come close to realizing its full potential. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
SITUATING INDIA IN THE GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF 
CONSTITUENT POWER 
 
In 1973, an unprecedented thirteen judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India 
was required to adjudicate upon the validity of certain constitutional amendments, enacted by 
a two-thirds supermajority of Parliament in purported exercise of its constituent power under 
Article 368 of the Constitution of India, 1950. Although there was no contemporary trend of 
the higher judiciary being thus approached anywhere else in the world, constitutional 
amendments in India had already been challenged thrice before since independence, with the 
Court either surrendering completely to Parliament’s assertion of constituent power, or denying 
the juridical significance of the concept altogether by treating it merely as a species of ordinary 
legislative power. With Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, the Court is generally believed 
to have turned a new leaf by bringing it back into judicial consideration, while at the same time 
holding that Parliament’s amending power was nevertheless subject to the substantive 
principles of superlegality, encapsulated in what has globally come to be known as the basic 
structure doctrine.1 
 
The judicial review of constitutional amendments was justified in Kesavananda Bharati by 
distinguishing the Parliament as a constitutional creature from the constitution making capacity 
of the people of India, and casting aspersions on its credentials as their representational agent. 
To put this in J.M. Shelat and A.N. Grover, JJ.’s words,  
 
‘When a power to amend the Constitution is given to the people, its contents can be 
construed to be larger than when that power is given to a body constituted under that 
Constitution. Two-thirds of the members of the two Houses of Parliament need not 
necessarily represent even the majority of the people of this country. Our electoral 
system is such that even a minority of voters can elect more than two-thirds of the 
members of either House of Parliament. … . That apart, our Constitution was framed 
on the basis of consensus and not on the basis of majority votes. … . Therefore the 
contention on behalf of the Union and the States that the two-thirds of the members in 
the two Houses of Parliament are always authorised to speak on behalf of the entire 
people of this country is unacceptable.’2  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 AIR 1973 SC 1461. 
2 Id., para 692. 
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On the other hand, K.K. Mathew, J., emphasized in his judgment that far from being enacted 
by the people themselves, the constitutional text was actually framed by a rather 
unrepresentative Constituent Assembly:  
 
‘The preamble to the Constitution of India says that "We the people of India...adopt, 
enact and give unto ourselves this Constitution". Every one knows that historically this 
is not a fact. The Constitution was framed by an assembly which was elected indirectly 
on a limited franchise and the assembly did not represent the vast majority of the people 
of the country. At best it could represent only 28.5 per cent of the adult population of 
the provinces, let alone the population of the Native States. And who would dare 
maintain that they alone constituted “people” of the country at the time of the framing 
of the Constitution?’3  
 
Yet even if the fiction of a people authored constitution was to be pursued with, it could not 
come in the way of the proto sovereign Parliament’s exercise of a substantially 
uncircumscribed amending power:  
 
‘the real sovereign, the hundred per cent sovereign—the people—can frame a 
Constitution, but that sovereign can come into existence thereafter, unless otherwise 
provided, only by revolution. It exhausts itself by creation of minor and lesser 
sovereigns who can give any command. And, under the Indian Constitution, the original 
sovereign—the people—created, by the amending clause of the Constitution, a lesser 
sovereign, almost coextensive in power with itself.’4  
 
With a thin majority of seven to six, the Court eventually decided that Parliament was free to 
amend any provision of the Constitution, without however abrogating or damaging the 
essential features of its basic structure. Violating the basic structure was unconstitutional 
because this amounted to destroying the very identity of the Constitution itself, which was 
believed to have been sourced from the constituent power of the people, expressed through 
their representatives in the Constituent Assembly at the so called founding moment of India as 
a sovereign democratic republic. Thus in H.R. Khanna, J.’s famous opinion,  
 
‘The word "amendment" postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of 
its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subjected to 
alterations. As a result of the amendment, the old Constitution cannot be destroyed and 
done away with; it is retained though in the amended form. What then is meant by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Id., para 1665. 
4 Id., para 1677. 
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retention of the old Constitution? It means the retention of the basic structure or 
framework of the old Constitution.’5 
 
That constituent power or the power of constitution making ultimately vested in the people 
themselves was widely understood in the emerging postcolonial context within which the 
Assembly operated. Shri Krishna Sinha, the then Chief Minister of Bihar, invoked the term 
‘constituent power’ to describe the goal of the anticolonial freedom movement, while 
endorsing Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s objectives resolution on the floor of the house. 
‘It was for the assertion of this basic right of a people’, Sinha pronounced, ‘that hundreds 
mounted the scaffold, thousands faced bullets and men, in lakhs swarmed the jails. The country 
was ‘moved from one end to the other’, with its millions rallying in revolt under a banner raised 
by Mohandas Gandhi in 1921, and subsequently consumed by a ‘spirit of rebellion’ in 1942, 
only for the sake of such a long yearned achievement.6 While his may have been a rare direct 
reference to constituent power, it can hardly be disputed that with the exception of princely 
aristocracies hitherto accustomed to enjoying varying degrees of sovereign entitlements under 
British paramountcy, most others were gradually attuning themselves to the inescapable reality 
of a ruptural transition from conditions of coloniality to a postcolonial state form, with at least 
the symbolic centrality of the people secured herein. 
 
Nehru for instance, recognized that the Assembly’s strength resided in the people at large, and 
urged his colleagues ‘to keep in mind the passions that lie in the hearts of the masses…and try 
to fulfil them’. The collective responsibility that lay before the House, of ushering India with 
a ‘mighty past of five thousand years’ into an even ‘mightier future’ could indeed be 
overwhelming, but at the commencement of such a momentous reconstructive undertaking, he 
drew sustenance from the ‘various Constituent Assemblies that have gone before’—the 
‘making of the great American nation’ through a ‘constitution which has stood the test of so 
many years’, the Constituent Assembly of the ‘mighty French Revolution’ which met to frame 
a constitution in spite of difficulties posed by the monarch and other authorities, ‘and did not 
disperse till they finished the task they had undertaken’, and the Russian Revolution ‘out of 
which has arisen .. another mighty country which is playing a tremendous part in the world.’7 
By connecting the work of the Indian Constituent Assembly with the great political revolutions 
of the West and their constitution making legacies, Nehru was alluding to people’s constituent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Id., para 1480. 
6 Sinha (CADs, Vol. I: 16 December 1946). 
7 Nehru (CADs, Vol. I: 9 December 1946).  
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power as the originating source of the constitution, the fundamental aspects of which were 
sought to be protected in Kesavananda Bharati from Parliamentary incursion. Amending 
power was after all derivative of original constituent power, and therefore thought to be limited 
by explicit and implicit terms of its delegation. 
 
This standard narrative about a limited amending power will serve as the point of departure for 
my thesis on the nature of constituent power in colonial and postcolonial India. In spite of 
having become the chief theoretical cornerstone of a well established legal and constitutional 
orthodoxy, I find such an account inadequate and unconvincing, as the originary concept of 
constituent power is only presupposed herein, without being intellectually engaged with in 
terms drawn from India’s own collective self imagination as a political society. The over 
emphasis on establishing or discrediting the normative legitimacy of basic structure 
constitutionalism has meant that scholarly focus has rarely shifted from an examination of the 
contours of amending power, to a deeper juridical investigation of the constituting postulates 
of the fundamental law of the political that have underpinned and influenced constitutional 
thought in action at every juncture of the anticolonial national movement leading up to formal 
independence, and the subsequent foundation and augmentation of the new postcolonial legal 
order. 
 
I should point out that the fundamental decisions of the Constituent Assembly which are sought 
to be protected by the superlegality of basic structure review, cannot be understood exclusively 
in terms of the legal mythology of an autonomous constitution making exercise giving itself its 
own law. The Assembly after all was constituted in accordance with the British Cabinet 
Mission Plan of 1946 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947, and saw itself as striving to 
actualize the various democratic constituent possibilities that had generated around the 
anticolonial national movement. Yet even though the Assembly claimed to speak in the 
constituent voice of the people themselves, its members were either elected by Provincial 
Legislatures or nominated by Princely States based on property and community qualifications, 
and were thus at least in an empirical sense not as widely representative of the entire population 
as future Parliaments have been under India’s universal adult franchize democracy. 
 
My objective however, is not to abandon the democratic mythology of a ‘We the people of 
India’ coming together to ‘give to ourselves this Constitution’. But if it is to be persisted with, 
we must necessarily ponder upon the following questions: Who are the constitution authoring 
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people in India and how do they get constituted themselves? In what way can they be said to 
have pre-existed the framing of the constitution, when it was through the Preamble that they 
were first officially institutionalized? How can the association of people’s constituent power 
with specific constituted authorities like the Constituent Assembly, Government in Parliament 
and Supreme Court, be squared with its resistance to all forms of institutionalized 
representation? 
 
These and many other germinal questions of fundamental law are treated differently in the 
three rival thought traditions of constitutionalist, revolutionary and relational constituent power 
which have succeeded in capturing the political imagination of much of the modern world. In 
the remainder of this introduction therefore, I shall respond to them by attempting to situate 
India in the global intellectual history of constituent power. I will argue that the Indian career 
of constituent power can neither be placed within the constitutionalist nor the revolutionary 
thought traditions, and instead proceed to interpret the early twentieth century Indic concept of 
swaraj or self-rule as a distinct local articulation of a less appreciated yet enormously 
influential relational concept of constituent power. While doing so however, the endeavour will 
be to move beyond the constricting debate between diffusionist universalism and exceptionalist 
particularism, and prepare the ground for distinguishing the Indian political from globally 
circulating constitutional paradigms in the rest of the thesis. 
 
India and constitutionalist constituent power 
 
Nehru’s reference to the great modern political revolutions and their constitution making 
legacies in the Indian Constituent Assembly was however conspicuously silent about the two 
conflicting interpretations of constitutionalist and revolutionary constituent power emerging in 
their aftermath. I would in fact argue that in spite of some attempts to the contrary, it is not 
possible to discuss India’s case strictly under either of these accounts which have dominated 
much of Euro American constitutional thought engaging with the concept in the last two and a 
half centuries. 
 
Constitutionalist interpretations of constituent power distinguish constitution making from 
ordinary law and politics, but owing to anxieties about authoritarian implications of command 
centric conceptions of popular sovereignty, conceive of it primarily as a normativist exercise 
in collective self legislation. Normativity here obtains from the semantic meaning of the Latin 
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expression constituere or to constitute, that is the ‘act of founding together, founding in concert, 
or creating jointly’.8 Even if constituent power cannot be juridically contained by ordinary 
legality, legitimacy none the less demands conformity with rational principles inherently 
associated with the concept such as reciprocity, deliberation, inclusion and participation, so 
that as Jurgen Habermas’s stipulates, citizens are able to recognize themselves not merely as 
addressees of the constitution, but also as its very authors. His highly influential co-originality 
thesis commends this course, for in it lies a possible reconciliation of seemingly contradictory 
ideas such as democracy and constitutionalism, popular sovereignty and human rights, and 
public and private autonomy.9 
 
Although not precisely in this form, a limited constituent power may actually be traced to Abbe 
Sieyes, its most well known exponent at the brink of the French Revolution. While highlighting 
the supremacy of the will of the Third Estate as nation over positive law, Sieyes qualified its 
operationalization by the circumscription of natural right, which in his scheme was above and 
prior to the nation.10 Furthermore, in what has been read as the bringing together of Rousseau 
on sovereignty and Montesquieu on separation of powers, his prioritization of constituent over 
constituted power went hand in hand with a preference for representative government. This 
meant that it could be exercised only by extraordinary representatives of the nation assembled 
in the Constituent Assembly and not otherwise.11 
 
The concept has received a similar treatment in most assessments of the American Revolution 
and its aftermath. In spite of being indisputably recognized as the locus of sovereignty, people 
have by and large been viewed here as wholly constitutionalized, either according to Federalists 
like James Madison in official constitutional conventions and the Article V formal amendment 
mechanism,12 or in Bruce Ackerman’s framework, exclusively in dramatic constitutional 
moments of higher law making, still subject to normative criteria of an institution oriented 
procedural democracy.13 These restrictions have led critics to charge that constitutionalist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Kalyvas, 2005: 235. 
9 Habermas (1996); Habermas (2001). 
10 'The nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin of everything. It's will is always legal. It is the law itself. 
Prior to the nation and above the nation, there is only natural law.' Sieyes, 2003 [1789]: 136. 
11 See Zweig (1909) cited in Kelly (2014). 
12 Madison (1788). 
13 Ackerman (1991); Ackerman (2000); Ackerman (2014). 
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readings of constituent power end up assimilating it to constituted power, as a result of which 
its revolutionary potential is severely curtailed.14 
 
Some attempts have been made to place India’s experience with constituent power in this 
constitutionalist style of thought, especially by scholars supportive of the basic structure 
doctrine. Dietrich Conrad, commonly acclaimed for being its most influential advocate, 
perceived original constituent power exercised by the Constituent Assembly in consonance 
with aforementioned normative principles and so justly attributable to the whole of the people, 
as a means to obviate revolutionary violence in the same way as derived amending power was 
devised so as to obviate an easy resort to constituent power.15 Such a convenient bifurcation 
continues to hold the field even today. It resonates with some recent works which seek to posit 
India as a dualist democracy by borrowing theoretical insights from Ackerman and other 
republican constitutionalists, mostly in the Anglo American world. Sarbani Sen’s celebratory 
narrative about a prior period of prolonged popular engagement with the anticolonial struggle 
culminating in the post-independence constitutional moment of reasoned deliberation and 
choice, comes across as a nuanced expression of original constituent power in Conrad’s 
sense.16 This has subsequently been supplemented by Sudhir Krishnaswamy’s endorsement of 
basic structure review as a legitimate interpretive limitation upon amending power, dedicated 
to the task of protecting the constitutional core from vagaries of passing legislative 
supermajorities. It is of course presented in such a way that the path to radical constitutional 
change by the people themselves cannot be hindered, provided they arrive upon it through 
democratic deliberation, as was supposedly the case in the Constituent Assembly.17 
 
I have two major disagreements with the way in which these accounts envisage the so called 
founding moment. First, if we go back to the question of origins, it would be noticed that 
constitution making in India was deeply imbricated in violence, a critical point which theorists 
of constitutionalist constituent power generally end up shielding from juridical enquiry by 
providing an entirely normative picture of the interaction between law and democracy. The 
constitution-violence interface could not remain concealed because political sovereignty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Carl Schmitt affirmatively quoted R. Redslob who remarked thus about Sieyesean constituent power in the 
French Revolution: '…the will of the people cannot be represented without democracy transforming itself into an 
aristocracy. Nonetheless, democracy was not at issue in 1789. It was, rather, a constitution of a liberal, bourgeois 
Rechsstaat.' Schmitt (2008/1928: 128-9). 
15 Conrad (1999: 88, 96, 99). 
16 Sen (2007). 
17 Krishnaswamy (2009). 
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acquired through colonial conquest, although supported by ideological justifications of 
improvement and protection of native society, always ran the risk of turning into outright 
domination whenever confronted by prospects of anticolonial resistance. Coupled with this, 
there were numerous indigenous registers of Indo Islamic violence which also impressed upon 
legal and political imagination of the period in subtle or obvious ways. Illustratively, the 
millennial forms of injustice sponsored by what B.R. Ambedkar referred to as the ‘lawless 
laws’ of the Hindu caste system characterizing the Indian social, insidiously threatened to 
engulf the political arena, since most protagonists leading the freedom movement were 
deploying an overarchingly spiritual and cultural vocabulary for their emancipatory 
imaginations. More apparently visible were the gruesome hostilities associated with the 
partition of British India, producing the largest ever mass migration and displacement in world 
history, with at least one million people being killed and another twelve to twenty million left 
to languish as refugees in the newly independent India and Pakistan. Finally, intensifying 
peasant and labour unrest in different parts of the country around the time of independence 
meant that the Constituent Assembly was very much interested in finding a constitutional 
solution to the spectre of insurgency haunting the unity and integrity of a nation state yet to be 
brought into existence. 
 
So if at all, the talk of constitutionalist constituent power might have sounded appealing only 
in a context where a normatively driven constitution making enterprise had already been 
preceded by the relegation of violence from within the body politic to its peripheral borders. 
While this was arguably true to an extent for European models of modern state formation, the 
kind of socio-political conditions which framed the work of constitution making in postcolonial 
India meant, as Aditya Nigam has shown, that the Constituent Assembly could hardly be 
regarded as a Habermasian terrain of rational-critical discourse committed to the establishment 
of a consensual single will.18 
 
The second reason for my discomfiture with constitutionalist constituent power in the Indian 
context is its construal by Conrad and others as a juridical category operating in lieu of 
revolution. We must remember here that it has usually been enunciated in order to counter the 
disruptive ideology of permanent revolution, and instead affirm an elitist rendering of a 
specifically Euro American historical sequence, where revolutionary upheavals of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Nigam (2004). 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were followed by normatively orientated projects of 
collective action, aimed at stabilizing their perceivably fragile achievements in constitutional 
form. But this sequence of events was not necessarily shared by constitutional experiences 
elsewhere in other time-spaces, not so especially by the mid twentieth century colonial setting 
of India gearing up for transition to a transformative postcolonial state and society. As is 
evident from Granville Austin’s important biography of the founding moment, a social 
revolution was less a cause and more the telos of the anticolonial movement, which the 
Constituent Assembly strove to inscribe in the letter and spirit of the new constitution.19 Or to 
draw upon Uday Singh Mehta’s insightful observation, unlike the classical bourgeois 
revolutions of the West producing a largely preservative constitutional imagination of their 
own, in India, more than the struggle for liberation from colonial rule, it was through the 
performative act of constitution making that a fundamental break was first inaugurated by 
unlocking India from the waiting room of historical time.20 
 
Hence, for a ruptural moment of such a magnitude, constitutionalist constituent power does not 
serve as an appropriate referent. Even if its normative dimension could have been ignored to 
bring into sharper focus the crucial element of original violence discussed earlier, republican 
India’s constitutional founding and post-founding cannot be analogized to a chronological 
distinction between higher and ordinary law making temporalities respectively. 
 
India and revolutionary constituent power 
 
References to original violence and fundamental break in the previous section may lead one to 
surmise that constitution making in India can perhaps be better contextualized within 
revolutionary interpretations of constituent power. Here constituent power is not only 
categorically distinguished from constituted power, but is more importantly also accorded 
absolute priority over established constitutional forms and their normative prescriptions. 
This is no doubt a variegated thought tradition, but there have been few clearer articulations of 
its driving force besides the prescient distinction drawn by Maximillion Robespierre between 
revolutionary government and constitutional government. According to Robespierre, the goal 
of the former was to establish and not merely to conserve the republic, as was the case with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Austin (1966). 
20 Mehta, US (2010B). The nationalist abolition of the imaginary ‘waiting room of history’ metaphor is drawn 
from Dipesh Chakrabarty. Chakrabarty (2000: 8-9). 
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latter. So, contrary to a constitutionalist government predominantly interested in protecting 
individuals from abuses of public power, in a revolutionary government, public power was 
obliged to defend itself from factions and dangers seeking its dissolution from within or 
without. To use his famous words, it was ‘the despotism of liberty over tyranny’ aimed at 
nothing less than ‘the salvation of the people’.21 Such a valorization of revolution has been read 
as a concretized expression of Rousseau’s metaphysical general will, wherein an 
unrepresentable people asserting real sovereignty has little patience for institutional limitations 
of a mixed constitution and a contestatory citizenry vigilantly controlling public power.22 
 
With time, many divergent conceptions of revolutionary constituent power emerged in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to counter the hegemony of bourgeois liberal 
constitutionalism and the tame apolitical culture associated with it. They have ranged in 
antistatist thinking mostly affiliated to the left, from Karl Marx’s espousal of a proletarian 
dictatorship committed to abolishing the capitalist system and its constitutive social classes,23 
to Antonio Negri’s championing of the boundless creative strength of the multitude as absolute 
process.24 Among communist and conservative revolutionary perspectives tethered to the 
modern state form, I may point respectively to Vladimir Lenin’s presentation of the Soviet 
Bolshevik Party in a vanguard role vis-à-vis workers and peasants,25 and Carl Schmitt’s 
enthusiastic nomination of the Reich President as bearer of people’s constituent power in 
Weimar Germany.26 
 
The common concern uniting different political enterprises inspired by these positions is to 
ascertain who should hold public power, rather than ruminating over the specific form it ought 
to take. Constituted authority is either disregarded altogether or viewed sceptically as a hurdle 
on the path to emancipation. As a result, revolutionary constituent power has in turn been held 
responsible for contributing significantly to devastations wrought by episodes such as the 
Jacobin reign of terror, Stalinist purges and Nazi holocaust.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Robespierre (1794) cited in Jennings (2011: 10). 
22 For the Rousseau inspired voluntarist drive to unity in French constitutional thought and practice, see 
Rosanvallon (2006: 79-116). 
23 Marx (1977/1843). 
24 Negri (1999/1992). 
25 Lenin (1917). 
26 Schmitt (2008/1928); Schmitt (2004/1932); Schmitt (2005/1922). 
27 Hannah Arendt therefore understood a successful revolution as one which also sought to enact a new 
constitution: '[O]nly where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning ... to bring about the formation of a 
 16 
An emergent elitist consensus in favour of democratic constitutionalism at the time of 
constitution making in post-independence India meant that no talk of an antilegal revolution 
could have actually taken centre stage. But trappings of a revolutionary rhetoric were 
unavoidable for a national leadership committed to government sponsored growth and 
development, and compelled by circumstances of colonial and indigenous exploitation to 
privilege social transformation over bourgeois liberal rights in case of any conflict between the 
two. Without getting embroiled in the difficult task of laying out its precise parameters, I wish 
to argue however that this transformative constitutional project cannot be affiliated to the 
revolutionary tradition of constituent power mainly for two reasons. 
 
First, my reference to the founding moment as a fundamental break in the previous section 
should not lead us to ignore its pervasive continuities with the colonial past. Contrary to what 
one might come to expect from a total revolution, the Constitution of India did not do away 
entirely with the hitherto operational British legal system. In fact, it retained all prevailing laws 
in force thus far, and left the question of their validity to be ascertained by the wisdom of future 
authorities.28 I am aware that a complete juridical disjuncture from the previous regime may 
be placing too high a definitional demand upon political revolutions, for they need not 
necessarily be interested in altering existing private law arrangements dealing with civic 
obligations in a given society.29 But India’s lack of fit with revolutionary constituent power is 
attributable more basically to the colonial lineages of its positive public law framework 
regulating the government. Instead of beginning on a clean slate, its Constituent Assembly 
largely chose to retain and improvise upon already existing legislative, administrative and 
judicial apparatuses of rule that had been gradually institutionalized over several decades by 
the British through various constitutional enactments and measures ultimately traceable to 
London.30 
 
This is not to suggest that constitution making in India was not a momentous occasion, or that 
the only thing it helped accomplish was a transfer of political power from colonial elites to 
their native counterparts. All I want to convey, by adapting a Schmittian distinction, is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we speak 
of revolution.' Arendt (2006/1963: 25). 
28 Art. 372, Constitution of India, 1950. 
29 Loughlin (2004: 2, fn. 5). 
30 B.R. Ambedkar, who was the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly, acknowledged 
that some two hundred and fifty clauses had been directly incorporated into the Constitution from the previous 
Government of India Act, 1935. Cited in Mukherjee (2010: 203). 
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India’s transition to democracy was undoubtedly brought about by the annihilation of the 
colonial constitution of state, but without a simultaneous elimination of its constitution of 
government.31 While on one hand, the colonial state was resented with varying degrees of 
vehemence in nationalist thought for having historically suppressed the people’s constituent 
voice, whereas on the other, there was also a mostly unabiding respect for its modes of 
governance, which were only partially modified and redeployed in the constitutional pursuit of 
social transformation. As a result, two apparently antithetical logics of break and continuity 
with the colonial past had to be adopted as equally crucial and mutually reinforcing elements 
under the new Constitution.32 
 
A second related reason disconnecting India from revolutionary constituent power was the 
absence of an uncontentiously recognized collective constitutional subject capable of 
expressing a unified will of the people as a whole. In order to grasp this point, we must look 
beyond a triumphal nationalist narrative about the freedom struggle’s stagist progression from 
roughly the establishment of Indian National Congress in 1885, followed by programmatic 
disagreements over methods and goals between moderates and extremists in its early decades, 
which were later synthesized harmoniously under Gandhi’s mass based leadership, culminating 
finally in complete independence and an unanimously endorsed republican constitution. What 
such an iteration sought to conceal intentionally or otherwise, was a socio political climate 
characterized at every juncture of its evolution by deep-seated constitutive divisions in terms 
of religion, caste, class and so on, implying thus that conflict and exclusion had to be as integral 
facets of the constitution making exercise as were consensus and accommodation. 
 
Among the many competing constituent possibilities emerging in this period, some no doubt 
found a home in the newly created state of Pakistan, whose complicated intellectual history I 
do not intend to engage with in this project. But as far as India was concerned, the national 
bourgeoisie now at the helm of an interventionist governmental regime, strove to acquire 
control over those which remained unrealized or were to germinate in future, a phenomenon 
which has been theorized in the Antonio Gramsci inspired subaltern scholarship of Ranajit 
Guha, Sudipta Kaviraj and Partha Chatterjee either as a dominance without hegemony or a 
passive revolution.33 For Guha, dominance of postcolonial elites could not be translated into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Schmitt (2008/1928: 140-146). 
32 Dasgupta (2014). 
33 Guha (1997); Kaviraj (1988); Chatterjee (1986). 
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overall hegemony because, as evidenced by the continuation of rule through coercion more 
than persuasion, they were unable to bridge the gap separating their particular class interests 
from the general interest of society at large. Even if force gave way to consent at least virtually 
if not effectively with India’s transition to a democratic state form, Kaviraj and Chatterjee 
associate it with transformism rather than expansive hegemony in Gramsci’s sense. That is, 
under conditions of passive revolution prevalent here, national elites endeavoured to integrate 
the masses merely through a system of absorption and neutralization, as opposed to the creation 
of an active and direct consensus on the basis of a popular mobilization and a genuine adoption 
of their interests while enacting the constitution in the name of the people.34 
 
India and relational constituent power 
 
That India’s constitutional experience cannot be adequately captured through constitutionalist 
or revolutionary accounts of constituent power should not surprise, given its historical 
specificity as a postcolonial democracy. But the general sway of normative thought in 
constitutional theory across the world is such that much of the celebratory scholarship on this 
subject is simply contented by and has yet not been able to look beyond conveniently placing 
India in the club of modern liberal constitutionalism. What is more, those who critique the 
Constitution or at least some of its provisions, do so primarily for lacking or possessing a liberal 
character which is otherwise commonly taken to be an integral feature of the constitutional 
form. Even the relatively new postcolonial version of political decisionism retains this 
touchstone, albeit as an oppositional anchor while drawing a sharp binary distinction between 
liberal norms and democratic exceptions, with the former rendered open enough to being 
departed from if necessitated by the latter, but never to be fundamentally altered or abandoned. 
Owing to this widely prevalent tendency to proceed with a priori theoretical suppositions, it 
has not been possible to undertake a non-ideological investigation of India’s founding 
constitutional precepts in their own conceptual terms. In order to prepare the ground for such 
an exercise, we must turn our attention to theorizing constitutional practices by appreciating 
their distinct circumstances of evolution in proper context, rather than merely reinterpreting 
them in the light of deductively derived ideal type theoretical models. Therefore, my enquiry 
on the nature of Indian constituent power cannot remain confined to tracing resonances and 
dissonances with constitutionalist and revolutionary thought traditions, and will instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For the Gramscian distinction between transformism and expansive hegemony, see Mouffe (1979: 182). 
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commence by examining the Indic expression swaraj or self rule, which served as its most 
hegemonic conceptual signifier after being revived and considerably improvised upon during 
the freedom movement. 
 
Even if the concept of constituent power may have rarely been invoked explicitly in and around 
the Assembly, I wish to argue that its work of representing the most democratic conviction of 
the modern age, which being that the ultimate source of legitimate authority in a political 
system resided in the people, was performed by swaraj. As the ligature of two morphemes—
swa and raj, meaning self and rule respectively, swaraj came to be recognized as a potent 
symbol of the emerging aspiration for home rule from the turn of the twentieth century. But 
unlike other new indigenous coinages of the period for republic or democracy such as 
ganatantra or lokatantra, it pre-existed British rule by a long duration and could in fact be 
traced to India’s ancient Vedantic literature. In modern times, it was first drawn upon politically 
by the moderate leader Dadabhai Naoroji at the 1906 Calcutta Congress, although Shyamji 
Krishnavarma, the radical nationalist, pointed out that the term had been used much earlier as 
titles of two weekly Anglo vernacular papers published from Bombay.35 It then became the 
clarion cry of extremists such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Aurobindo Ghose, and under 
Gandhi, the chief cornerstone of anticolonial politics until independence and the making of the 
Constitution.36 
 
In spite of its central importance to the constitutional imagination of a free India, my attempt 
at drawing a connection between swaraj and constituent power may meet with two possible 
objections. First, it may be argued that swaraj essentially encapsulated the national desire for 
liberation from the British, and not that of freedom to co-institute constitutional arrangements 
for government and society, a feature necessary for any conceptualization of constituent power. 
Second, sovereignty is key to constituent power, with constitution making seen as carried out 
by a people unhindered by legislative and even constitutional restraints, whereas swaraj 
entailed a principle of nonsovereignty, given its fashioning of the self not only as the subject 
of rule but more importantly, also as its very object. Let me deal with these objections, and 
establish a conceptual equivalence between the two at least in so far as both can be shown to 
speak to collective self constitution, while remaining mindful of the fact that notwithstanding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Naoroji (1906); Krishnavarma (1907: 11). 
36 Gandhi’s most famous political tract is itself entitled ‘Hind Swaraj’ or ‘Indian Home Rule’. See Gandhi (1909). 
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this point of intersection, swaraj could at once be concerned with more and less than what 
constituent power encompassed. 
 
We cannot deny that swaraj was usually invoked during the anticolonial movement in 
discussions pertaining to the nature of desired constitutional relations with the British, that is 
in debates about the pros and cons of greater autonomy, dominion status and complete 
independence. But as is clear from wide ranging discussions around imperial legislations 
dealing with colonial government, and multiple indigenous constitutional proposals made from 
time to time, this struggle was not about achieving liberation from foreign rule alone, but also 
extended to the generation of constituent power appropriate for the new postcolonial state 
form.37 That swaraj also alluded to the realization of internal freedom is further corroborated 
by a closer look at its etymological antecedents. The original Vedantic expression svarajya is 
actually an abstract noun which refers not just to self rule, but relatedly along with it to a state 
of svarat or self luminosity. Specifically with respect to British colonialism, swaraj helped 
produce a non-liberal or anti-liberal politics of collective selfhood, while at the same time 
serving as the guide-post for different imaginations of a free and enlightened constitutional 
state to be actualized in future.38 
 
Approaching swaraj in terms of internal freedom takes us to the principle of nonsovereignty, 
which supplies the second possible objection to its equation with constituent power. We may 
in fact notice that swaraj is an ambiguous expression, with self rule simultaneously capable of 
bearing two meanings—rule of the self, and rule over the self. While the former, that is the self 
conceived as subject of rule was in sync with modern sovereignty, the latter, that is the self as 
object of rule appeared to have little to do with it, particularly so in Gandhi’s exemplary fidelity 
to those governmental technologies of the self which were creatively fashioned by him to 
negotiate with the depredations of modern civilization.39 But this ethical interpretation of the 
concept was not necessarily antipolitical, and in fact resonated with interpretations of 
sovereignty in relational accounts of constituent power in the Euro American public law 
tradition, even if constitutionalist and revolutionary constituent power were not comparable 
enough reference points for reasons highlighted above. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Mantena (2016: 297-316). 
38 For swaraj and the non-liberal or anti-liberal politics of selfhood, see Kapila (2007: 109-127). 
39 Godrej (2017: 894-922). 
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Sovereignty here is understood not as a property possessed by an absolutist or populist agent 
and exercised from on high, but rather as a preeminent political relationship established among 
the rulers and the ruled, consequently upon a symbolic representation of the people as vested 
with constituent power.40 Swaraj can in this sense be read as supplying a conceptual frame for 
constituent power in the Indian context, with its ambiguous nature analogizable to the 
irresolvable paradox of constituent power involving the reflexive constitution both by and of a 
collective selfhood.41 When invoked to refer to the rule of the self, it gestured to the constitution 
of a legal order by a political unity, that is to the authority acquired by the Constituent 
Assembly to enact a positive constitutional document in the name of the people at the time of 
independence. However more fundamentally, as connoted by the rule over the self dimension 
of swaraj, this was accompanied by the notionally prior constitution of India as a political unity 
in consonance with the fundamental law of rajadharma, approximately translatable into droit 
politique, jus politicum, political right and other similar European variations of public law. 
 
The primacy of rajadharma in nationalist imagination can be gleaned from these remarks of 
Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, the famous philosopher and second President of India: ‘Dharma, 
righteousness, is the king of kings. … It is the ruler of both the people and the rulers themselves. 
It is the sovereignty of the law which we have asserted.’42 That such a sovereignty of law was 
political in nature and thus not identical to the constitutionalist notion of rule of law, was made 
even more evident by Radhakrishnan explaining its meaning and significance on another 
occasion through imperial and theological imageries of the Buddhist dhammachakra or wheel 
of law popularized by the ancient ruler Asoka and the sanatan dharma or eternal religion of 
Vedantic Hinduism:  
 
‘The Ashoka’s wheel represents to us the wheel of the Law, the wheel of the Dharma. 
Truth can be gained only by the pursuit of the path of Dharma, by the practise of virtue. 
It also tells us that Dharma is something which is perpetually moving. … . This wheel, 
which is a rotating thing, indicates to us that there is death in stagnation. There is life 
in movement. Our Dharma is Sanatana, eternal, not in the sense that it is a fixed deposit 
but in the sense that it is perpetually changing. Its uninterrupted continuity is the 
Sanatana character.’43 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Loughlin (2015: 1-25); Lefort (1988: 213-255); Ricoeur (1960: 196-207). 
41 Lindahl (2008: 9-24). 
42 Radhakrishnan (CADs, Vol. II: 20 January 1947).  
43 Radhakrishnan (1947) cited in Rao (1966: Vol I, 504). 
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However, as I enter India’s postcolonial constitutional field and investigate the constitutive 
conditions of possibility producing the symbolic centrality of swaraj for the new political 
community, what strikes me immediately is that the fundamental law of dharma is not easily 
graftable onto some of the key categorical distinctions between the theological and the secular, 
the private and the public, and the social and the political, which have been so critical to the 
foundations of modern Euro American public law and its global circulation. The foundation 
and augmentation of the constitutional order in independent India has not necessarily been 
accompanied by a concomitant depoliticization of the theological, the private and the social, a 
phenomenon which would come across as threatening to compromise the very autonomy of 
the political in standard Western accounts of relational constituent power. Its survival as a 
sovereign democratic republic even after seventy years of not conforming with some pregiven 
global constitutional script may either be read as an aberration or oddity, or as a successful 
model worthy of emulation in the global South as well as in the global North, especially in the 
contemporary period when the different conceptual building blocks of modern public law are 
separated from one another only by wavering lines and fuzzy boundaries. I shall pursue neither 
of these two options, and instead highlight the ruptures of the Indian political from the global 
model of relational constituent power, primarily with a view to bring its own internal 
contradictions into sharper focus. Radhakrishnan’s observations on dharma after all, were 
indicative of a nationalist attempt at subsuming and sublating what was its rival, conflicting 
and irreconcilable ethical lifeworld of non-nationalist dhamma.44 It is this intellectual 
antagonism between the hegemony of dharma and the counter hegemony of dhamma that my 
thesis will explicate by engaging with the modern career of constituent power in colonial and 
postcolonial India. 
 
Thesis outline 
 
The thesis will situate the modern Indian political in, and distinguish its own inner 
contradictions from the Euro American and global thought tradition of relational constituent 
power in the next five chapters. Each chapter will take up one pair of apparently oppositional 
concepts associated with the collective self institution of society, the determination of its 
normative point of joint action, and the identification of an authoritative agent for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This miscasting of dhamma as dharma is also noted by Ranajit Guha quoting from D.D. Kosambi’s work on 
the cultural history of ancient India. Guha (1997: 35); Kosambi (1972: 165). 
 23 
articulation, monitoring and enforcement of this normative point. These pairs include the 
tension between an inside and an outside, law and subjectivity, universalistic homogeneity and 
particularistic heterogeneity, functionalist duties and normativist rights, and reason of state and 
public reason. Apart from their open, provisional and dynamic reconciliation in influential 
accounts of relational constituent power, the Indian experience is characterized by another 
more fundamental irreconciliation that no constituted authority has been able to tame or defuse 
completely. 
 
In chapter one, I will show how this antagonism was manifested in the philosophical history of 
the Indian political in two conflicting understandings of fundamental law, originarily 
associated either with the inner domain of the domestic householder, or with the outer domain 
of the wandering ascetic. 
 
Chapter two will turn to the intellectual exchange between Gandhi and Ambedkar during the 
anticolonial national movement, and pull out from their constitutional debate two concepts of 
swaraj anchored in competing social and political conceptions of law and subjectivity, 
premised upon the negative externality of the colonial legal order on the one hand, and the 
Hindu caste order on the other. 
 
I will next move to the making of the collective constitutional subject in chapter three, and 
establish that the divergent views on minority entitlements in colonial India leading up to the 
institutionalization of affirmative action on grounds of backwardness in postcolonial India 
were in fact attributable to two contrasting ideas of national sovereignty based on social 
familiality and political contract. 
 
Chapter four will then intellectualize the postcolonial project of transformative 
constitutionalism elaborated in Parts III and IV of the Constitution, and contend that its 
endeavour to arrange sovereignty and governmentality as well as democracy and 
constitutionalism in a more manageable relationship had to grapple with two irresolvably 
incompatible discourses of social duties and political rights, not only at the founding moment 
but also in the contemporary age of populist reason. 
 
Finally in chapter five, I will return to the judiciary once again, and by connecting the basic 
structure doctrine to the constitutional jurisprudence on public interest litigation, caste and 
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religion, bring out how the Supreme Court’s legitimacy as an agent of constituent power has 
been dependent on its ability to deploy two strikingly different justificatory logics of social 
reason associated with the positive theology of being, and political reason associated with the 
negative theology of becoming, which is reducible neither to being nor to non-being. 
 
The conclusion will bring these conflicting elements together to argue that the autonomy of the 
Indian political is equally threatened by the hegemony of both antagonistic languages of 
fundamental law, and make a case for imagining the people and the constitution as empty 
signifiers of its sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
THE PLACE OF LAW IN THE INDIAN POLITICAL 
  
Introduction 
 
The legal imagination of postcolonial India has undisputedly been fashioned around the 
primacy of public law over private law, much more so than is the case in most other 
constitutional societies in the world today. Its republican constitution of 1950 has inaugurated 
an unprecedented era of political absolutism, in which apart from the procedural checks and 
balances of modern constitutionalism, there are potentially no substantive limits on the ever 
increasing politicization of different facets of extant social life.45  
 
Over the years, two contrasting intellectual positions have emerged on the precise relationship 
between public law and politics in the eventful career of India’s constitutional enterprise. While 
on the one hand, normativist thinkers treat the formal constitution as an aspect of applied moral 
philosophy, and seek to promote and strengthen the rule of law ideal in order to tame 
unregulated ordinary politics,46 decisionist thinkers on the other hand harp upon the material 
constitution envisaged as an empirical arena of competitive politics, where law is simply 
treated as an instrument of coercion and domination in service of ruling ideologies.47 
Notwithstanding their other divergences however, both of these perspectives commonly 
construe politics in narrow terms as an activity pertaining to the sharing and distribution of 
power understood as a monopoly over the legitimate exercise of force,48 and the constitutional 
text and its official and nonofficial interpretations as objective articulations of supreme positive 
law.49 
 
When approached in this manner, public law and politics can only be thought of as belonging 
to two entirely separate domains which are mutually incompatible and struggling for 
supremacy with one another. What gets neglected as a consequence of focusing excessively on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Mehta, US (2010B: 23-27). 
46 See for example, Khosla (2012); Krishnaswamy (2009). 
47 See Chatterjee (2011A); Chatterjee (2004). 
48 The point is famously associated with Max Weber. See Weber (1946: 26-45). 
49 Constitutional judicial review is traceable to the landmark United States case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1803). 
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the legal regulation of politics is a more foundational concept of the political, which gestures 
to the collective self institution of society as a whole,  where law is neither equated with norm 
nor reduced to decision, but is rather viewed in a fundamental sense as being constitutive of 
the imaginary field of symbolic power from which all ordinary and extraordinary constitutional 
actions derive their very meaning.50 
 
Although the discipline of Indian constitutional studies has produced its fair share of 
normativist and decisionist scholarship like anywhere else in the modern world, much less 
attention has been devoted over here to the institutional approach to law, which is the only 
legal theory that requires a thorough appreciation of the workings of the political.51 The Indian 
political itself has hardly been engaged with in a sustained manner, perhaps because the 
postcolonial constitutional regime does not share some of the most essential features marking 
the European experience of the political, which have unavoidably served as influential 
signposts in the global journey of the concept thus far. Unlike many Western countries where 
the political was premised upon modern state sovereignty and its subsequent transition into 
governmentality, the establishment of colonial governmentality in India long preceded the 
acquisition of a rather unstable, insecure and deeply contentious national sovereignty, where 
the state does not even possess the monopoly over violence and has to share this most sovereign 
of all entitlements with other powerful forces in society. In other words, conflict has been at 
the heart of the postcolonial constitution of state, and therefore cannot be left exclusively upon 
its constitution of government to manage, as is arguably possible today in the European context. 
Nevertheless, these differences must not lead us to jettison the concept of the political 
altogether; the dissensus underpinning its formation, deformation and reformation must instead 
be examined carefully so as to come up with a fresh reconstruction of India’s constitutional 
enterprise. 
 
This dissensus is expressed not only in violence and politics, but has also been articulated in 
debates about the meaning of fundamental law governing the generation and acquisition of 
political authority, above, within and besides the constitution.52 India’s moment of arrival into 
the postcolonial was in fact marked by an irreconcilable conflict between two radically 
antagonistic concepts of law, jostling for hegemony in the project of fashioning a new 
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collective constitutional subjectivity. There existed over here a dormant precolonial 
constitutional tradition marked by the autonomy of the political from the social, which was 
disrupted by colonial rule and waiting to be revived through the prioritization of the concept 
of political law. However, it was up against the concept of social law which had made a strong 
case for capturing the space of the political in the name of a vibrant social sphere activated 
afresh during the anticolonial movement.  One can notice an obvious preference for the latter 
approach, strictly going by the original intention of those party to a fragile post-partition 
nationalist consensus in the country. Yet no seemingly definitive response could durably 
colonize the whole of the political, without at the same time damaging the very conditions of 
its own possibility. Therefore, to the extent that this founding problematic of the first order 
Indian political continues to remain relevant even today, no intellectual study of the 
constitutional project can afford to ignore the second order constitutive antinomy between 
social law and political law, and the philosophical history underpinning its development at 
every stage.53 
 
I shall commence my thesis on the intellectual career of constituent power in colonial and 
postcolonial India by bringing together in this first chapter the legal, historical and 
philosophical scholarship on the two conflicting concepts of fundamental law into a coherent 
narrative about their place in the Indian political. The chapter is divided into three sections. 
Section one will conceptualize the Indian political by contrasting its distinctive trajectory of 
development with the widely circulating twentieth century debate on the European concept of 
the political. My argument will be that unlike the most influential European renditions of the 
concept, the inside-outside distinction constitutive of the constitutional order in precolonial 
India was internal and symbolic rather than external and real, and thus produced an 
ineliminable fundamental antagonism between two languages of social law and political law 
associated with the different cultures of theological sovereignty in Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Islam. In section two, I will move to the period of British colonialism, and respond to the 
diverging views of postcolonial theorists and legal pluralists on the nature of colonial law, by 
borrowing insights from the general jurisprudence of law as a species of authorized collective 
action. The objective will be to show how colonial rule sought to depoliticize the Indian 
political through the institutionalization of a liberal constitutionalism premised upon a 
relationship of abstract estrangement between the colonizer and the colonized. Finally, section 
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three will theorize the changing indigenous attitudes towards the colonial constitutional 
paradigm, ranging from an initial acceptance and domestication at least among the elite 
intelligentsia in the first half of the nineteenth century, followed by scepticism and subsequent 
rejection, coupled with a politics of collective selfhood from its second half onwards. This turn 
to repoliticization will be explained by drawing short sketches from the constitutional thought 
of Raja Rammohan Roy, Swami Vivekananda and Jawaharlal Nehru. With the eventual 
reoccupation of the space of the political however, my suggestion will be that the focus must 
shift now to the investigation of its own unresolved inner contradictions. 
 
1   The Indian political and its two concepts of fundamental law  
 
In an important essay, Samuel Moyn has carefully distinguished between two alternative 
approaches to thinking about the concept of the political in twentieth century Europe, broadly 
associated with the intellectual imagination of Carl Schmitt and Claude Lefort.54 Briefly put, 
the European debate on the political was focused on the signification involved in breaking 
away from the transcendental theological to a largely immanent mode of constitutional thought 
triggered by post-enlightenment processes of secularization, modernization and 
democratization. For Schmitt on the one hand, even if this may have resulted in the replacement 
of god or king by the people as a new constituent subject, there was no concomitant change to 
the theologically inspired structure of constituent power. A distinctly identifiable entity of the 
demos remained in charge of a normatively unrestrained sovereignty through its representation 
in a presidential dictator.55 Lefort on the other hand, read into the new political a more profound 
rupture in the symbolic order of representation itself. According to him, modern democracies 
had brought about an opening up of the symbolic centre of society by construing power as an 
empty place, incapable of being substantialized in any entity—divine, princely or popular.56 
Furthermore, while both Schmitt and Lefort understood that the political was inconceivable 
without some distinction between an inside and an outside, they diverged from one another 
over whether it was to be defined in real or in symbolic terms. In Schmitt’s account, the political 
emerged as a precondition of the modern state form, and became a contrastive autonomous 
domain separable from morality, economics and aesthetics, based on potentially intensive 
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nationalist feelings of friendship for one’s own and enmity for the other.57 Many who 
subscribed to Schmitt’s thrust on the primacy of the political, gradually improvised upon or 
completely rejected most or all of its features, given the problematic consequences of his 
temporary Nazi affiliation.58 Moving beyond this fruitful yet troubling legacy, a rival tradition 
of French thought lead by Lefort alternatively interpreted it as a phenomenon deemed 
foundational to all aspects of social life, and not just the governmental sphere of everyday 
partisan politics alone. Such a comprehensive understanding of the political, gesturing to 
principles generating different forms of society from ancient to contemporary times, could 
make do with symbolic externality for constitutive purposes, and thereby render the need for 
real enmity entirely redundant.59 
 
These two theoretical positions may have proved invaluable in capturing the distinctiveness of 
the European experience, but it is not clear how they can be unreflexively extended to other 
political societies elsewhere in the world, whose pathways of being and becoming do not 
necessarily match the one described herein above. I would like to suggest that when decoupled 
from European historical specificities, what still remains relevant of the political in a 
generalized sense under global conditions of modern secular democracy is the vanishing 
mythology of transcendental sovereignty and the inside-outside distinction. However, these 
ingredients are not easily graftable in their exact European or global form onto the markedly 
different background conditions in which the Indian political can be said to have originated. 
Although the idea of a transcendental order in precolonial India may well have resonated with 
premodern European imagination, it did not have an equivalent institutional locus of 
theological sovereignty, akin to what the church and state had fought to occupy in the famed 
religious wars of medieval Europe. Rather, the more fundamental conflict in India was between 
two altogether different modalities of sovereignty, one of which was oriented to the inner 
domain of the domestic householder, and the other to the outer domain of the wandering 
ascetic. As a result, the constitutive distinction between the inside and the outside was internal 
to India’s own political society, and could not be sufficiently externalized even after the 
establishment of nation state sovereignty in the country. This has produced over here an 
irreconcilable antagonism between the two symbolic lifeworlds of social law and political law, 
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whose conceptual entailments I shall now proceed to elucidate, in the historical context of their 
emergence and development up until the colonial period. 
 
1.1  Dharma, dhamma, niti 
 
The legal culture of ancient and medieval India has most commonly been understood as an 
exemplary instantiation of a distinctly social constitutional paradigm. Its chaotic pluriverse of 
human and nonhuman life was presented in classical Hindu thought as an immanent expression 
of an eternally existing transcendental cosmos, which was meant to be governed in accordance 
with what can be referred to as the social law of dharma. The term dharma was derived from 
the Sanskritic root 'dhr', meaning ‘to support’, ‘to hold’, ‘to nourish', and alluded to a 
transcendental order that was sustained by norms of proper behavioural conduct, sourced from 
Vedic srutis and smritis, sadachar or good conduct of the cultured elite, and the customary 
laws of temporally and geographically dispersed communities.60 These norms sought to 
organize society on the basis of different logics of inclusion and exclusion, and were 
theologically believed to be determined by the varna or class and asrama or stage of life to 
which a person belonged. 
 
According to the Brahminical mythology espoused in the Manusmriti, the most well known 
legal treatise of the Dharmasastra tradition, four ideal type social classes or castes emanated 
from the sacrificial dismemberment of the primordial cosmic man purusa, and assumed their 
respective svadharma or own duties from the place they occupied in the divinely sanctioned 
hierarchy.61 This purusa gave birth to Brahmin priests and teachers from his mouth, Kshatriya 
rulers and nobles from his arms, Vaisya farmers and merchants from his thighs, and Sudra 
servants and labourers from his feet. Atisudra untouchables were assigned the most scorned 
occupations connected with death, products from dead animals and trash, along with other 
forms of unskilled labour, and deemed so low and polluted that they did not even find a position 
in the caste hierarchy. Finally there was the category of mlecchas or barbarian foreigners, who 
were completely outside the juridical purview of the caste order, unless conquered and brought 
within its fold at the lowest rungs of society.62 
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This caste order was to be preserved and maintained by a coalitional arrangement among its 
upper echelons, with the rulers in particular required to follow their rajadharma, that is the 
‘law(s) for kings’ or the ‘Whole Duty of the king’, pertaining to war and punishment, protection 
of subjects and creatures, and enforcement of dharma of all the other social segments.63 But 
although rajadharma may have defined the duties of a king as per his Kshatriya varna in 
classical Hinduism (second to sixth century AD), its intellectual antecedents traceable to the 
Vedic period (fifteenth to sixth century BC) takes us to the concept of dharma understood in a 
more fundamental sense as satrasya ksatram, that is the ‘ruling power of the ruling power’, or 
the cosmic power behind royal power. In the Vedic period in fact, dharma as a category had 
little significance in social life, apart from its association with royal rituals such as the royal 
consecration (rajasuya) and the horse sacrifice (asvamedha), and royal guardianship of the 
moral order. What made dharma’s transformation from a marginal regal to a general social 
concept possible, was its Buddhist ethicization in the Pali language as the political law of 
dhamma, which subsequently went on to assume a central place in the Mauryan ruler Asoka’s 
imperial theology in the third century BC. 
 
Dhamma was invoked by the Buddha in its originary sense as political law along with other 
royal symbols as the key legitimizing principle of his new ascetic religion.64 The Buddha was 
born as Siddhartha Gautama, himself an heir apparent to the throne of the Sakya kingdom, who 
renounced familial and regal life to set out in quest as a wandering mendicant, and famously 
attained enlightenment at the age of thirty five. In spite of having given up on kingship, he was 
now portrayed as the world conquering universal emperor propagating the new truth in the 
language of dhamma, with his very first sermon recorded as the Dhammacakkappavattana 
Sutta, or the Sutra that set the ‘wheel of law’ in motion. With this Buddhist appropriation 
therefore, dhamma became an ethical signifier of a good and righteous life lived in consonance 
with the truth discovered by ‘the enlightened one’. 
 
It was during Asoka’s reign that dhamma was popularized as an integral feature of imperial 
theology, after his conversion to Buddhism in the wake of the bloody battle of Kalinga in 262 
BC. Rather than the hierarchical arrangement of society on the basis of the subjective status of 
varna, his royal edicts gestured to an alternative social ordering grounded in a twofold 
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horizontal spatial distinction between the pravrajitas who had wandered forth from home to 
the homeless state, and the grhasthas who opted to stay at home, while belonging to and 
following the tenets of their respective pasandas or communities.65 Four major pasandas 
mentioned by name were the Brahmanas, the Buddhists, the Jains and the Ajivikas, all of which 
were in turn composed of both ascetics as well as householders. While Asoka disparaged the 
ritualism of domestic householders, he not only patronized various ascetic institutions but also 
sought to draw legitimacy from them, with an undeniable partiality for the Buddhist Sangha. 
His prioritization of an ascetic mode of life, especially by downgrading if not abolishing animal 
sacrifice altogether, curtailed the exceptional status of the Brahmanas as custodians of the ritual 
economy of the royal function in Hindu theological imagination, and in effect brought them at 
par with other Sramana communities in the realm.66 
 
With the decline of Buddhism as a political religion however, Brahminical Hinduism returned 
to the fore once again, gave up on the primacy of Vedic ritual sacrifices, and reconceptualized 
dharma as social law in consonance with its householder centric lifeworld. The prioritization 
of grhastha over pravasti was accomplished not by disavowing asceticism altogether, but by 
domesticating it into the asrama system of the four life-stages of the Vedic student, the married 
householder, the forest hermit and the wandering mendicant.67 In this way, the alternative 
pathways of religious life available in society came to be fused into a singular temporal 
sequence, premised upon the normative superiority of the married householder brought about 
by the supplementation of the major sanskaras or rites of passage with the ritualization of 
normal daily family life as a whole.68 What is more, to the extent that the four asramas were 
only open to the first three varnas who were known as the dvijas or the twice born after their 
initiation into Vedic learning, this system effectively reinstated the supremacy of the Brahmin 
in coalition with the other upper castes, and relegated the Sudras, Atisudras and other heretical 
pasandas to the margins of society.69 
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There were no further fundamental challenges to the primacy of dharma in the language of 
political law and sovereignty from within a purely Indic imagination in the post-Buddhist 
period. But it did encounter another competitor in the form of a rival rajaniti tradition, 
concerned not so much with the preservation and maintenance of a transcendental cosmic 
order, and more with the immanent politics and policy of statecraft and governmentality. As is 
evident from Kautilya’s Arthasastra, the most famous treatise of this genre composed in around 
the first century BC, the niti tradition was not as interested in the soteriological question of the 
king’s salvation, as it was in the material question of consolidating and expanding his worldly 
rule.70 Arthasastra’s ambivalence towards theological sovereignty however, left open the 
possibility of its subsequent integration into the dharma tradition during the classical age of 
Brahminical Hinduism, extending up to the reign of the Gupta empire from the fourth to the 
sixth centuries AD.71 Later on, from around the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries, niti is shown 
to have broken free from the logic of dharma and become relatively autonomous once again, 
particularly so in the vernacularized political milieu of the Kakatiya and Vijayanagara 
kingdoms of the South.72 
 
1.2  Shariah, fiqh, siyasah 
 
It is easy to work with the presupposition that this complicated culture of conflict and 
contestation was radically altered under Muslim rule from the thirteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries, given the Islamicate emphasis on a monotheistic imagination of theological 
sovereignty much like in premodern Europe. However, precolonial Islam shared with Indic 
religions much more so than its Judaeo-Christian cousins elsewhere, the absence of an 
established church representing the sovereignty of God on earth, and supplying to imperial and 
kingly monarchs a model worth replicating or breaking away from. So instead of the struggle 
to occupy the space of sovereignty, its legal culture of shari’ah was bifurcated into two 
competing articulations of fiqh and siyasah, which can in fact be broadly mapped onto the 
irreconcilable distinction between social law and political law in Hinduism and Buddhism. 
Fiqh was the juristic enterprise of understanding divine law through an exegetical interpretation 
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of the Qur’an, Hadiths and so on, which gradually came to be superseded by siyasah, where 
the rulers themselves made laws (kanun) for their subjects in consonance with higher 
theologico philosophical principles of justice (adl) and welfare (maslahah).73 The siyasah 
tradition came to India during the reign of the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal empire set up 
successively in 1206 and 1526, most noticeably through Nasir-al-Din Tusi’s Akhlaq-I Nasiri 
(thirteenth century AD), authored first whilst in service of a heretical Isma’ili ruler of Northern 
Iran and finally completed at the court of the pagan Mongol conqueror Hulegu Khan. Tusi’s 
work was then adapted and ingeniously deployed in an Indian setting by Muslim monarchs to 
normatively govern an overwhelmingly large body of zimmi and kafir subjects who did not 
belong to the fold of Islam.74 
 
Following the ascendancy of siyasah, the fuqaha or jurists of the doctrinal shari’ah came to be 
displaced by ascetical mystics from the various Sufi orders as the criteria of legitimacy for 
Muslim rulers in India. The more powerful emperors in fact, went on to internalize this 
legitimacy unto themselves by sacralising their sovereignty in the manner of Sufi saints and 
holy saviours, as was best exemplified in Akbar’s (r. 1556-1605) portrayal of himself as the 
messianic ‘millennial sovereign’, who was supposed to usher in a new temporality of peace 
and justice (Sulh-I kul) at the turn of Islam’s first millennium. Inviting accusations of heresy 
from the orthodox intelligentsia, Akbar instituted a devotional order of imperial discipleship 
known as Din-I Ilahi or the Divine Religion, and thus fashioned himself both as a material lord 
as well as a spiritual guide to all his subjects regardless of caste, creed, religion and ethnicity.75 
Consequently, there emerged in India a political culture of constitutional neutrality in which 
the sovereign ruler could remain Muslim only in a nondenominational sense. In 1857, this is 
precisely what encouraged rebel sepoys of the British Indian Army, cutting across otherwise 
ineffaceable religious and regional divides, to see the last Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar 
(r. 1837-1857) as vested with enormous de jure power, even though actual de facto authority 
at his command was virtually non-existent.76 So at least ninety years before the 
institutionalization of adult franchize democracy in the post-independence constitution, 
sovereignty here was conveniently being imagined as akin to an empty place of power. But the 
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replacement of the figure of the monarch at its symbolic centre by that of the people would 
have to wait until the arrival and departure of an alien colonizer. 
 
2   Colonial depoliticization of the Indian political 
 
We may argue whether a decisive break from the extant Mughal state form was made 
immediately after the British victory in the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and the subsequent grant 
of diwani in 1765, with the Cornwallis reforms of 1793, the Charter Acts of 1813 and 1833, or 
only when Queen Victoria at last formally assumed charge as Empress of India in 1858. But 
there is little doubt that a markedly distinct regime of modern governmentality was stutteringly 
put in place since the initial years of East India Company rule itself, although the chief guiding 
motivations then were largely commercial and military in nature. 
 
To be sure, colonial governmentality could never envelop the whole of society, or require a 
complete overhaul of social law at any stage of development, even as they were both 
increasingly being recast in order to cater to colonial priorities. However, the pervasive 
presence of a primitive social law was used as justification for a more decisively antipolitical 
project of hollowing the premodern crown, and denying its claim to sovereign power in respect 
of making legislative enactments.77 While the authoritarian and arbitrary dimensions of 
political law were conveniently read in consonance with occidental mythology about oriental 
despotism,78 its ethical components were curiously translated into moral tales applicable to all 
and prescribed for study in school curricula.79 As a result of these orientalist moves, a long and 
complicated history of frequent struggles for supremacy between dharma and dhamma, 
shari’ah and siyasah, was sought to be reduced to one unalterably defined by the primacy of 
the social, and a concomitant absence of an autonomous political. It is this depoliticization of 
the Indian political that I now explain, by responding to an intellectual disagreement between 
postcolonial theorists and legal pluralists over the role of law in establishing and furthering 
colonial rule. 
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2.1  Postcolonial theory versus legal pluralism 
 
Notwithstanding the immensity of violence involved in its foundation and maintenance, 
colonial domination was couched in the rhetoric of rule of law, and presented as a corrective 
antidote to primitivism and despotism assumed to be characterizing an oriental society like 
precolonial India. Hence the role of law in propelling the British to a position of paramountcy 
has generated considerable scholarly curiosity over the years. Broadly speaking, two opposing 
positions on the subject are in circulation at present: the first approaches colonial rule through 
a norm-exception dialectic open to the withholding of ordinary laws if the task of subordination 
so required, while the second stresses upon a vibrant culture of legal pluralism playing out 
under conditions of imperial sovereignty. 
 
Many theorists and historians who identify themselves either with subaltern or postcolonial 
studies often draw a contrast between metropolitan norms of natural and positive law, and their 
temporary or permanent suspension in multiple zones of colonial exceptionality. They readily 
admit that a modern legal order was indeed introduced in India by the British, but go on to 
show how its formation was continuously shaped by colonial concerns regarding the regulation 
of a seemingly immature, inscrutable and heterogeneous subject population, and the 
management and suppression of anticolonial resistance. To deal with such troublesome 
matters, various innovative techniques and modalities were deployed by administrators and 
judges which had no comparable precedents in the metropole, and were in fact even exported 
there from colonial fields whenever required. These included but were not limited to the 
following: the ‘rule of colonial difference’ motivating the setting up of separate legal practices 
and procedures for British and native subjects based exclusively on a racial marker, and 
thereafter becoming integral to the physical and systemic infliction of ‘white violence’;80 the 
policy of ‘define and rule’ essentializing individuals and groups for governmental purposes 
according to fixed and enumerable criteria of race, religion, caste and tribe;81 and the colonial 
‘jurisprudence of emergency’ mediating the tension between the government’s prerogative to 
exercise force and its commitment to an established legal order through the manoeuvre of 
suspending the rule of law.82 
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All of these critical formulations are in different ways indebted to Ranajit Guha’s instructive 
theorization of colonial autocracy as a ‘dominance without hegemony’, or in other words as 
one where the element of coercion far outweighed that of persuasion.83 Guha noticed that the 
ruling bourgeoisie certainly attempted to portray the newly instituted order as grounded in 
consent rather than conquest, by presenting its own sectional interests as general interests of 
its Indian subjects. But this façade gave way under colonial conditions of a truncated liberal 
universalism, and a relentless socio-economic and epistemic exploitation of the masses. 
Governmental practices here remained imbricated in an irresistible extraterritorial urge for 
capitalist expansion and reproduction. All that they could contribute to under the 
circumstances, was the further exacerbation of unequal relations of domination and 
subordination existing between the rulers and the ruled, as well as those prevalent within 
society at large. 
 
In an orthodox Marxian vein, Guha construed law purely as an epiphenomenal aspect of 
colonial expropriation.84 He made the structuralist claim that along with other trappings of alien 
and indigenous elite cultures, the massive infrastructure of laws put in place over a span of two 
centuries rarely ever had a meaningful impact on an autonomous domain of subaltern agency. 
Thus whenever threatened by local insurrections, there was nothing to prevent the bourgeois 
aspiration for hegemony laid out in an inefficacious legal order from turning into outright 
domination. That is, no lofty claim to political legitimacy could conceal this bare fact that its 
foremost objective always remained the protection of the colonial state’s acquired sovereignty 
in India. 
 
While the norm-exception framework is critiqued by liberal political philosophers in general, 
its use in the study of colonial law has eminently been challenged by the Lauren Benton 
initiated legal pluralism approach towards imperial sovereignty.85 As a comparative legal 
historian of modern world empires, Benton attributed the growing appeal of this analytical 
framework to the unitary model of state sovereignty which became globally ascendant only in 
the late nineteenth century, and argued against its easy extension to older historical time-
spaces. According to her, in the early modern period in fact, a spatially elastic and territorially 
unbound notion of imperial sovereignty was more widely prevalent, where exceptional zones 
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of normlessness were practically inconceivable. It was largely in metropolitan high theory 
discourses that a contrast came to be drawn between European normative legality and non-
European lawless externality. On the ground however, imperial sovereignty was elaborated 
through divided, shared and layered systems of jurisdictional authority, which rendered the 
search for exceptionality a largely futile enterprise. Far from offering us a top down ruling 
regime that resorted to law only as a tactical instrument of command and control, she contended 
that it actually spawned and oversaw a pluralistic culture of legal contests among officials, 
subjects and conquered populations, spread across differentiated, fragmented and uneven 
colonial territories. This therefore implied that the tension between norms and exceptions was 
not what drove legal and political developments under conditions of imperial sovereignty. 
Rather, more active here were competitions between myriad articulations of a multiplicity of 
laws which remained obdurately present even after their purported formal suspension by 
government.86 
 
In making her case for adopting an imperial sovereignty approach, Benton specifically 
disapproved Guha’s repudiation of E.P. Thompson’s celebration of the rule of law as a ‘cultural 
achievement of universal significance’.87 Even as Guha was willing to concede the centrality 
of this bourgeois ideology to the building of a metropolitan state hegemony, he refused to 
countenance the possibility of it having ever been materialized in colonial India for reasons 
briefly alluded to herein above. In order to counter his position, Benton fruitfully combined 
poststructuralist insights on identity and difference with a Thompsonian reading of law as 
custom. This enabled her to think about the rule of law not as a reified ideological concept but 
a dynamic contingent construct, one which was continuously shaped by complexities of 
interactional legal politics constituting imperial sovereignty. Working with such an 
understanding, she strove to sketch a convincing picture of different interpenetrating grids of 
mutually recognizable laws in action coming together in British India and other colonial spaces. 
It was only with the growing influence of modern state sovereignty that these variegated 
practices and the pluralistic legal cultures within which they were embedded, came to be 
haltingly and incompletely superseded around the late nineteenth century.88 
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Benton productively deployed a practice centric methodology to bring out various pluralistic 
facets of imperial legal cultures that had hitherto remained underexplored. What had possibly 
caused this neglect was a simplistic reduction of their complicated histories to the norm-
exception dialectic. Particularly with respect to British India, she showed how state law had 
for a considerably long period coexisted and intersected here with a multiplicity of 
complementary and competing forms of non-state law. By doing so, she was able to offer a 
crucial corrective to Guha’s narrowly defined statist legal positivism, which could not envisage 
people’s law formations as law proper unless backed by sponsorship of the colonial state.89 
This polychromatic past mapped so competently by her, has in fact still not been completely 
wiped out from postcolonial India’s legal landscape even after seventy years of functioning 
under nation state sovereignty. Its traces can most noticeably be observed today, in an officially 
sanctioned regime of separate personal family laws for different religious communities.90 
 
But I would like to argue that the detailed nuances and refinements supplied to colonial law by 
Benton, should not lead us to infer that imperial sovereignty was operationalized as a spatially 
unlimited concept. A boundary distinction between the inside and the outside was as integral 
to its workings as to any other form of law understood as authoritative collective action. Such 
a distinction came to be institutionalized under a colonial liberal constitutionalism premised 
upon a relationship of abstract estrangement between the colonizer and the colonized, which 
in effect paved the way for the thorough depoliticization of the Indian political. 
 
2.2  Abstract estrangement 
 
For moving beyond the unresolvable impasse between norm-exception and legal pluralism 
approaches towards the study of colonial law, let me draw upon Hans Lindahl’s stimulating 
general theory of legal order as a first-person plural concept. Very briefly, according to Lindahl, 
no concrete legal unity is imaginable in the absence of boundaries, limits and fault lines within 
which the who, what, when and where dimensions of human behaviour come to be normatively 
regulated.91 The distinction between domestic and foreign legal spaces that Benton and others 
have done much to decentre in their historical investigations, is for Lindahl only a contingent 
feature associated with the modern territorial state. It is rather a derivative instantiation of a 
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more fundamental distinction between inside and outside, which remains a necessary element 
in the constitution of all legal orders in general. By combining insights from analytical 
philosophies of collective intentionality and phenomenology of the alien or strange, he 
perceptively suggests that this inside-outside distinction is primordially manifested in a divide 
between familiar spaces which a legal collective can call its own, and strange indeterminate 
spaces of a-legality which are discontinuous with its order of legality and illegality. In other 
words, without reference to a closure separating the own inside from the strange outside, it is 
not possible to envisage an open order of (il)legality where the normative point of joint action 
could then be realized.92 
 
What all of this implies for British India both under Company as well as Crown rule, is that 
even if imperial sovereignty might not have insisted on a strict geographical bifurcation of 
territories into metropolitan and colonial spaces, an intrinsic distinction between own and 
strange spaces was nevertheless critical to the workings of the colonial state all throughout its 
extensive career. A domain of the own, comprising official and non-official Britons along with 
their native collaborators, came together here in a colonial civil society, which sought to govern 
over, but was at the same time cordoned off from a radically diverse indigenous society of 
strangers made up of people belonging to different aristocratic lineages, religions, castes, tribes, 
genders and so on. There was certainly an enormous variation in forms of colonial law, but this 
does not take away from the underlying logic of ownness and estrangement giving it concrete 
shape as a legal unity. 
 
To be sure, the idea of including the own and excluding the strange from social and political 
collectivities was by no means unknown to India’s precolonial juridical imagination. But the 
various techniques and strategies deployed for this purpose were imbricated in concrete 
relations of familiarity and unfamiliarity among the rulers and the ruled, reflected either in a 
face-to-face reciprocity or an ethical compact envisaging India as an empire of social 
distinctions. What distinguished British rule in my opinion, was that governmental relations 
between state and society came to be defined under its jurisdiction by a novel phenomenon of 
abstract estrangement. We may debate as to whether this was causally produced by the anxious 
search for semantic coherence in a colonial project of dominating an incomprehensible alien 
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population,93 or could instead be sourced to socially mediating abstractions of liberal capitalism 
germinating in the metropole itself in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.94 
Nevertheless, there is consensus on at least this point that it was for the first time that proximity 
and distance understood in a physical sense gave way to an estrangement which was more 
reflexive and conceptual in nature. 
 
The transition from concrete ownness to abstract estrangement in India’s symbolic constitution 
had begun under Company rule from the mid eighteenth century onwards, as can be gaged 
from Ghulam Hussain Tabatabai’s 1788 historical work Sair al-Mutakkhirin. Tabatabai 
metaphorically described the treatment of Bengal’s populous by British officials as ‘pictures 
set against a wall’, that is as static objects available for detached governmental scrutiny from a 
position of externality.95 The process of transition was complete by 1858, with Queen Victoria 
being proclaimed Empress of India after a brutal suppression of the 1857 military rebellion. 
 
In an important essay, Bernard Cohn has vividly portrayed how this transition was brought 
about by departing from a sacral notion of monarchy, and its replacement with one heuristically 
grounded in a European style social contract.96 According to Cohn, loyal imperial subjects high 
enough in rank and status were in an earlier period symbolically incorporated into bodies of 
Mughal sovereigns and other Indian rulers through reciprocal acts of prestation and present 
giving, signifying loyalty and lordship respectively. There was then an intimate albeit 
hierarchical bond of affection between these subjects and the person of the monarch, who not 
only outranked but could at the same time also encompass everyone under his rule. When the 
British took over, Cohn observed that this relationship was radically altered, with older ritual 
idioms of incorporation being reinvented and redeployed merely as contractualist forms of 
economic exchange. It remained hierarchical as before, but was now governed by two distinct 
colonial sociologies of feudalism and community interests, which were in turn mediated by 
abstract conceptions of labour, rent and property unknown to concrete intersubjective 
intertwinements of precolonial India. As a result, what were previously regarded as thick 
ethical obligations of the rulers and the ruled towards their common realm, now came to be 
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conceived as thin contractual promises relating to the preservation of life, liberty and property, 
in return for explicit or implicit native consent to colonial occupation. 
 
2.3  Colonial liberal constitutionalism 
 
The governmental operationalization of this new public culture of abstract estrangement did 
not necessarily have to be oriented to an antinormative project of suppressing colonial 
exceptionality at every possible occasion. Ordinarily in fact, it was institutionalized in a 
modern regime of liberal constitutionalism, with distinct interventionist and noninterventionist 
variations developed specifically for the purpose of governing a heterogeneous colonial 
society. 
 
Although a strict periodization is not possible here, we may still roughly say that the early 
nineteenth century saw the emergence of a relatively active government which pursued a 
civilizing mission of improvement by intruding in society’s internal affairs on grounds of 
utilitarian or evangelical principles.97 This aggressive posture towards tradition was given up 
after the events of 1857, in favour of a more indirect form of colonial rule through indigenous 
institutions with the discovery of a new ‘alibi of empire’, that being the protection of society 
from destructive consequences of an unregulated modernity.98 Subsequently, around the 
beginning of the twentieth century, an improvement oriented governmental attitude was 
revived once again in response to the rising tide of anticolonial nationalism, as could be 
discerned from the incremental expansion of franchise and the enactment of other progressive 
legislations. 
 
Such inner divergences notwithstanding, the three phases in the colonial constitution of society 
were united in their normative preference for the rational, adult, bourgeois individual, whose 
inevitable arrival on the stage of universal history was taken for granted. A major question 
separating them instead pertained to how this liberal constitutional subject was to be 
specifically anticipated. While interventionists like Bentham and the Mills espoused an 
indefinite period of enlightened hypermasculine despotism to create conditions for eventual 
self government,99 noninterventionists such as Maine left this project of transition to be sorted 
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out by social processes on their own without government interference, through a gradual 
evolution from customary relations of status to modern relations of contract.100 
 
Which one among these two ordering criteria came to be selected in a particular situation would 
no doubt have been determined by strategic and circumstantial necessities confronting the 
ruling regime at that moment.101 Yet although both of them were instrumental in sustaining a 
highly exploitative governmental relationship for nearly two centuries, I must at least point out 
that British colonial domination in India had never been juridically committed to the 
assimilation or annihilation of indigenous strangeness, as was the case with many other 
European colonial adventures elsewhere.102 To this extent, colonial liberal constitutionalism 
may be read adapting Lindahl’s formulation as institutionalized exercises in collective self 
restraint while responding to a strong dimension of a-legality challenging the practical 
possibilities of British India as a (il)legal unity.103 
 
If there was nothing more to add to liberal constitutionalism under conditions of colonial 
estrangement, it would have at best been only an alternative version of the archetypal modern 
form of the metropolitan constitutional state. Both certainly shared a common abstract 
constitutional language, articulating individual or group based principles of a liberal public 
culture. However, one substantial distinction separating the two begins to surface if we go back 
to the concept of the exception, which remains an ineliminable feature of all modern ruling 
regimes, be it the imperial, the metropolitan or the colonial, even if not going on to supply to 
them their very essence. 
 
Crucial here is not the more familiar who decided upon the exception question, but rather in 
respect of whom it was actually exercised. Metropolitan constitutional jurisdictions generally 
witnessed exceptions being made to ordinary normative legality in the name of a sovereign 
political unity of their own people taken as a whole. But as we have seen already, regardless 
of whether British India is construed today as a colonial or imperial constitutional setting, the 
sphere of the own comprised only a small civil society, and excluded a much larger multitude 
of indigenous strangers from its associational purview. This therefore implied that the resort to 
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exceptional powers in such a case could not move beyond a narrow concern for preserving and 
stabilizing imperial-colonial rule threatened by insurrectionary outbreaks, and simultaneously 
cover a wider field of salus populi or people’s health, safety, welfare, salvation and so on, 
which had remained a chief guiding precept informing the (il)legal and a-legal workings of the 
modern European state. 
 
In other words, my contention is that exceptions did not invite attention to India’s own political 
unity as the source of governmental authority, but merely alluded to British domination as 
being ultimately founded on an originary act of conquest. Thus as a consequence of colonial 
occupation that was concealed by a liberal constitutionalism based on rights and obligations of 
strangers, and revealed more clearly in exercises of exceptional prerogatives in relation to 
them, the pre-existing precolonial space of the Indian political was thoroughly depoliticized. 
Its revival and democratization had to wait for the emergence of an anticolonial movement, to 
which I turn in the next and final section of this chapter. 
 
3   Anticolonial repoliticization of the Indian political 
 
British colonialism in India expectedly generated a flurry of indigenous responses across 
different time-spaces, ranging from the uncritically adulatory to the outrightly hostile. While 
some subjectivities welcomed it for opening up many new roads to escape millennial forms of 
traditional civilizational injustice, others who noticed its oppressive operationalization from 
close quarters remained wary of all emancipatory promises made in order to justify alien 
domination. But here I wish to move beyond sectional particularities and their varied 
experiences of the beneficial and destructive aspects associated with colonial rule, and focus 
instead on how they received its depoliticization of the Indian political as a collective unity. 
Although a plurality of voices could be heard in this regard as well, these claimed to transcend 
specificities of ordinary partisan politics, and could be read as expressive of different attitudes 
towards a foundational and more holistic first order concept of the political, understood as a 
project pertaining to the collective self constitution of society and the field of symbolic power 
surrounding it. 
 
Pursuing such a unified approach, we may be able to trace at least two distinct stages to the 
indigenous reception of colonial depoliticization, beginning with its affirmative domestication 
in the former half of the nineteenth century, followed by a counter repoliticization in the latter. 
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Subsequently, it was the repoliticization of the Indian political which created the conditions of 
possibility for collective freedom, and eventually paved the way for formal independence and 
a republican constitution in the mid twentieth century. Let me elaborate upon this journey 
towards repoliticization by providing some vignettes from the constitutional thought of Raja 
Rammohan Roy, Swami Vivekananda and Jawaharlal Nehru. 
 
3.1  Rammohan’s domestication of colonial depoliticization 
 
The unprecedented transformations wrought by colonial modernity discussed in the previous 
section were not restricted to the sphere of government alone, but also began to reconfigure 
indigenous social life from the early nineteenth century. We should remember that in the 
precolonial period, most Indic languages unsurprisingly lacked an expression denoting the 
modern concept of society as a whole, and there was no perceptible need for one either. The 
traditional social order was viewed as a cumulative amalgamation of different fuzzy 
unenumerated communities, with each one of them being referred to as a separate samaj 
(society) in their own right. But as was the fate of older coinages in post-enlightenment Europe, 
the semantic range of this Sanskrit term was considerably altered and expanded in nineteenth 
century India so as to be made into an interchangeable equivalent for society as an abstract 
field of mutual cooperation among all its participants.104 
 
A variety of indigenous civil social associations sprang up over here, organized for the first 
time on contractual principles, and devoted to the modernist pursuit of rational, scientific, 
economic and reformative enterprises. What distinguished at least this formative stage, was a 
genuine desire of the elite intelligentsia who set up such associations, to belong to an emerging 
colonial civil society as equal members alongside nonofficial European and Eurasian 
counterparts. In order to realize their aspirations, they did not hesitate to collaborate with these 
foreigners to demand from the Company administration a climate of free trade and free public 
debate, which could hopefully contribute to the creation of an open public sphere unmarked by 
criteria of race or nationality. 
 
This trend was best exemplified in Raja Rammohan Roy (1774-1833), the pioneering socio 
religious reformer, publicist, and India’s first global thinker of liberalism. Although 
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Rammohan began his intellectual career by engaging with Islamic and Brahmanical theological 
debates, and acquired proficiency in European enlightenment ideas only later on, he finished 
as an inaugural figure of sorts, marking a decisive shift from being a late Mughal official to a 
fervent champion of liberal constitutionalism on a global scale.105 His liberal constitutionalism 
was not defined by a negative concern for absence of coercion, but entailed an espousal of civic 
republican virtues and a mixed constitutional government without necessarily giving up on 
popular monarchy. Consequently, he was a vocal supporter of contemporary constitutional 
revolutions in Iberia, Latin America and France, as well as of legislations for parliamentary 
reform in Britain. 
 
Rammohan domesticated European discourses on checks and balances and separation of 
powers by translating them in the language of Hindu mythology to make a case for the 
regeneration of India’s moribund ancient constitution.106 This constitution had come about at 
an early age of civilization, when the ‘arbitrary and despotic’ rule of Rajput Kshatriyas was 
ended by way of a violent rebellion under the leadership of the mythical Brahmin hero 
Parashurama, who avenged his father’s murder at their hands by defeating the royalists and 
cruelly putting to death almost all male members of that caste. Henceforth according to 
Rammohan, a kind of caste based division of powers was established, with Brahmins and 
Rajputs exercising ‘legislative authority’ and ‘executive authority’ respectively, resulting in 
India enjoying many centuries of ‘peace and harmony’. But once again, an ‘ absolute form of 
government’ gradually began to prevail two thousand years later, as Brahmins abandoned their 
legislative function and started hankering for executive offices. They thereby became entirely 
dependent on Rajputs, who now exercised the whole of legislative and executive power all by 
themselves for a thousand years. This ‘tyranny and oppression’ of hundreds of petty princes 
detested by their respective subjects, made it possible for destructive Muslim invaders to 
conquer a divided country and introduce their own system of tyrannical government. Although 
Rammohan did entertain a hope of future quiet and happiness with the British takeover of 
imperial power, he blamed the Company for perpetuating despotism by allowing for the 
consolidation of executive and judicial authority in a single office of the revenue collector. But 
believing in the providential nature of British rule, he desisted from calling for a representative 
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government at the local level, or the early separation of India from the empire, two causes 
which only a minority of radical voices were interested in discussing at this stage. 
 
The ideal constitutional arrangement for India in Rammohan’s scheme, included an imperial 
parliament with indigenous representation acting as its legislative guardian, working alongside 
a company government playing the role of its executive protector. Both in effect took up 
positions which were respectively held by Brahmins and Kshatriyas in the ancient 
constitution.107 This was to be supplemented by Indian participation in local juries, and the 
operation of a free press dedicated to the public expansion of knowledge in civil society and 
the scrutiny of governmental conduct.108 So he did seek to envisage an Indian public after all, 
or at least one in the making, but although supposedly bearing distinctively liberal 
characteristics, it was largely disinclined from engaging with political questions of collective 
selfhood and collective freedom for the time being. 
 
3.2  Vivekananda’s theologization of collective selfhood 
 
However as discussed in the previous section, the pervasive presence of racial discrimination 
in colonial civil society, often even manifesting in violent action, meant that far from 
recognition of Indian subjects as equal citizens of empire, there was a more fundamental failure 
to exercise self restraint whilst negotiating with an undoubtedly ineradicable distinction 
between the own and the strange. This in turn produced a counter response of disidentification 
with colonial rule, leading eventually to the repoliticization of the Indian political from the late 
nineteenth century onwards. 
 
When approached from a first person plural perspective of emerging indigenous subjectivities, 
the depoliticized colonial state- civil society is what appeared as a strange inaccessible space, 
in contrast with an own space of a revived Indian political under conception. The idea of 
repoliticization though, did not cohere well enough with a dominant conception of society as 
an abstract field for mutual cooperation among strangers, which had thus far characterized the 
colonial regime of liberal constitutionalism. Nor could there be a simple reversion to an 
autochthonous fantasy of a primordial social order with its fuzzy sense of community 
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allegiance, as this was being rendered increasingly unrealizable under conditions of an 
inescapable modernity. What made the Indian political possible in my opinion, was a society 
conceived as a field of collective intentionality, providing space for the performative enactment 
of different notions of constitutional identity as collective selfhood.109 That such collective 
voices were undeniably modern in outlook, could be discerned from their novel regard for 
reflexivity in imaginations of the people as a political unity.110 As was the case with European 
discourses of constituent power, this feature then became an essential precondition for 
subsequent exercises of collective freedom in India, resulting in  formal liberation from British 
rule in 1947 and a republican constitution in 1950. 
 
There are many elite and popular examples which help explain this transition from liberalist or 
indigenist forms of society to a society understood as an expression of collective selfhood. To 
illustrate my point, I draw upon the Hindu ascetic icon Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), 
whose political theology approach gestured to the imminent oncoming of people’s sovereignty 
more emphatically than most others in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
Vivekananda is recognized globally for being at the forefront of Hinduism’s transformation 
into a world religion, and specifically for his idealist reconstruction of Advaita (non-dualist) 
Vedanta by extending its application to a newly germinating modern social sphere in India.111 
During the high noon of colonialism, a Hinduism sanitized of all perceived impurities was in 
general being considered a progenitor of Hegelian idealism. This was more so the case with 
the eighth century sage Adi Sankaracharrya’s advaita, for its monistic insight that the 
illusionary diversity of the phenomenal world merely cloaked the transcendental, unchanging 
and undifferentiated reality of the noumenal world, that is in essence, atman or individual self 
was the same as Brahman or divine godhead. Vivekananda’s revised neo Vedanta converted 
the erstwhile immediacy of such a relationship of identity between the individual and the divine 
into an immanent abstraction, which was now reflected in the mediating institution of society 
as a collective unity. The individual’s existence here, was inconceivable independently of 
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111 For Vivekananda’s role in transforming Hinduism into a world religion, see Bayly (2014); on the conceptual 
structure of late nineteenth century indigenous nationalism, see Sartori (2008: 136-175). 
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society as a whole, with social work coming to be regarded as the highest form of self 
realization in his intellectual imagination.112 
 
Vivekananda’s preoccupation with the social whole made him speak about the disappearance 
of vain and sleeping gods, and their replacement by the substantialist all encompassing figure 
of Virat as the embodiment of theological sovereignty, and the only God awake and worthy of 
worship. His Virat though was nothing other than the collective unity of the people themselves:  
 
'This is the only God that is awake, our own race, everywhere His hands, everywhere 
His feet, everywhere His ears, He covers everything. All other Gods are sleeping. What 
vain Gods shall we go after and yet cannot worship the God that we see all around us, 
the Virat?...These are all our Gods, — men and animals, and the first Gods we have to 
worship, instead of being jealous of each other and fighting each other.’113 
 
These innovations were a far cry from Vivekananda’s preceptor, the charismatic mystic 
Ramakrishna Paramhansa’s (1836-1886) ecstatic love and mad longing for Kali as a personal 
goddess, and disdain for charity and philanthropy undertaken arrogantly or hubristically as 
potential forms of worldly attachment.114 Yet in spite of having remoulded Hinduism into a 
scientific and rational religion more commensurable with its modern Semitic counterparts in 
the West, the Vivekananda moment cannot be read simply as a particular episode in a 
universalizing story of the European political. We must not forget that the immanent monism 
of Advaita Vedanta was rather at odds with transcendental underpinnings of sovereignty in 
both Schmitt and Lefort discussed in section two. However, far from ushering in an age of 
depoliticization as was perceivably the case with Europe’s movement from transcendence to 
immanence in the nineteenth century, it would not be an exaggeration to state that Vivekananda 
in fact turned out to be inaugural for the anticolonial Indian political in many respects. The 
image of a renouncer working dedicatedly for collective social well being, captivated future 
nationalists and non-nationalists alike, especially under conditions of colonial subordination 
and even subsequently thereafter.115 
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115 On the Vivekananda moment and the Indian political, see Banerjee (2014: 323-339). 
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3.3  Nehru’s secularization of popular sovereignty 
 
This is not to suggest that the return of theological sovereignty took away from the ruptural 
nature of secularization, modernization and democratization in India. It was neither possible 
under the new circumstances to institutionalize a hierarchical constitutional order exclusively 
on the basis of caste, nor could anyone think of enthroning a descendant of the deposed last 
Mughal emperor on the seat of sovereignty in Delhi. But I believe that even if the detailed 
contents of precolonial constitutional discourses may no longer be of much relevance, their 
structural features as conflicting concepts of fundamental law have continued to shape the 
formation, deformation and reformation of the Indian political at every juncture of its 
development. 
 
That sovereignty could not be decoupled from the theological context within which it was 
historically and philosophically nested, can best be grasped from the thinking of as modern and 
secular a statesman-politician as Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), India’s charismatic first Prime 
Minister and a chief protagonist of the founding moment. In spite of his personal atheism, 
Nehru did express an intellectual appreciation for the nondualistic monism of Advaita Vedanta, 
even though he confessed not to have understood it in all its depth and intricacy.116 He 
proceeded to secularize an immanentist theological sovereignty in a manner akin to the 
modernist rendition of Advaita Vedanta by famously casting the people in the substantialist 
image of Bharat Mata or Mother India:  
 
‘Sometimes as I reached a gathering, a great roar of welcome would greet me: Bharat 
Mata ki Jai—'Victory to Mother India.’ I would ask them unexpectedly what they meant 
by that cry, who was this Bharat Mata, Mother India, whose victory they wanted? … . 
The mountains and the rivers of India, and the forests and the broad fields, which gave 
us food, were all dear to us, but what counted ultimately were the people of India, 
people like them and me, who were spread out all over this vast land. Bharat Mata, 
Mother India, was essentially these millions of people, and victory to her meant victory 
to these people. You are parts of this Bharat Mata, I told them, you are in a manner 
yourselves Bharat Mata, and as this idea slowly soaked into their brains, their eyes 
would light up as if they had made a great discovery.’117 
 
From the whole of India’s ancient and medieval past, Nehru was attracted most to the 
monarchical figures of Asoka and Akbar, not only because they could be portrayed as secular 
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icons of toleration and pluralism, but also because of their association with the establishment 
of vast, expansive and lasting regimes of imperial sovereignty which he aspired to nationalize 
under his leadership in postcolonial India.118 While no distinctly Indo-Islamic symbols of 
sovereignty were incorporated into the new state form after the partial externalization of the 
Muslim question with the creation of Pakistan, the Buddhist Dhammachakra or ‘Wheel of 
Law’ was placed at the centre of the Indian political, both in its national flag called the Tiranga 
or Tricolour, as well as its national emblem which was an adaptation of the Asokan Lion 
Capital at Sarnath, with the additional inscription of the Hindu Upanisadic motto Satyameva 
Jayate or the ‘Truth alone triumphs’. This selection was no doubt inspired by Nehru, who saw 
in the Asokan symbology a convenient way for modern India to connect with its venerable 
ancient culture and build towards a prosperous future free from conflict:  
 
'[W]hat type of wheel should we have? Our minds went back to many wheels but 
notably our famous wheel, which had appeared in many places and which all of us have 
seen, the one at the top of the Asoka column and in many other places. … . For my part, 
I am exceedingly happy that we have associated with our flag not only this emblem but 
in a sense the name of Asoka, one of the most magnificent names in India’s history and 
the world. It is well that at this moment of strife, conflict, and intolerance, our minds 
should go back towards what India stood for in the ancient days and what, I hope and 
believe, it has essentially stood for throughout the ages in spite of mistakes and errors 
and degradations from time to time.’119 
  
While simultaneously resorting to Vedantic Hinduism and Asokan Buddhism, Nehru however 
quietly passed over the irreconcilable antagonism between their respective symbolic languages 
of fundamental law. Such may have been the case since nationalist constituent power was just 
like modern Vedanta an integrative enterprise, which sought to unify all the disparate sections 
of society into a singular collective, in the same manner as Vivekananda had attempted to bring 
together the different schools of dualism, qualified monism and non-dualism into the universal 
religion of Advaita Vedanta and its abstract immanent monism.120 But although nationalist 
thought was only following a trajectory familiar from the mainstream of Hindu intellectual 
history in aspiring to appropriate or domesticate Buddhism and other heterodox imaginations, 
this could not ensure the elimination or externalization of a dissensus which has in fact 
remained internal to and constitutive of the Indian political itself. The conflict though is not 
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sectarian but comprehensive in nature, whose conceptual entailments will further be 
investigated in the rest of the thesis by engaging with the career of constituent power in colonial 
and postcolonial India. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued in this chapter about the fundamental incompatibility between two concepts of 
social law and political law, originarily associated with the rival symbolic languages of Hindu 
dharma and Buddhist dhamma respectively. Their irreconcilability can be attributed to a 
germinal spatial distinction between the inside and the outside, which has in fact been internal 
to the constitution of the Indian political for much of its philosophical history, including even 
the Indo-Islamicate period and the distinction between fiqh and siyasah within the legal culture 
of shari’ah. Its depoliticization by British colonial rulers coincided with the externalization of 
this distinction into one between their own civil society and a society of indigenous strangers. 
The subsequent repoliticization of the Indian political in turn involved a complete inversion of 
the two categories, with the own inside of anticolonial nationalism now up against the strange 
outside of colonial liberal constitutionalism. As the space of the political was being reoccupied 
however, the inner contradictions of India’s own constitutional imagination began to surface 
once again, with the hegemonic conceptual vocabulary of social law facing powerful resistance 
from other counter hegemonic understandings of fundamental law. 
 
In spite of the undeniable supremacy of dharma, P.V. Kane, the eminent jurist of ancient Hindu 
law, paradoxically faulted the 1950 Constitution for breaking away from it altogether. Kane 
criticized the constitutional text for focusing excessively on rights, without simultaneously 
providing for the traditional idea of duties. In a largely illiterate and uneducated democracy 
that independent India was, he apprehended that rights without obligations engendered a 
feeling among its masses that they could ‘give the force of law and justice to their own ideas 
and norms formed in their own cottages and tea shops’.121 This may seem surprising, as dharma 
and popular sovereignty do not necessarily make an antinomous conceptual pairing under 
conditions of modern democracy. Nevertheless, Kane’s discomfort with a populace rising to 
power suggestively indicates that the postcolonial constitutional field was a more open space 
than might have been the case if it were merely a concretization of a dharmic imaginary. Since 
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the constitution was enacted even in the name of those who were not tutored in or refused to 
subscribe to the nationalist myth of founding, the language of social law and subjectivity alone 
could not have bound it into a sustainable political unity. How it came to be challenged by an 
alternative language of political law and subjectivity drawn from the counter imaginary of 
dhamma, will be elaborated in the next chapter with specific reference to the constitutional 
thought of M.K. Gandhi and B.R. Ambedkar. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
RELATIONAL CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE TWO CONCEPTS OF SWARAJ 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I reconstructed the social law of dharma and the political law of 
dhamma as providing two rival languages of constituent power to the modern Indian political. 
But they have received little scholarly attention in legal and constitutional studies thus far. This 
is hardly surprising, given a widely prevailing lawyerly tendency to juridically contain different 
assertions of constituent power within established forms of constituted power. Intriguing 
however, is their relative neglect even among those perspectives which explicitly or implicitly 
strive to move beyond the constitution of government, and stress upon more fundamental 
questions pertaining to the constitution of state instead.122 What explains such intellectual 
indifference towards dharma and dhamma, in spite of their germinal role in shaping a distinct 
anticolonial and postcolonial constitutional politics? A clue may perhaps lie in the conceptual 
career of swaraj, and the way it has come to be received as the most widely accepted symbolic 
signifier of constituent power in India. 
 
Swaraj or self-rule is a composite expression of Sanskrit derivation, sharing an etymological 
affinity with the Latin term ‘suum regnum’ or ‘one’s own rule’.123 As a ligature binding the 
two morphemes swa and raj, it points to the indissociable inseparability of individual and 
communal notions of selfhood from modalities of rule necessary for their free flourishing. That 
one cannot be pursued entirely at the cost of the other is clear from the irreducible ambiguity 
of the coinage itself, which gestures to the ‘rule of the self’ as well as the ‘rule over the self’ 
simultaneously. But curiously enough, this deeply entangled relationship is hardly ever drawn 
upon as a guiding framework of reference in the study of India’s nation state enterprise. In fact, 
imagining the nation’s constitutional identity and fashioning a constitutional form appropriate 
for the state have generally been treated as discrete isolated endeavours in legal, political and 
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historical scholarship, as though the two dimensions of swa and raj were entirely disconnected 
from one another.124 
 
This decoupling has forced upon the concept of swaraj an untenable disjunctive bifurcation 
between law and subjectivity. When translated in constitutional language, it can conveniently 
be mapped onto well known Euro American debates regarding the nature of collective 
autonomy between proponents of revolutionary and constitutionalist constituent power. While 
for the former, autonomy usually eludes to self-mastery and self-realization through liberation 
of the collective subject from exploitation in all spheres of life, the latter generally invoke it to 
mean the collective freedom to institutionalize normative principles of modern 
constitutionalism in a self governing political society.125 To make a broad generalization here, 
the revolutionary tradition sees law as derived from the will of a preconstituted autonomous 
subject, whereas in the constitutionalist tradition, the subject is constituted through the reason 
inherent in the idea of a co-instituting higher law.126 
 
So on one hand, we have Indian thinkers of liberation who begin with different subjectivities 
defined in nationalist, economic or cultural terms, and venture to construe the postcolonial 
constitutional project as either furthering or hindering their respective emancipatory struggles 
against colonial rule and its persisting vestiges.127 Thinkers of freedom on the other hand, start 
with the presupposition that law has a separate life of its own independent of governors and 
governed, and proceed to fashion therefrom a distinctive liberal or republican subjectivity 
consonant with constitutional morality.128 Thus in effect, these oppositional positions seek to 
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disentangle law and subjectivity by individually prioritizing either one of the two, and 
concomitantly working with a largely derivative understanding of the other. 
 
However, the capaciousness of swaraj as a symbolic signifier suggests that the productive 
tension between law and subjectivity can be brought together in a more unified field of 
intellectual enquiry. It is possible to do so by moving beyond the liberation versus freedom 
debate in theories of revolutionary and constitutionalist constituent power, and emphasizing 
instead on their mutual entwinement, as was the case for most protagonists of India’s 
anticolonial and postcolonial constitutional imagination. One may easily discern in this 
imbrication a clear resemblance with Euro American theorizations of relational constituent 
power.129 But my intention here is not to merely write about the local enactment of an already 
predetermined global script of constitutional dialectics. By bringing liberation and freedom, 
law and subjectivity in closer proximity, what I wish to do in fact, is to make space for the 
study of a more irresolvable and deep-seated conflict between the social and political 
conceptions of swaraj. 
 
To be sure, these two oppositional categories are by no means unknown to Euro American 
constitutional experiences. But most influential interpretations of relational constituent power 
tend to be premised on the autonomy of the political from the social.130 Even when 
politicization of the social question is actively encouraged, this phenomenon is understood to 
refer only to the fresh imagination of more inclusive and less elitist collective subjectivities at 
best.131 What makes India’s original constitutional model distinctive, is that the social and 
political modalities of swaraj here were reflective not merely of rival subjectivities and their 
competing expectations, but more importantly also of diverging formulations of fundamental 
law grounded in dharma and dhamma respectively. 
 
This chapter will engage with the tension between dharma and dhamma through the 
constitutional thought of Mohandas Gandhi and B.R. Ambedkar, and is divided into four 
sections. Section one lays down the most widely accepted view about the tension between 
Gandhi as a thinker of political independence and Ambedkar as a thinker of social justice. It 
shows that this is premised on a disjunctive view of subjectivity and law. Sections two and 
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three challenge this disjunctive view by establishing that both Gandhi and Ambedkar in their 
constitutional thought appreciated the relational and deeply entangled nature of these concepts. 
The final section puts forth another more irreconcilable tension between Gandhi as a thinker 
of social dharma and Ambedkar as a thinker of political dhamma as being constitutive of the 
modern Indian political. 
1   Political independence and social justice 
	  
India’s national movement, which began in the latter half of the nineteenth century and 
culminated with formal independence and the framing of a new republican constitution in 1950, 
did not take place in a homogenous anticolonial field of mutual consensus and reciprocity. In 
order to explain why this was the case, I must begin by pointing out that although the idea of 
Hindustan had become juridically and politically salient during the precolonial period, its 
constituting elements were bound together within a shared and layered system of sovereignty 
only as a lose imperial unity.132 The self reflexive project of unifying them in a territorial and 
geographical sense was actively undertaken for the first time perhaps by the Indian National 
Congress as a response to the depredations of British colonialism, and more particularly its 
dangerous yet highly effective unofficial policy of divide and rule. But whatever limited 
success this enormously ambitious integrative enterprise could manage to achieve, was 
undercut at every stage by the most profound intellectual disagreements among different 
contending participants over the future course of collective action. We must remember here 
that they were confronting not just the mightiest colonial regime of their times, but also a 
radically diverse indigenous society comprising a plurality of resilient lifeworlds with 
millennial histories of injustice. Their variegated responses to these challenges were so sharply 
polarizing, that apart from a nominal acceptance of swaraj as the normative goal of the 
movement, it is post facto difficult to identify a common ground of jointly held presuppositions 
over which everyone could be said to have unarguably converged. India’s founding moment 
then, was suffused with a multiplicity of conflicting constituent possibilities, and must 
therefore be thought of as agonistic in the strongest sense of the term.133 
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Among the numerous rivalries influencing anticolonial and postcolonial constitutional 
imagination in India, it can safely be surmised with the advantage of hindsight that the 
dissensus between political independence and social justice has proved to be of most 
consequence. To briefly recall from the previous chapter, after initially embracing colonial 
liberal constitutionalism, the native elite intelligentsia were compelled by its exclusionary logic 
to vacate the depoliticized space of the precolonial Indian political, and turn inward to their 
own society as a potential site for initiating an autonomous politics of collective selfhood. 
However, the project of repoliticizing the Indian political was always marked by an 
irreconcilable tension, one which would only become more intensified as this new politics 
gradually began to expand and sought to bring the ordinary masses within its purview from the 
early years of the twentieth century. On one side of the unbridgeable divide, were those who 
gave priority to challenging the colonial state and winning back political sovereignty for the 
colonized self. They in turn faced opposition from others who were more invested in probing 
India’s hierarchical and inegalitarian social order, and making a case for its fresh 
reconstruction. To be sure, the two incompatible positions were much more varied and 
complicated than what my crude generalization might suggest. But instead of a broad brush 
elaboration of this conflict, I wish to turn specifically to the adversarial constitutional 
imagination of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948) and Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar 
(1891-1956) as its most generative iteration in modern India thus far. 
 
The powerful intellectual antagonism between Gandhi and Ambedkar is yet to be tamed, in 
spite of several well intentioned attempts to bring them closer in dialogue with one another, or 
supply to their divergent constitutional projects some unity of purpose.134 In 1932, they had 
famously clashed with one another on the issue of separate electorates as a special form of 
voting entitlements for India’s untouchable communities, officially known then as the 
Depressed Classes. At that time, Ambedkar was forced to give up on this brave demand by 
Gandhi’s coercive fast unto death, and instead accept a watered down scheme of legislative 
reservations under the terms of the Poona Pact. He resented the new compromise solution 
deeply, and slowly became the most acerbic unrelenting critic of the Gandhian enterprise as a 
whole. That this remained for Ambedkar a lifelong animosity is clear from his harsh assessment 
of Gandhi even in 1955, a good seven years after the latter’s assassination:  
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'as I met Mr. Gandhi in the capacity of an opponent, I have a feeling that I know him 
better than most other people, because he had opened his real fangs to me. And I could 
see the inside of the man, while others who generally went there as devotees saw 
nothing of him except the external appearance which he had put up as a Mahatma. But 
I saw him in his human capacity, the bare man in him. . . . He was never a Mahatma. . 
. . He doesn't deserve that title. Not even from the point of view of his morality.’135  
 
Gandhi too continued suspecting Ambedkar’s machinations until the very end, and therefore 
did not find it worthwhile to negotiate power sharing arrangements with him when the British 
were finally about to leave:  
 
‘I see a risk in coming to any sort of understanding with him, for he has told me in so 
many words that for him there is no distinction between truth and untruth, or between 
violence and nonviolence. He follows one single principle, viz, to adopt any means 
which will serve his purpose. One has to be very careful indeed when dealing with a 
man who can become Christian, Muslim or Sikh and then be reconverted according to 
his convenience. . . . To my mind it is all a snare.’136 
 
To be sure, I am not interested here in capturing specific details of this engrossing adversarial 
relationship, but only in figuring out what it might have to contribute to our understanding of 
swaraj as a constitutional concept. At this fundamental level, we find that while Gandhi is 
generally regarded as an anticolonial thinker of liberationary subjectivity, Ambedkar is treated 
as a postcolonial thinker of freedom through law. Gandhi and Ambedkar are in fact seen as 
having prioritized political independence and social justice respectively, and therefore as 
occupying opposing positions in the founding debate of Indian constitutional imagination.137 
Although later parts of the chapter would go on to problematize this neat formulation of their 
complicated intellectual rivalry, it is necessary first to lay down what the two are generally 
taken to be standing for on the question of constitutional self rule. 
 
Gandhi did not only become the undisputed leader of the largest mass movement against 
colonial rule in the world, but was also one of the foremost thinkers of anticolonial liberation 
in the twentieth century. He was born in the Modh Bania community of Hindu Vaishnava 
merchants, studied law in England, and began his career as a practicing lawyer and activist in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Ambedkar interview to the British Broadcasting Company (1955).). 
136 Gandhi (1946, Vol. 91: 393-394). 
137 For a recent formulation of the Gandhi Ambedkar debate in these terms, though with a view to bring the two 
in closer proximity, see Gandhi (2015: 35). 
 60 
South Africa. It was in South Africa that he fashioned satyagraha or truth force as a nonviolent 
form of civil resistance, which later became the most powerful technique of mass mobilization 
in India’s anticolonial movement. 
 
Gandhi thought about liberation entirely in terms of swaraj, and managed to turn it into the 
most popular signifier of the collective aspiration for political independence. In his own 
understanding however, swaraj was not merely identical with indigenous demands for the 
expulsion of the British and the concomitant institutional transfer of power from one set of 
governing elites to another. He famously observed in his political manifesto Hind Swaraj that 
this was simply akin to wanting ‘English rule without the Englishmen’, or ‘the tiger’s nature, 
but not the tiger’; that is to say, you would make India English. And when it becomes English, 
it will be called not Hindustan but Englistan. This is not the Swaraj that I want.’138 
 
 By swaraj, Gandhi instead meant a sense of individual and collective ‘self-reliance’, which 
neither he, nor the Viceroy and not even God could grant or take away from the people. It was 
instead ‘in the palm of our hands’, and had ‘to be experienced by each one for himself.’139 As 
Gandhi strove to show in his own conduct, this required taking complete control over one’s 
bodily desires and appetites, through a disciplined engagement with different practices and 
technologies of the self, such as spinning khadi, fasting, celibacy and reduction of consumption 
to the barest minimum.140 
 
However, such a novel reformulation of swaraj did not lead to its conversion into a purely 
moral concept of high philosophy. Gandhi deployed it effectively in defying the historicist and 
developmental logic underlying the British promise to make India a self governing entity in an 
unspecified distant future, after a necessary period of colonial tutelage.141 As Faisal Devji has 
argued, by placing the agential subject at the centre stage of the national movement, he in fact 
opened up the possibility of realizing swaraj in the immediate present itself, for anyone who 
was fearless enough to accept death and suffering in the process of withdrawing cooperation 
from, and civilly disobeying an illegitimate antipolitical regime.142 
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Furthermore, although Gandhi had sought to secure imperial citizenship and dominion status 
for a long part of his political career, when the idea of complete independence did seize him 
eventually, he did not hesitate in militantly calling for the British to leave India immediately: 
‘Leave India to God. If that is too much, then leave her to anarchy.’143 For the sake of India’s 
liberation, he did not even mind risking the possibility of ‘complete lawlessness’ in the country: 
‘For Heaven’s sake leave India alone. Let us breathe the air of freedom. It may choke us, 
suffocate us, as it did the slaves on their emancipation. But I want the present sham to end.’144 
Anticolonial liberation was thus a lifelong preoccupation with Gandhi as a thinker. But once 
he gets pigeonholed into such a category, the only question left for a theorist of constituent 
power to ask in relation to his work is: who was to be liberated from the colonial state’s 
constituted authority? 
 
This question about the subject of emancipation has unsurprisingly generated many different 
interpretative responses in the large corpus of Gandhi scholarship over the years. At the 
broadest level of generalization, it can be seen that his critique of modern Western civilization 
accompanied by liberal capitalism and the nation state form, has either been read as developed 
from the vantage point of an authentic Indic cultural selfhood, or as flowing from an unabiding 
concern for the plurality and multiplicity of unalienated everyday life.145 My intention here is 
not to engage with this rich literature, but only to make the argument that as a result of its 
pervasive hold, Gandhi’s understanding of law has come to be treated as entirely derivative of 
his more originary insistence on subjectivity. 
 
Gandhi is either read as an antilegal thinker who deplored modern law for its abstract nature 
and distance from the subject, or as someone who made a case for its replacement by a 
reconstructed traditional law, which was supposedly more concrete and much nearer to the 
subject’s own lifeworld. It is well known that he made various constitutional proposals for 
postcolonial India to adopt: the panchayat or the council of village elders, the trusteeship model 
of property relations, and the idea of a decentralized peasant democracy, composed of non-
hierarchically organized self sufficient village republics as basic units of government, with the 
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self ruling individual at their centre. These are all read in the literature as Gandhi’s prescriptions 
for negating colonial modernity, and creating conditions for a more thorough liberation of the 
colonized subject than would be possible under modern constitutionalism.146 
 
If Gandhi indeed was essentially a thinker of anticolonial liberation, it is not difficult to see 
why Ambedkar was so deeply hostile to his constitutional imagination. Ambedkar was one of 
twentieth century’s most formidable thinkers of postcolonial freedom, who helped author the 
Constitution of independent India from 1946 to 1950, as Chairman of the Drafting Committee 
of its Constituent Assembly. He was born in the Mahar community of untouchable Dalits, 
which had for centuries been condemned by India’s hierarchical caste system to the margins 
of social existence. After obtaining doctorate degrees from Columbia University and the 
London School of Economics, he returned to India and went on to become a distinguished 
lawyer, jurist, economist, scholar of religion and a radical anticaste activist and intellectual. As 
the leader of sixty million untouchables, Ambedkar’s approach to the struggle for political 
independence could not but be very different from his upper caste counterparts, who had 
enthusiastically positioned themselves at its forefront. 
 
Ambedkar was deeply sceptical of the emerging anticolonial discourse on swaraj, and 
especially its prioritization of national liberation over the social question. Thus while 
responding to the political extremist Bal Gangadhar Tilak’s clamouring for swaraj, Ambedkar 
remarked: 'If Tilak had been born among the untouchables, he would not have raised the slogan 
"Swaraj is my birthright", but he would have [instead] raised the slogan "Annihilation of 
untouchability is my birthright”.’147 In fact, from a superficial reading of the large corpus of 
Ambedkar’s collected works, one may even get an impression that he regarded the pursuit of 
swaraj as antithetical to the more pressing national cause of the annihilation of caste:  
 
‘In the fight for Swaraj you fight with the whole nation on your side. In this 
[annihilation of caste] you have to fight against the whole nation and that too, your own. 
But it is more important than Swaraj. . . . only when the Hindu Society becomes a 
casteless society that it can hope to have strength enough to defend itself. Without such 
internal strength, Swaraj for Hindus may turn out to be only a step towards slavery.’148  
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However, a more careful investigation reveals that he was not as uncomfortable with the 
concept of swaraj, as he was with the absence of a sincere commitment to social reform and 
social democracy in its dominant nationalist renderings.149 The swaraj of his imagination was 
premised on the destruction of the power of India’s traditional governing classes, and their 
replacement by a government of the people, by the people and for the people as its reason d’être 
and only justification.150 
 
So, the postcolonial constitutional project was for Ambedkar less a culmination of a successful 
anticolonial struggle for liberation, and more an opportunity to make a new beginning by 
reconstituting society as a whole in consonance with the notion of collective freedom. But once 
his constitutional thought is construed entirely in these terms, the only pertinent question left 
for a theorist of constituent power to address is: what was this freedom to constitute composed 
of? 
 
It can be stated uncontentiously that Ambedkar was an arch modernist, who envisaged for India 
a society which would recognize the inseparable union of liberty, equality and fraternity as the 
foundational postulate of its democratic life. As in Gandhi’s constitutional model, the 
individual was the basic unit of society for him too, but without in any way being anchored in 
a hierarchically organized caste ridden village community. Ambedkar in fact denounced the 
village as ‘a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism’, and 
held it responsible for bringing upon the ‘ruination of India’. Furthermore, contrary to the 
‘ridiculous’ idea of trusteeship which only showed how class structure was Gandhism’s ‘living 
faith’ and ‘official doctrine’, he worked towards securing property entitlements for the servile 
classes so as to make space for them in capitalist modernity and facilitate their transition into 
citizenship. Finally, he advocated a strong centralized state for India, with a distant and abstract 
institutional apparatus of rule, capable enough of intervening positively on behalf of the 
underprivileged in what according to him was a highly unjust society. 
 
All of this and much else in Ambedkar’s constitutional work has generally been interpreted in 
terms of various liberal and republican values, such as individual and group rights, non-
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discrimination and nondomination, and constitutional morality and public reason.151 For most 
commentators, he was able to innovatively readapt these globally circulating normative 
principles to cater to India’s unique circumstances, without needing to move beyond them for 
much of his life.152 They highlight his firm commitment to the law of modern constitutionalism 
implicit in the idea of a constitutional democracy, even whilst striving to found a new social 
order. This reading would lead us to the conclusion that Ambedkar was reluctant to concede 
authorial space to any prior existing collective subject, but more importantly, also that he saw 
it as being constitutively grounded in the higher principles of normative democracy.153 
Therefore, his constitutional imagination could not be any further from Gandhi’s, who as we 
have seen earlier, is regarded primarily as a thinker of a liberationary anticolonial subjectivity, 
and only secondarily as a thinker of constitutional law. 
 
I have tried to develop here a conceptual framework within which dominant scholarly 
assessments generally receive Gandhi and Ambedkar as antagonistic constitutional thinkers. In 
the next two parts of the chapter, I engage with the two separately, and show that distinctions 
between subjectivity and law, and liberation and freedom, end up supplying inadequate and 
even somewhat misguided explanatory glosses to their complicated intellectual rivalry. To say 
the least, they both were certainly aware of the deeply imbricated and entangled relationship 
between these concepts during India’s moment of transition from the anticolonial to the 
postcolonial. 
 
2   Gandhi and relational constituent power 
 
I shall make a case for reading Gandhi as a thinker of relational constituent power in this 
section, by connecting his motivation to work for the liberation of the anticolonial subject with 
his seemingly paradoxical endorsement of the modern law of postcolonial freedom. In order to 
do so, the following subsections take up his engagement with violence and power, civil 
disobedience and modern constitutionalism, and renunciative liberation and constitution 
making as constructive satyagraha. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See Omvedt (1993), Mehta, PB (2010), Chakrabarty (2016: 133-148), Nussbaum (2016: 295-336), Bhatia 
(2016). 
152 Bayly (2012: 297-307); Bajpai (2011: 53-76). 
153 See Mukherjee (2010: 345-370). 
 65 
2.1   Violence and power 
 
In her famous essay on violence, Hannah Arendt contended that Gandhi’s enormously 
powerful and successful campaign of nonviolent resistance was possible in India only because 
it was up against England, and not Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany, or even pre-war Japan. 
Had any of these been the enemy, Arendt speculated that the ‘outcome would not have been 
decolonization, but massacre and submission’.154 This observation was based on her highly 
generative conceptual distinction between power and violence: while power stemmed from the 
human ability to act in concert and participate in public affairs, violence referred to the 
instrumental use of tools and implements to increase and multiply natural strength for the 
purpose of realizing particular ends. She claimed that the ‘rule by sheer violence’ came into 
play only when power was being lost, and reckoned that colonial rule in India, backed by 
restraints endemic to a constitutional government, was simply too powerful to resort to the kind 
of totalitarian violence that Stalin and Hitler had pursued.155 
 
While crediting British forbearance for Gandhi’s success, Arendt might well have 
underestimated the immensity of violence inflicted by the colonial state upon an alien 
population at every juncture of its ruling enterprise. There is evidence in Gandhi’s writings 
which suggests that the difference between colonialism on the one hand, and Nazism and 
Fascism on the other, was for him ‘only one of degree’, since ‘Messrs. Hitler and company’ 
had merely perfected and reduced ‘to a science the unscientific violence their predecessors had 
developed for exploiting the so-called backward races for their own material gain’.156 Yet in 
spite of his refusal to distinguish British colonialism from other forms of rule by violence in 
qualitative terms, I wish to argue that Gandhi would certainly have agreed with Arendt in so 
far as he believed that whatever power it was able to generate, depended entirely upon the 
conscious or unconscious, voluntary or forced cooperation of the people in India. According 
to Gandhi, India was not conquered or retained ‘with the power of the sword’, ‘but by 
employing the strength of our own people’.157 The English did not take or hold onto India with 
arms and ammunitions, and were instead kept here by the people themselves in their ‘base self-
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interest’: ‘We like their commerce; they please us by their subtle methods and get what they 
want from us. To blame them for this is to perpetuate their power.’158 
 
This is not to suggest that Gandhi wanted to downplay the role and contribution of British 
strength in colonizing India. But as Ajay Skaria has pointed out, assumption of sole or absolute 
responsibility was the crux of his politics. So even if British strength may have also been 
responsible for their conquest and retention of India, this did not in any way diminish the 
responsibility of those Indians who colluded with them, and thereby made colonial rule 
possible.159 By making the people bear complete responsibility for India’s occupation in such 
a manner, what Gandhi strove to establish was that all regimes—even the most tyrannical or 
despotic—required for their support, collaboration from the many, and could never be 
sustained on the basis of physical force alone. The only way then to delegitimize any ruling 
regime was the withdrawal of this consent on a mass scale, which however did not necessarily 
include the mounting of a counter anticolonial violence against its authority. 
 
To be sure, Gandhi was ready to permit violence when cowardice were the only other 
alternative left, for unlike the archetypal pacifist, he valued courage and sacrifice over 
everything else.160 However, as Faisal Devji has argued, he believed that it was possible to 
dissociate these virtues from their purely instrumental use in revolutionary violence, and 
instead make them the basis of a heroic and self-sacrificing nonviolence which prioritized the 
‘will to die’ over the ‘will to kill’ as the ‘highest form of bravery’ imaginable.161 When put to 
work in the context of India’s national movement, Gandhi’s ideas thus produced an ethical 
politics that sought a disciplined disruption of the power of the colonial state, by performatively 
enacting the ‘power of the people’ through a nonviolent civil resistance. 
 
2.2   Civil disobedience and modern constitutionalism 
 
We may be tempted to situate Gandhian satyagraha within the rich discourse on civil 
disobedience in liberal and republican constitutional thought.162 Gandhi’s attention was in fact 
drawn to their possible convergence by a questioner who suggested to him that ‘the nonviolent 
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spirit of selfless love for all’ could only succeed if it found expression in ‘a liberal, democratic 
and constitutional form of government’, in which laws were promulgated by a majority 
decision after public discussion, and enforced not by war but by police when persuasion and 
example did not suffice. But in response, Gandhi distinguished his idea of nonviolence from 
the enthronement of violence as law in all modern constitutions, regardless of whether they 
were democratic or nondemocratic. He believed that a society deliberately constructed in 
accordance with the ‘law of nonviolence’ would be structurally different from what it was at 
present, but could not anticipate in advance what a wholly nonviolent government might look 
like. All he was able to say was that nonviolence had to be recognized as ‘a living force, and 
inviolable creed, not a mere policy’, or in other words, as the necessary precondition of a 
democratic constitutional government, and not simply as its object or telos.163 
 
This response must be appreciated in light of Gandhi’s radical critique of modern 
constitutionalism. Gandhi’s anticolonialism did not take the British as its political enemy, but 
was instead premised on a profound scepticism towards the particular form of rule which they 
administered in India. He was in a sense uninterested in the ‘who rules’ question of sovereignty, 
and so his quarrel was not as much with the colonial rulers themselves, as it was with their 
governing methods. 
 
In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi railed against the entire institutional apparatus of rule associated with 
modern governmentality. He idiosyncratically likened the English Parliament to a ‘sterile 
woman’, which ‘had of its own accord not done a single good thing’, and ‘a prostitute’ ‘without 
a real master’, which was ‘under the control of ministers who change[d] from time to time.’ 
What was done by the Parliament on one day could be undone on another, and it was ‘not 
possible to recall a single instance in which finality [could] be predicted for its work.’ 
According to him, the English nation would have occupied a much higher platform if only ‘the 
money and the time wasted by Parliament were entrusted to a few good men’.164 Gandhi was 
rather ambivalent towards majoritarian democracy:  
 
‘It is a superstition and an ungodly thing to believe that an act of a majority binds a 
minority. Many examples can be given in which acts of majorities will be found to have 
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been wrong, and those of minorities to have been right. All reforms owe their origin to 
the initiation of minorities in opposition to majorities.’165  
 
Finally, he was most scathing in his assessment of the legal profession, and held lawyers to 
have been principally responsible for India’s enslavement, the accentuation of Hindu-
Mahomedan dissentions, and the confirmation of English authority. Motivated exclusively by 
a desire to become rich and wealthy, lawyers were as a rule interested only in advancing 
quarrels instead of working to repress them. The settlement of disputes either by fighting or by 
asking one’s relatives to decide was for him less unmanly and cowardly than resorting to courts 
of law: ‘Surely, the decision of a third party is not always right. The parties alone know who is 
right. We, in our simplicity and ignorance, imagine that a stranger, by taking our money, gives 
us justice.’166 
 
Reading all of these reflections together, it becomes clear that Gandhi did not believe in making 
too sharp a conceptual distinction between power and violence. As has been discussed above, 
he postulated that both metropolitan as well as colonial versions of the modern state could 
generate power only through their people’s consent. But a powerful state was not necessarily 
a nonviolent one. For Gandhi in fact, the state represented ‘violence in a concentrated and 
organized form’; it was a ‘soulless machine’ which could never be weaned from violence to 
which it owed its very existence.167 This violence though, must not be conflated with the 
physical force required for every successful taking and retaking of a spatial territory by a 
conquering sovereign, for he was not as uncomfortable with the fact of India’s colonial 
occupation as most other revolutionaries and nationalists in his times were. What disturbed 
Gandhi more deeply was the structural violence underpinning the materialist modern 
civilization of extractive industrial capitalism that had degraded and ruined much of the world 
including England, and the strong possibility of its replication in India as well, irrespective of 
whether the country was being governed by a colonial or a postcolonial regime. As long as this 
civilization remained a dominant pace-setter in political society, exploitation of the weak by 
the strong was for him ineliminable from the conceptual universe of modern constitutionalism, 
even if its governing institutions were to operate in the name of the people themselves.168 
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2.3   Renunciative liberation and constitution making as constructive satyagraha 
 
It is more productive to place Gandhi’s constitutional project within the Indic tradition of 
renunciative liberation, in so far as he sought to take leave of or exit the modern state form 
altogether.169 Rather than being associated with negative and positive entitlements of the 
citizen subject or the national community, this conception of liberty, derived from Sanskrit and 
Prakrit terms such as sanyasa, moksha, mukti and nirvana, was genealogically connected with 
Hindu, Buddhist and Jain spiritual discourses pertaining to the renunciation of the world, and 
their respective ascetic and meditative practices. Gandhi identified himself as an orthodox 
sanatani [eternalist] Hindu belonging to the Vaishnava sect, and unambiguously declared that 
the aspiration for moksha was behind all his activities including the pursuit of swaraj.170 
Moksha could only be achieved by reducing the self to ‘zero’ and becoming a ‘cipher’. ‘In 
English’, Gandhi pithily remarked in his lectures on the Gita, ‘I’ is a vertical line with a dot 
above it. Only when this ‘I’ is done away with can one attain self realization.’171 It was his firm 
conviction that only through such a renunciation of the self could a politics be established 
which was grounded entirely in nonviolence.  
 
As colonial modernity took roots in India, anticolonial nationalist thinkers imaginatively 
abstracted from the renunciative tradition and refashioned it as a distinctly ‘this worldly’ 
phenomenon, wherein a person could continue to engage with the world and yet not be of it.172 
Gandhi followed in their footsteps reverentially, but made two crucial modifications to this 
exemplary figure of a detached this-worldly activist who was obliged to intervene in state 
politics for the benefit of all. First, unlike the post-enlightenment idea of worldly asceticism 
which was developed to counter Christian and Hindu priestcraft in Europe and South Asia, 
Gandhi more ambitiously sought to establish some kind of equivalence between the 
charlatanism of ‘selfish and false religious teachers’ and the hypnotism induced by the social 
scientific knowledge apparatus of British colonialism. He consequently made it a mission for 
himself to ‘fight’ the ‘humbug’ and ‘superstition’ of both religious as well as secular ruling 
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ideologies at the same time.173 Second, contrary to the nationalist cannon wherein the Gita’s 
idea of detachment towards the fruit of action was interpreted as enabling any desireless action 
in general, Gandhi clarified that it could only be read as enjoining the performance of ethically 
right action under all circumstances, be they normal or exceptional. This enabled him to remain 
detached even from a ‘good cause’ like the goal of winning swaraj, for only then ‘will our 
means remain pure and our actions too.’174 
 
Attachment to truth or satya as ethically right action is what gave Gandhian politics much of 
its meaning. For Gandhi, truth was not an abstract or cognitive notion which purported to 
describe the world in objective terms; it was rather a concrete and experiential capacity of 
revelation, which could bring to surface and make visible the hidden and invisible relations 
ordering the practical world.175 Contrary to what the legal theorist Chhatrapati Singh averred, 
it did not inhere in synthetic and a priori propositions of practical reason, and so could not be 
regarded as the source of law in the same way as in antipositivist normative thought.176 Gandhi 
in fact, was a conventional legal positivist at least in so far as he implicitly believed in the 
dictum that ‘authority, and not truth makes the law.’ When truth was mobilized in satyagraha 
to withdraw the power of consent and thereby expose the bare violence underpinning modern 
constitutionalism, the object was not to negate the law altogether or institute something 
completely new in its place. Instead of ceasing to invoke the lawyerly vocabulary of interest, 
mediation, contract and rights, what Gandhi sought to do was to limit its influence in human 
society by concomitantly expanding the influence of an alternative supplementary vocabulary 
of disinterest, direct encounter, voluntary sacrifice and duties, and thus transform already 
existing legal categories and institutions in creative ways.177 
 
This explains why Gandhi did not find it contradictory to devote his ‘corporate activity’ as the 
leader of the national movement to the ‘attainment of Parliamentary swaraj in accordance with 
the wishes of the people’, without necessarily backtracking from his stinging critique of 
modern constitutionalism discussed herein above.178 As a ‘practical idealist’, he did not 
struggle to come to terms with the fact that the people actually wanted in India a Parliament 
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chosen by them ‘with the fullest power over the finance, the police, the military, the navy, the 
courts and the educational institutions.’179 In 1931, Gandhi actively influenced the drafting of 
Congress’s Karachi Resolution on Fundamental Rights and Economic Change, which went on 
to become the chief inspiration behind Parts III and IV of the Indian Constitution. Later that 
year, while participating in the Second Round Table Conference, he alluded to the need for an 
interventionist national government which would move beyond the recognition of negative 
non-discrimination and fulfil the positive duty to ‘equalize conditions’ by ‘passing legislation 
in order to raise the down-trodden, and the fallen, from the mire into which they have been 
sunk by the capitalists, by the landlords, by the so-called higher classes, and then, subsequently 
and scientifically, by the British rulers.’180 Finally, even though the entire nationalist leadership 
had in effect rejected his constitutional scheme for village swaraj, Gandhi never the less 
enthusiastically welcomed the setting up of the Constituent Assembly in 1946 as an arena for 
the potential performance of ‘constructive satyagraha’. It was true that the Assembly had many 
defects, but a satyagrahi whom he likened to a soldier, had to fight to get them removed, 
because ‘A satyagrahi knows no defeat.’ Better alternatives were available no doubt, but they 
could only have been realized had the members of the Congress done justice to ‘constructive 
work’. A satyagrahi could not wait or delay action till perfect conditions were forthcoming, 
and had to ‘act with whatever material is at hand, purge it of dross and convert it into pure 
gold.’ Gandhi recommended participation in the affairs of the Assembly to those who were 
sufficiently qualified ‘by virtue of their legal training or special talent’, and willing to approach 
the task as ‘a duty to be faced even like mounting the gallows or sacrifice of one’s all at the 
altar of service.’181 Keeping these criteria in mind, he anointed the modernist Nehru as his 
political successor instead of the more conservative Patel, and according to some stories also 
insisted on the induction of Ambedkar into the Assembly on a Congress ticket in spite of their 
formidable intellectual rivalry over the years. 
 
3   Ambedkar and relational constituent power 
 
I shall now focus on Ambedkar’s constitutional thought in this section, and seek to show that 
although having to grapple with very different concerns, he provides us an equally appealing 
picture of relational constituent power as Gandhi did. In order to establish that he was not 
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merely a thinker of freedom and law but also of their complicated entanglement with liberation 
and subjectivity, I discuss his engagement with constitutional morality and insurrectionary 
constitutionalism, and the hegemony of caste and collective liberation as non-oppression in the 
following subsections. 
 
3.1   Constitutional morality and insurrectionary constitutionalism 
	  
The normative political theorist Pratap Bhanu Mehta has insightfully situated Ambedkar’s 
advocacy of constitutional morality in the Constituent Assembly decisively within the liberal 
constitutionalist tradition of procedural democracy.182 Borrowing from the classicist George 
Grote, Ambedkar understood constitutional morality as ‘a paramount reverence for the forms 
of the constitution’, and invoked it while justifying the decision to include the details of 
administration in the constitutional text itself. He feared that the constitution could be perverted 
or opposed in spirit simply by changing the form of administration, and hence believed that 
this could not be left for the legislature to prescribe in a political society where the people were 
not saturated with constitutional morality. Constitutional morality was for Ambedkar, just as it 
was for Grote, not a ‘natural sentiment’, but one which had to be carefully ‘cultivated’ in a 
people who were ‘yet to learn it’. This was especially true for India, where democracy was 
only a ‘top-dressing on an Indian soil’ which was ‘essentially undemocratic’.183 Mehta 
interprets Ambedkar’s constitutional thought entirely in light of Grote’s definition as having 
emphasized upon all the commonplace features of a nonideological liberal constitutionalism 
such as ‘self-restraint, respect for plurality, deference to processes, scepticism about 
authoritative claims to popular sovereignty, and the concern for an open culture of criticism’. 
 
This strong commitment to constitutional form further leads Mehta to read Ambedkar in some 
sense as being a greater proponent of nonviolence than even Gandhi was. While famously 
exhorting everyone to ‘hold fast to constitutional methods’ for achieving social and economic 
objectives, Ambedkar had denounced not just ‘the bloody methods of revolution’, but also ‘the 
method of civil disobedience, non-cooperation and satyagraha’ as a ‘grammar of anarchy’ 
which were to be abandoned as soon as possible, if India was to maintain its democracy both 
in form as well as in fact.184 Mehta argues that by thus equating Gandhian satyagraha which 
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he had experienced as coercion during the Poona Pact controversy, with the violence of armed 
revolution, Ambedkar sought to show that for political action to be genuinely nonviolent, it 
had to respect the formal and procedural propriety entailed in the idea of constitutional 
morality. 
 
There is little to disagree with in Mehta’s formulation to the extent that faith in the rule of law 
did certainly underpin Ambedkar’s conception of democratic politics at a broad level of 
generality. However, since Ambedkar was more a theorist of constituent power and less a 
votary of liberal legalism, he did not hesitate in prioritizing democracy over law whenever the 
two appeared to him to be incompatible with one another.185 He valued constitutional morality 
and the institutional apparatus within which it was enshrined for the protection they accorded 
to the form of constitution from the form of administration, but rejected their extant 
articulations as utterly inadequate when measured against the touchstone of democracy. ‘Habits 
of constitutional morality may be essential for the maintenance of a constitutional form of 
government’ he clarified, but ‘the maintenance of a constitutional form of government is not 
the same thing as a self-government by the people.’ Similarly, although the institutional 
mechanism of adult suffrage could produce a ‘government of the people’ in contrast with the 
‘government of a king’, he averred that it could not by itself bring about a ‘democratic 
government’, that is one set up ‘by the people and for the people’.186 
 
Democracy was for Ambedkar much more than an antimonarchical principle, and required for 
its accomplishment the dissolution of the power of the governing classes which had happened 
to grow up in every country by the force of historical circumstances. Writing about interwar 
Europe, he noted that Parliamentary democracy had turned out to be a tragic failure not only 
in dictatorial regimes owing to its slowness and delay in taking swift action, but also in 
countries pledged to democracy for various ideological and organizational reasons. There was 
widespread discontentment among the masses with its ideology of ‘freedom of contract’, which 
in turn evinced a clear preference for liberty over social and economic equality, and its 
organizational entrenchment of the vicious division of political life between a ‘hereditary 
subject class’ and a ‘hereditary ruling class’. In Ambedkar’s opinion, the ‘very formal’ and 
‘superficial’ view of democracy propounded by ‘Western writers on Politics’ did not do enough 
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to overcome the danger posed to it by ‘permanently settled governing classes’. Far from 
proving to be fatal to the ‘power and position’ of governing classes, constitutional morality and 
institutional mechanisms of adult suffrage and frequent elections had in fact ‘helped to give to 
their power and prestige the virtue of legality and made themselves less vulnerable to attack by 
the servile classes.’ For all of these reasons, he took the courage to tell the people of India thus: 
‘Beware of parliamentary democracy, it is not the best product as it appears to be.’187 
 
I do not mean to suggest that Ambedkar was sceptical of modern constitutionalism in the same 
way as Gandhi was, but only that he was aware of the severe shortcomings at least in its liberal 
version which had resulted in dire consequences for Europe. In the same very speeches before 
the Constituent Assembly wherein he drew upon constitutional morality, Ambedkar had also 
warned that if such a model were to materialize in India, those who suffered at its receiving 
end ‘could blow up the fabric of the state’ and the ‘structure of political democracy’ which the 
Assembly had so laboriously built up.188 In its place therefore, as Shruti Kapila has shown, he 
espoused a counter liberal and agonistic constitutionalism that was geared towards visibilizing 
the continuous subterranean struggles between the rulers and the ruled, by according them an 
appropriate constitutional outlet. Conflicts were for him ineliminable from political society, 
and so the task before a constitution was not to resolve them pacifically, but to provide 
imaginatively fashioned institutional arenas where relations of antagonism and hostility could 
be converted into and articulated as adversarial relations of confrontation and competition.189 
It is certainly possible to discern in this a marked resonance with contemporary theorists of 
agonistic democracy, but as Kapila has argued, the recent revival of the agon in Europe is a 
post-consensus phenomenon, whereas Ambedkar operated under conditions of radical 
dissensus characterizing late colonial and early postcolonial India.190 
 
Ambedkar’s agonistic constitutionalism was centred around the category of the governed, and 
had space in it both for insurrectionary as well as disruptive activities. This category of the 
governed was either composed of different major and minor communities sharing a common 
ultimate destiny within a nation, or of different nations divided on the question of ultimate 
destiny itself.191 Drawing upon the utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick, he distinguished 
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between a community’s ‘right of insurrection’ as being ‘restricted only to insisting on a change 
in the mode and manner of government’, and a nation’s greater ‘right of disruption’ as also 
extending ‘to the secession of a group of the members of a State with a secession of the portion 
of the State’s territory in its occupation.’ Thus in summary, while a community had a ‘right to 
safeguards’, a nation had a ‘right to demand separation’.192 Employing this distinction, 
Ambedkar dispassionately made a philosophical case for India’s partition and the creation of 
Pakistan in 1941, as he believed that Muslims in India had transformed themselves from a 
community demanding constitutional recognition, into a nation attracted by the magnetism of 
a ‘new destiny’ to live together in a ‘separate national state’.193 
 
Such a disruption of India would not only diffuse the fraternal enmity between Hindus and 
Muslims, but it was also at the same time a necessary precondition for the constitutionalization 
of an insurrectionary politics around the caste question, which was in many ways the chief 
motivation for Ambedkar joining the Constituent Assembly. With a view to translate this 
aspiration in concrete form, Ambedkar had for much of his life argued in favour of 
supplementing adult suffrage with innovative constitutional mechanisms more relevant for 
India’s divided society such as separate electorates, and reserved seats in legislatures and 
government employment for the Dalit community at par with other minorities and neglected 
groups. His idea behind setting up of representative and participatory institutions was to confer 
upon deprived sections their fair share in democratic state sovereignty, and not merely to 
placate or mollify them so that the constitution could be secured from illegal and extralegal 
insurgencies. Thus in 1953, when Ambedkar realized that the constitutional text which he had 
helped author did not live up to these expectations, he denounced it from the floor of 
Parliament: ‘Sir, my friends tell me that I made the Constitution. But I am quite prepared to 
say that I shall be the first person to burn it out. I do not want it. It does not suit anybody.’194 
This vehement attack, reminiscent of Ambedkar’s public burning of the Manusmriti—
Hinduism’s ancient code of casteist jurisprudence—in a symbolic funeral pyre in 1927, was 
perhaps unprecedented in the history of modern constitutionalism, wherein the framer of a 
constitution had effectively disowned his own creation.195 He followed it up two years later 
with another lament couched in theologico political language: ‘We built a temple for a god to 
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come in and reside, but before the god could be installed, if the devil had taken possession of 
it, what else could we do except destroy the temple ?’196 Disillusioned with what formal politics 
had to offer, he converted to Buddhism just two months before his death in a mass ceremony 
along with five hundred thousand followers, a gesture which has become the most well known 
act of public defiance faced by postcolonial India’s Brahminical establishment thus far. 
 
3.2   The hegemony of caste and collective liberation as non-oppression 
 
While grappling with the question of caste, Ambedkar’s agonism could not afford to merely 
stick to either of the two conceptions of liberal freedom as noncoercion or republic freedom as 
nondomination associated with modern constitutionalism. This was because contrary to 
Upendra Baxi, he did not see the caste system as a ‘dominance without hegemony’ sanctioned 
by the ‘lawless laws’ of the Hindus, that is simply as a state of affairs where coercion 
outweighed persuasion.197 It was rather a hegemony supported by the consent of the ‘dvijas’, 
that is the twice born or the first three castes who were situated at different rungs in a 
hierarchical regime of ‘graded inequality’. This meant that the tremendous violence heaped 
upon the panchamas, or the fifth caste of untouchables who were not included within the fold 
of the caste system, was not merely physical but also structural, as it was numerically backed 
by a general acquiescence even if not an outright endorsement from the rest of society. Unlike 
the case with slavery, the untouchables did not have to deal with a single identifiable master 
exercising coercion or domination over them; they were rather up against the entire society of 
caste Hindus which subordinated them systematically, without even allowing them their 
consciousness of unfreedom. 
 
Untouchability was for Ambedkar not a category of positive law, and so could not be reduced 
to a clear and precise definition in the same way as coercion and domination could. In his 
understanding, it was a ‘social concept’ which had come to be embodied in a ‘custom’, and 
just as custom varied from place to place, so did untouchability. The untouchables were in fact 
legally free and only socially unfree, but ‘custom is no small a thing as compared to law’. Even 
though law was enforced by the state through its police power and custom was not unless 
legally valid, this distinction between the two was practically of no consequence, for ‘[c]ustom 
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is enforced by people far more effectively than law is by the state. . . the compelling force of 
an organized people is far greater than the compelling force of the state.’ As a pervasive social 
practice, untouchability was ineliminable from the ‘nomos’ of caste order, and could therefore 
depend upon the ‘amplitude of plenary powers’ generated by ‘mass action’ for its defence.198 
 
In order to annihilate this hegemony of caste, Ambedkar’s agonistic constitutionalism had to 
resort to a counter hegemonic constituent power as collective liberation. There is much in 
Ambedkar’s thinking on state socialism and nationalism grounded in social homogeneity 
which seems to share affinities with the tradition of positive liberty as self mastery and self 
determination, but he was neither a conventional Marxist nor a communitarian nationalist. This 
was because the oppression entailed in caste and untouchability could not be analogized with 
the exploitation of capitalism and colonialism. His project of collective liberation as non-
oppression instead drew upon an alternative Indic source in the religion of Buddhism, which 
he in turn imaginatively contemporanized for the mid twentieth century. Ambedkar embraced 
Buddhism for its rational, godless, soulless and casteless theology, and went to the extent of 
identifying the Buddha and not the French Revolution as the source of his social philosophy of 
liberty, equality and fraternity. He specifically reworked its liberatory concept of nibbana, the 
dominant monastic interpretations of which had thus far emphasized exclusively upon 
individual self renunciation. Somewhat akin to Hindu social reformers and anticolonial 
activists including Gandhi, Ambedkar brought out nibbana into the world as a socially engaged 
Buddhist, but unlike them, he did not believe in the metaphysical idea of a soul needing 
salvation from the transmigratory cycle of birth and rebirth. His religion was utterly this-
worldly, wherein nibbana meant nothing more than ‘enough control over passion so as to 
enable one to walk on the path of righteousness.’199 Furthermore, he did not feel particularly 
drawn to the exemplary figure of the detached individual renouncer acting for the sake of social 
welfare, and sought to fashion in its stead an exemplary community of Dalits acting collectively 
for their own liberation from the oppressive structure of caste. It is hardly surprising then that 
he remained such a fierce opponent of Gandhi’s all through his life.200 
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4   The social and the political 
 
In the previous two sections, I have dealt with the constitutional thought of Gandhi and 
Ambedkar separately, and tried to show that their antagonism is not reducible to tensions 
between subjectivity and law, liberation and freedom, as is usually the case with rival 
protagonists of revolutionary and constitutionalist constituent power. Although working on 
constitutional projects which were undoubtedly very different from one another, they both were 
united in their common appreciation of the relational nature of these concepts under conditions 
of India’s distinct pathway to modernity. By bringing them closer together in this manner, I 
believe that we may now be able to unsettle the widely accepted disjunctive bifurcation of 
Indian constitutional imagination into categories of political independence and social justice 
discussed in section one, which have also gone on to inform much of the public intellectual 
discourse on the Gandhi Ambedkar debate thus far. 
 
This distinction is by no means an Indian peculiarity, and is in fact roughly analogous with the 
separation of the political from the social in the Euro American constitutional context, which 
has been best articulated in Hannah Arendt’s philosophical writings. To put it succinctly, 
Arendt theorized the domain of the political as an aesthetic arena of public life dedicated to the 
performative enactment of speech and action in concert, and differentiated it from the domain 
of the social construed as a private realm of necessities which had little to do with politics as 
an art of collective associational living. She went on to caution that every attempt at providing 
a political solution to the social question of necessity in the name of a sovereign dispossessed 
people had led to terror, as was the case with the French Revolution. In sharp contrast was her 
unreserved admiration for the American Revolution, which she believed was guided by a 
genuine political impulse to found a republic unhindered by the material problem of human 
misery. Arendt’s formulations have remained a mainstay in discussions of relational 
constituent power, even though she has been heavily criticized for her elitist conceptualization 
of the political, which completely excludes the creative and emancipatory potential of the social 
from its purview. 
 
However relevant such a sharp binary may be for European and American constitutional 
cultures, it yields a strange conclusion at least when applied to India, suggesting that only the 
anticolonial struggle for national liberation was a political movement, and therefore had to be 
prioritized over the comparatively less significant social question of institutionalizing freedom 
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under a postcolonial constitution. It is possible to infer that this is precisely what may have 
happened over here, with Gandhi’s initial victory over Ambedkar signifying the primacy of the 
political over the social during their lifetime when independence was yet to be achieved, and 
Ambedkar’s symbolic sidelining of Gandhi in more recent times being indicative of the 
triumph of the social over the political, with a greater attention being given to issues of 
corrective and distributive justice, now that the question of independence had been fully 
resolved and was no longer salient in public life. But we must not rest satisfied with this pithy 
formulation, as my debunking of the disjunctive bifurcation between subjectivity and law, and 
liberation and freedom in the constitutional thought of Gandhi and Ambedkar raises serious 
doubts about the way in which categories of political independence and social justice have 
come to distinguish them from one another in particular and divide the Indian constitutional 
field in general. 
 
4.1   Gandhi on caste and Ambedkar on nationalism 
	  
It is true that Gandhi was not as trenchant a critic of the caste system as Ambedkar was, but 
the removal of untouchability had always remained an integral part of his constructive 
programme. He attacked untouchability in most emphatic terms as a ‘blot on India’s forehead’, 
and a ‘sin of Hinduism’, and went on to suggest just like Ambedkar that ‘even the slavery of 
the Negroes is better than this’.201 Gandhi believed that colonialism was a just retribution for 
the ‘crime of untouchability’, and made it very clear in 1920 that ‘[w]e shall be unfit to gain 
Swaraj so long as we keep in bondage a fifth of the population’.202 What is difficult to defend 
in Gandhi today, is that even while going on to practically call for the abolition of caste as an 
institution, he continued to value it for much of his life in an idealized fourfold varnasrama 
form as a horizontal, non-hierarchical and functional division of society. However as Skaria 
points out, this conservative faith in its enduring efficacy was gradually shaken up, especially 
after encountering the likes of Ambedkar, as he began to normatively prioritize the figure of 
the Atisudra over that of the Brahmin, and reluctantly brought himself to take seriously the 
argument that untouchability could not be destroyed without destroying the caste system 
itself.203 Thus when it was suggested to him in a 1927 interview that destruction of varna was 
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necessary for the destruction of untouchability, he had this to say: ‘I do not think so. But if 
varnashrama goes to the dogs in the removal of untouchability, I shall not shed a tear.’204 
 
Similarly, it cannot be denied that Ambedkar had largely refrained from taking an active part 
in the national movement at least on terms defined by the Congress and Gandhi. But he was no 
native collaborator or stooge of the colonial government either. In his opinion, while the 
untouchables had welcomed the British as their deliverers from age long tyranny and 
oppression by helping them in militarily conquering and retaining India, they did not get 
anything substantial in return, apart from the principle of ‘equality before the law’ thus far 
unknown to Hindu jurisprudence. In other respects, there was no fundamental change in the 
position of untouchables under colonial rule, as the British had literally done nothing for their 
emancipation and elevation in areas of public service, education and social reform. Therefore, 
speaking on behalf of the Depressed Classes at the First Round Table Conference in 1930, he 
had this to say in support of a swaraj constitution:  
 
‘We feel that nobody can remove our grievances as well as we can, and we cannot 
remove them unless we get political power in our own hands. No share of this political 
power can evidently come to us so long as the British government remains as it is. It is 
only in a Swaraj constitution that we stand any chance of getting the political power in 
our own hands, without which we cannot bring salvation to our people . . . though the 
idea of Swaraj recalls to the mind of many the tyrannies, oppressions and injustices 
practiced upon us in the past.’205 
 
My intention here is neither to force a reconciliation between Gandhi and Ambedkar, nor to 
create an opening for a fresh reinterpretation of the Indian political as a unified homogenous 
field of mutual consensus and reciprocity. Gandhi and Ambedkar certainly adopted divergent 
intellectual positions on caste, nationalism and other related issues, but there have been various 
scholarly and activist attempts to bring these views together in a productive dialogue if not in 
complete harmony with one another. However, I believe that even if it becomes hypothetically 
possible to envisage Gandhi as a radical anticaste activist and Ambedkar as an ardent 
anticolonial nationalist, there still remains a more fundamental incompatibility between the 
two as theorists of constitutional self rule, which a constitutionally less significant distinction 
between political independence and social justice ends up occluding from our view. This 
fundamental incompatibility to which I now turn in the remainder of the chapter, is between 
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Gandhi as a thinker of social law and subjectivity, and Ambedkar as a thinker of political law 
and subjectivity, or in other words as between their irreconcilable conceptualizations of swaraj 
through the rival languages of dharma and dhamma respectively. 
 
4.2   Dharma, niti, dhamma 
 
In my understanding, Gandhi and Ambedkar will remain separated from one another for their 
entirely different responses to questions of law and subjectivity, regardless of whether these 
were freely chosen or compelled by circumstances. To put it schematically, Gandhi’s 
constitutional project was determined by his experience of the law of colonial civil society as 
the negative other and source of self alienation. His response was therefore articulated from 
the position of an indigenous social subjectivity, the law appropriate to which was dharma. On 
the contrary, Ambedkar’s constitutional project was determined by his experience of the law 
of Hindu caste order as the negative other and source of self alienation. As an outcaste, he in 
fact did not perceive himself to belong to Gandhi’s social subjectivity, and hence his response 
was articulated from the position of an indigenous political subjectivity, the law appropriate to 
which was dhamma. Thus in effect, it can be said that Gandhi and Ambedkar respectively 
occupied what I have described in the previous chapter as the inner and outer domains of 
anticolonial society, and their engagement with law and subjectivity was influenced 
significantly by this spatial ordering of the Indian political. I do not wish to deny Gandhi and 
Ambedkar their creative agency, especially in an interpenetrating context marked by the 
simultaneous socialization of the political and politicization of the social, but am only 
interested here in explaining what this mutual incompatibility means in theoretical terms.  
 
Gandhi recognized that under conditions of colonial modernity, the social and the political 
could no longer be thought of as two unrelated spheres of activity entirely autonomous from 
one another. But rather than uncritically endorsing this intrusion of a corrupt statist politics in 
society, what he aspired to do was to purify and spiritualize India’s emergent anticolonial 
political subjectivity through social law. There was no one better than the figure of the sanyasi 
or renunciant to partake in this enterprise. When Gandhi was once asked about his idealization 
of sanyasa with his struggle for swaraj, he replied thus:  
 
‘If the sanyasins of the old did not seem to bother heads about the political life of 
society, it was because society was differently constructed. But politics properly so-
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called rule every detail of our lives  today.  We  come  in  touch,  that  is  to  say,  with  
the  State  on hundreds of occasions whether we will or not. The State affects our moral 
being. A sanyasin. . . being well-wisher and servant    par excellence of society, must 
concern himself with the relations of the people with the State, that is to say, he must     
show  the  way  to  the people  to attain swaraj.’ 206 
 
Gandhi variously translated dharma as duty, obligation, religion and law, and interpreted its 
different forms such as varnashram dharma (dharma of castes and stages of life), swadharma 
(dharma of the individual), rajadharma (dharma of the ruler) and so on, as distinguishing 
particular subjects from one another in terms of their distinct normatively prescribed roles in 
society. He conceived swaraj as a dharmarajya, that is as a polity oriented towards dharma, 
and provided for its emulation an ideal model of Ramarajya, an expression which usually refers 
to the reign of the popular mythical divine ruler Rama. 
 
Since Gandhi did not endorse the idea of a people as an abstract unity, and instead preferred to 
grapple with social relations in their ineradicable differences, commentators are divided on 
whether he could be regarded as an innovative thinker of sovereignty, or as someone who 
disavowed it altogether.207 I do not wish to elaborate on this debate, because neither sovereignty 
nor abstract unity are necessary prerequisites for a theory of constituent power, even though 
they appear to be so under global conditions of nation state supremacy today. It suffices for my 
purposes that Gandhi envisaged for concrete everyday interactions between the governors and 
the governed an integrating symbolic order of Ramarajya, where the ruler was to be regarded 
not as a sovereign master but instead as a ‘servant of his servants’: ‘Ramarajya  means rule of 
the people. A person like Rama would never wish to rule. God calls Himself a servant of his 
servants.’208 
 
This notion of Ramarajya was in turn modelled on affective bonds of family and kinship where 
relations of strife and conflict were most likely to be reconfigured non-violently by adhering 
to dayadharma or the dharma of love and compassion, and padoshi dharma or the broad 
ranging practices of neighbourliness, including satyagraha or civil resistance with antagonists, 
mitrata or friendship with equals, and seva or service with subordinates.209 
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What was true of families and communities was for Gandhi true of nations as well, since there 
was no reason to believe that there was one law for families and another for nations. At another 
place, he described satyagraha itself as ‘an extension of the domestic law on the political field’. 
In the same way as a son was dutybound to resist his father’s injustice, satyagraha was to be 
offered to the British if they did not see themselves as servants of the people:  
 
‘although you are the rulers, you will have to remain as servants of the people. It is not 
we who have to do as you wish, but it is you who have to do as we wish. . . . . if the 
above submissions be not acceptable to you, we cease to play the part of the ruled. . . . 
If you act contrary to our will, we shall not help you; and without our help, we know 
that you cannot move one step forward.’210 
 
If we briefly turn to Gandhi’s other two practices of neighbourliness, it would become very 
clear why Ambedkar would wish to have nothing to do with them. As a Hindu, Gandhi was 
able to move beyond the strategic alliance of interests to seek with Muslims an unconditional 
friendship on terms of equality. But as far as Dalit subalterns were concerned, he could only 
offer them seva or service in a spirit of atonement for the sin of untouchability, whilst at the 
same time refusing to countenance the possibility of their performing satyagraha against caste 
Hindus. From Ambedkar’s point of view, this sacred ritual of self-purification could have space 
only for one hero, that being the guilt ridden caste Hindu reformer, and not the untouchables 
themselves, who were waging a completely different battle against Hindu society for their own 
self-respect and dignity. Hence he had no option but to reject the Gandhian model in its 
entirety.211 
 
As D.R. Nagaraj has emphasized, Ambedkar was invested in posing a constitutive rather than 
merely a regulative challenge to Gandhi’s language of dharma.212 Like Gandhi, he too 
recognized that the social and the political had come to be closely related with one another in 
colonial India. But rather than worrying about protecting an indigenous social subjectivity from 
the corruption of colonial civil society, he called for its fresh reconstitution in consonance with 
the political law of dhamma. 
 
Ambedkar warned the nationalists against pursuing political power without first addressing the 
issue of ‘social reform’:  
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‘Are you fit for political power even though you do not allow a large class of your own 
countrymen like the untouchables to use public school ? Are you fit for political power 
even though you do not allow them the use of public wells ? Are you fit for political 
power even though you do not allow them the use of public streets ? Are you fit for 
political power even though you do not allow them to wear what apparel or ornaments 
they like ? Are you fit for political power even though you do not allow them to eat any 
food they like ?’213  
 
This social reform, by which he meant nothing less than the ‘annihilation of caste’, could only 
be accomplished by destroying the extant Hindu dharma upon which it was founded:  
 
‘if you wish to bring about a breach in the system, then you have got to apply the 
dynamite to the Vedas and the Shastras, which deny any part to reason, to Vedas and 
Shastras, which deny any part to morality. You must destroy the Religion of the Shrutis 
and the Smritis. Nothing else will avail.’214 
 
In order to politicize the social question of caste oppression, Ambedkar drew upon a counter 
constituent language from the niti tradition, which he regretted had for a long time become 
dormant in India.215 In a lecture to law students in 1948, he disagreed with orientalists and 
orthodox pundits who believed in the idea of a timeless India with a static ancient constitution, 
and instead alluded to a more eventful history wherein there was no other country in the world 
which had undergone so many revolutions as this country had. For Ambedkar, India had 
witnessed a conflict between ‘ecclesiastical law’ or ‘communal law’ made by God or divine 
lawgivers like Manu and Yajnavalkya, and a people made ‘secular law’ whose foundations 
were laid out in Kautilya’s Arthashastra, long before the Pope’s authority was sought to be 
challenged in Europe. But unlike Europe where the law had become purely secular today, with 
the jurisdiction of the church being confined to the priest alone, ecclesiastical law had 
unfortunately triumphed over secular law in India, which in his opinion was ‘one of the greatest 
disasters in this country’. As a result of this defeat, the decadent Hindu society could not reform 
its defects through law, and ‘our nation which was once at the pinnacle of progress started 
declining’ at first, and got completely devastated and destroyed eventually. 
 
I wish to clarify however, that Ambedkar’s roughly drawn categorial distinction between 
ecclesiastical law and secular law is not exactly mappable onto the familiar tension between 
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religion and secularism in modern Euro American constitutional debates. That Ambedkar did 
not regard the religious and the secular as binary opposites can be discerned from his final 
speech before the Constituent Assembly, in which he sited the Buddhist Sangha as an 
exemplary institution for the enactment of people made law:  
 
‘It is not that India did not know Parliaments or Parliamentary Procedure. A study of 
the Buddhist Bhikshu Sanghas discloses that not only there were Parliaments—for the 
Sanghas were nothing but Parliaments—but the Sanghas knew and observed all the 
rules of Parliamentary Procedure known to modern times. They had rules regarding 
seating arrangements, rules regarding Motions, Resolutions, Quorum, Whip, Counting 
of Votes, Voting by Ballot, Censure Motion, Regularization, Res Judicata, etc.’  
 
Ambedkar proceeded to conjecture that although the Buddha applied these rules of 
Parliamentary procedure to the meetings of Sanghas, ‘he must have borrowed them from the 
rules of political assemblies functioning in the country in his time’.216 In other words, what was 
important about these rules was not necessarily their antireligious secularity, but rather their 
political orientation which had to be extended to other spheres of society as well. 
 
On a similar note, it must also be said over here that Gandhi’s politics of religion was not 
necessarily hostile or antithetical to secularism. Gandhi is widely known to have been guided 
by the maxim that ‘those who think that religion has nothing to do with politics understand 
neither religion nor politics’. However at the same time, he strongly insisted on a secular vision 
of the state when independence drew closer:  
 
‘If I were a dictator, religion and State would be separate. I swear by my religion. I will 
die for it. But it is my personal affair. The State has nothing to do with it. The State 
would look after your secular welfare, health, communications, foreign relations, 
currency and so on, but not your or my religion. That is everybody's personal 
concern.’217 
 
What is more, although Gandhi was a Hindu, his religion was not denominational in nature. 
The Ramarajya of his imagination was not necessarily a Hindu institution, and could as well 
be helmed by the first Islamic Caliphs: ‘The race of Rama is not extinct.  In  modern  times  the  
first  Caliphs  may  be  said  to  have established Ramarajya.’218 
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I need not engage with the various illuminating scholarly attempts at making sense of the 
secularism that was internal to Gandhi’s religious politics, and the religion that was internal to 
Ambedkar’s secular politics. The only point being made here is that the two concepts were not 
in tension with one another in their work in the same way as social law and political law were. 
 
This leads me to consider the usefulness of another related categorial distinction between 
moralism and realism for explaining the irreconcilability between Gandhi and Ambedkar. 
While it is easy to read Gandhi as an ethical antipolitical thinker, the newer scholarship being 
produced on him seems to be rightly pointing out that he did not see politics and ethics in 
oppositional terms. Although Gandhi did not make any distinction between norm and 
exception, he intriguingly conceptualized his ethical politics around the site of the battlefield, 
where the question of violence was inescapable. His object was not to sanitize politics, but to 
convert its ineliminable violence into nonviolence through the exemplary performance of 
personal self sacrificial action. As Karuna Mantena has gone on to show, he may in fact be said 
to have practiced a form of political realism, for treating nonviolence not purely as morally 
right action, but also as a plausible practical orientation in a political world marked by recurring 
violence and conflict.219 
 
On the contrary, as far as Ambedkar is concerned, it is true that his agonistic constitutionalism 
was sceptical of constitutional morality, but he did not give up on the concept of morality as a 
whole. Ambedkar’s problem with Hindu dharma was precisely its morally bankrupt code of 
‘legalized class ethics’, against which he counterposed the universal morality of Buddha’s 
dhamma defined in terms of prajna or ‘understanding’, karuna or ‘love for human beings’, and 
maitri or ‘extending fellow feeling to all beings, not only to one who is a friend but also to one 
who is a foe: not only to man but to all living beings’.220 In order to further understand what 
Ambedkar meant by morality, we may turn to the distinction he made in Annihilation of Caste 
between rules and principles: while rules prescribed an imperative course of action for the 
agent to pursue unreflexively, principles were more intellectual in nature in that they laid down 
broad guidelines to enable the agent to think and judge reflexively. The Hindu caste order was 
a degenerated form of religion, since it was based purely on rules of commands and 
prohibitions, which even if right could only produce mechanical action. On the other hand, a 
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truly religious act was for Ambedkar grounded in principles, and so even if the principle was 
wrong, the act was at least conscious and responsible. With its law of kamma or responsible 
action, only Buddhism qualified as a moral religion of principles in this sense, and thus became 
worthy of veneration both for him and his followers.221 
 
One may argue over here on behalf of proponents of constitutional morality that it may today 
be able to accommodate what Ambedkar had in mind while talking about reflexive action. This 
is especially so after the antipositivist turn in normative legal theory, following which a roughly 
analogous distinction is commonly made between law as a structure of primary and secondary 
rules, and law as a structure of higher principles with an intrinsic morality of its own. All that 
can be said in response is that Ambedkar was not satisfied with morality alone, and also insisted 
upon its sacralization: ‘in Dhamma, Morality takes the place of God, although there is no God 
in Dhamma.’222 This sacralization of morality had got very little to do with fostering a culture 
of what has come to be known today as constitutional patriotism. It was instead geared towards 
the universalization of fraternity understood as a sovereignty concept, which could not be 
strictly encased within established forms of constituted authority—reflexive or otherwise. 
 
Conclusion 
 
If there is anything that brings Gandhi and Ambedkar closer together as constitutional thinkers, 
it has to be their keen appreciation of the distinction between the formal and material 
dimensions of India’s constitution. This enabled them both to effectively engage with 
institutional as well as extra-institutional politics at different points of time in their respective 
careers. But as has been discussed herein above, these engagements were mediated by two 
diverging worldviews encapsulated in rival symbolic languages of dharma and dhamma, of 
social law and subjectivity and political law and subjectivity, meaning thereby that a Gandhi 
Ambedkar reconciliation is impossible to envisage. 
 
This tension was not peculiar to Gandhi and Ambedkar alone, but has in fact been at the heart 
of the constitution of the modern Indian political as a whole. It is hardly surprising then that 
even though neither of the two partook in the mainstream of nationalist thought, the 
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postcolonial state has sought to appropriate Gandhi as the father of the nation and Ambedkar 
as the chief architect of the Constitution in many ways over the years to legitimize its authority. 
While Gandhi stands in for the hegemony of dharma which was initially secularized under 
Nehruvian civic nationalism and communalized later on under ethnic Hindu nationalism, 
Ambedkar has in more recent times become the most potent signifier of the recessive dhamma 
tradition which has been contained but refuses to be fully tamed owing to the emergence of the 
Dalit community as a powerful votebank on the landscape of India’s democracy. In the next 
three chapters, I turn to postcolonial debates on the making of the constitutional subject, 
transformative constitutionalism and the judicialization of politics, and map the traces therein 
of this irresolvable dyadic relationship between social law and subjectivity on the one hand, 
and political law and subjectivity on the other. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
UNITY IN DIVERSITY AND THE MAKING OF INDIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
SUBJECT 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I made a case for moving beyond an over emphasized dissonance 
between relational categories of subjectivity and law, liberation and freedom in Indian 
constitutional studies, and through an extensive engagement with the constitutional thought of 
M.K. Gandhi and B.R. Ambedkar, alluded to a more fundamental and irreconcilable 
antagonism between social and political conceptions of swaraj as the symbolic signifier of 
constituent power in India’s constitutional imagination. But since the domain of constitutional 
thought was over here barely sequestered from the domain of constitutional action in which 
Gandhi, Ambedkar and other protagonists of the national movement conducted themselves as 
effective leaders, reformers, jurists and ideologues, this antagonism cannot be regarded merely 
as an abstract formulation of high constitutional theory alone. It has in fact also been an active 
force in various foundational debates associated with concrete constitutional practice in 
colonial and postcolonial India. 
 
The most germinal among these debates has been the one pertaining to the very constitution of 
the people as a collective subject in the name of whom the new postcolonial constitutional text 
came to be enacted in 1950.223 This issue of the constitutional subject assumed centre stage 
because India’s so called founding constituent moment did not witness a preformed 
revolutionary subjectivity giving to itself an altogether fresh constitution of government which 
could be seen as having marked a clean break from the colonial past. However at the same 
time, continuities with the colonial form of government did not imply that it produced a 
constitutionalist constitution of state which could in turn be taken as having fashioned an 
antipolitical subjectivity wholly oriented to the rule of law. I shall rather argue in this chapter 
that the making of the constitutional subject in India has been shaped by the social law of 
dharma, the political law of dhamma and the unresolved conflict between the two. In order to 
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establish my point, I would need to turn to the contentious debates on affirmative action which 
have most starkly brought out the fault lines underlying the modern Indian political at the level 
of the constitution of its collective subject. 
 
India’s Constitution has put in place one of the most robust affirmative action programmes 
anywhere in the world, which today provides for the reservation of a sizeable quota of seats for 
a large range of beneficiaries in central and provincial legislatures, government employment, 
and public and private education. There has naturally developed an extensive body of 
scholarship critically appraising this policy in the light of various legal, moral and 
philosophical principles salient in normative constitutional theory. Perhaps the most commonly 
discussed question in respect of affirmative action in India has been whether the special 
provisions enabling or prescribing reservations were to be considered as temporary exceptions 
to the norm of formal equality for all citizens, or whether they could themselves be normatively 
defended by resorting to another related notion of substantive equality.224 In more recent times 
however, some commentators have begun to trace justifications for the programme in a revised 
theory of constitutional liberalism, where group differentiated rights were seen as 
supplementing individual rights in an anticipation of the Euro American turn to multicultural 
accommodation by several decades, and where the duty of asymmetric discrimination was 
grounded not so much in the equality ideal as it was in considerations of reducing group 
vulnerability and enhancing personal autonomy.225 Others prefer to look past 
antidiscrimination and instead draw support from ideas of corrective justice and distributive 
justice whilst conceiving the reservations policy either as a compensatory mechanism for the 
redressal of historical wrongs, or as an egalitarian device geared towards securing adequate 
representation for the disadvantaged in different sectors of society.226 Finally, it has also been 
explained as an instantiation of a procedural conception of aggregative democracy 
characterized simply by majority rule, covering nearly eighty percent of the population in one 
way or another.227 
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These concepts of formal and substantive equality, individual and group rights, 
antidiscrimination, personal autonomy, corrective and distributive justice, and procedural 
democracy have no doubt served a useful purpose in helping make sense of affirmative action 
as a constitutional policy in post-independence India. Their general influence has however 
meant that the system of reservations is essentially viewed as a successful or flawed 
actualization of particular normative values by existing judicial, executive and legislative 
institutions, and concomitantly as supplying a modular blueprint for institutional designers to 
consider emulating in deeply divided societies elsewhere in the world. In other words, it is 
understood primarily from the point of constituted power connected at best with the 
constitution of government as an institutional apparatus of rule, which has in effect resulted in 
a comparative neglect of the more fundamental idea of constituent power alluding to the 
constitution of state as a whole into a political unity. I therefore wish to address this lacuna in 
the literature by tracing the antecedents of affirmative action on grounds of backwardness in 
postcolonial India to the colonial history of minority entitlements and the constitutional 
imagination of anticolonial nationalism. 
 
The chapter is divided into five parts. In part one, I begin with the tension between homogenous 
universality and heterogeneous particularity which generally informs much of the intellectual 
discussion on the making of India’s collective constitutional subject. My argument will be that 
this antinomy cannot be regarded as having lent India’s constitutional experience a distinct 
postcolonial specificity, as it has in fact been a central feature in the intellectual history of the 
sovereignty concept across the globe. In order to explain what sets apart the Indian political 
from the global, part two makes a case for dissociating the homogeneity-heterogeneity dyad 
from the civil society-community framework of postcolonial theory, and recontextualizing it 
within the prism of the two primordial categories of collective intentionality, that is of the own 
and the strange, which are essentially at the root of structuring any multitude into a political 
unity. Connecting homogeneity and heterogeneity with ideas of the self, the other and the 
stranger, the third and fourth parts will seek to establish that the constitutional subject in India 
was in fact shaped by two fundamentally incompatible articulations of unity in diversity, 
anchored either in the social domain of familiarity or in the political domain of contract, and 
governed by the competing logics of dharma and dhamma respectively. Finally, in part five, I 
show how these contrasting images of collective selfhood confronted each other at the moment 
of transition from the colonial to the postcolonial, and displaced minority with backwardness 
as the new fault line for a counter hegemonic politics of a-legality.  
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1   Debating homogenous universality and heterogenous particularity in Indian 
constitution making 
 
Since India’s collective constitutional subject has explicitly been founded on the political 
principle of unity in diversity, no investigation into the intellectual history of its making is 
possible without focusing on the mediating ideas of homogenous universality and 
heterogeneous particularity which are increasingly being recognized as the basic building 
blocks of the modern state form everywhere across the globe. This is more so the case in India, 
where a deeply entangled relationship between these categories is in fact understood as having 
lent the republican constitutional state its distinct postcolonial specificity. In order to elucidate 
how their harmonic and disharmonic interaction is generally perceived in legal and political 
scholarship on the constitution, let me commence with two major constituent moments 
witnessed during the final phase of colonial rule, which continue to remain germinally 
significant in the postcolonial period even today. 
 
The first such episode pertains to the assertion of constituent power by MK Gandhi at the 
Second Round Table Conference in 1932, where he was famously confronted by BR Ambedkar 
on the issue of separate electorates for the then untouchable community of Depressed Classes, 
more popularly known today as the Dalits. Separate electorates had been controversially 
introduced by the colonial government in the context of an otherwise limited franchize as a 
special form of legislative representation for different communal minorities, who voted 
alongside a general electorate mostly composed of Hindu upper caste urban professionals to 
elect their own representatives in provincial and imperial legislative councils. They were 
initially granted to the Muslims in 1909, later extended to smaller groups such as the Sikhs, the 
Europeans and the Indian Christians in 1919 and 1935, and on Ambedkar’s passionate 
insistence almost to the Depressed Classes as well, but Gandhi’s forceful intervention came in 
the way. 
 
Gandhi held that unlike the question of religious minorities which did certainly concern a wider 
cross-section of people, the problem of untouchability was internal to Hinduism and had to 
find a solution within it alone. While repudiating Ambedkar’s demand, Gandhi not only relied 
upon the claim of the Congress to represent the whole of India, but further went on to declare 
emphatically that more than anyone else, it is he who represented the vast mass of untouchables 
in his own individual capacity:  
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‘I claim myself in my own person to represent the vast mass of the Untouchables. Here 
I speak not merely on behalf of the Congress, but I speak on my own behalf, and I claim 
that I would get, if there was a referendum of the Untouchables, their vote, and that I 
would top the poll.’228  
 
It goes without saying of course that implicit herein was a claim to represent the caste Hindus 
also, which prompted him in fact to talk about saving Hinduism from being compartmentalized 
into two divisions, if need arose even with his own life. So when British Prime Minister 
Ramsay MacDonald announced the so called Communal Award recommending the extension 
of separate electorates to the Depressed Classes for the next twenty years in areas where they 
were most populous, and at the same time allowing them to vote in general constituencies 
alongside caste Hindus, Gandhi decided to commence a fast unto death in Yerawada Jail, a fast 
which was to end only when the government agreed to withdraw this scheme and all 
representatives of the Depressed Classes were required to be elected by the general electorate 
under a common franchize. 
 
Ambedkar on his part sought to follow the example of the powerful Muslim model, and argued 
that the untouchables were an altogether separate community outside the fold of caste Hindu 
society, who were entitled to special legislative representation in the same way as was the case 
with other communal minorities under colonial constitutionalism. As a virtual outcaste in the 
country of his birth, he could not get himself to look past India’s hierarchical social divisions 
and uncritically endorse the Congress imagination of an extant culture of composite 
nationalism. So when praised by Gandhi as a ‘patriot of sterling worth’ for his espousal of 
swaraj at the First Roundtable Conference, Ambedkar insisted that he had no homeland of his 
own to speak about:  
 
‘How can I call this land my own homeland and this religion my own wherein we are 
treated worse than cats and dogs, wherein we cannot get water to drink ? No self-
respecting Untouchable worth the name will be proud of this land. … . If at all I have 
rendered any national service as you say, helpful or beneficial, to the patriotic cause of 
this country, it is due to my unsullied conscience and not due to any patriotic feelings 
in me.’229  
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Ambedkar had in fact indicated from the very beginning of his career that he prioritized the 
cause of the untouchables more than everything else, even though the precise contents of their 
constitutional entitlements were definitively sketched out by him only later on. There was an 
initial preference in his scheme for universal suffrage for the Depressed Classes, but since this 
was unlikely to be materialized anytime soon, he unequivocally asked for separate electorates 
at the Second Roundtable Conference and therefore ended up clashing with Gandhi as a 
consequence. 
 
In order to save Gandhi’s life however, Ambedkar was eventually left with no option but to 
compromise with his demand and sign upon the Poona Pact, which abandoned the idea of 
separate electorates and put the touchables and untouchables together in a joint electorate, 
albeit by also going on to provide a much larger number of reserved seats to the Depressed 
Classes in comparison with what they were supposed to receive under MacDonald’s 
Communal Award. Furthermore, there was an additional facility of a primary election in every 
reserved constituency, wherein voters belonging to the Depressed Classes were to first elect a 
panel of four candidates, who were to then contest a second election involving all voters 
making up the general electorate. This seemed to be only a provisional resolution of the conflict 
at the time, but was later carried forward even into the postcolonial constitution of 1950, and 
came to be regarded as a chief inspiration behind its scheme on reservations.230 
 
The second constituent episode took place just before independence, when the Cabinet Mission 
was sent to India in 1946 by the post War British Labour government to negotiate the terms of 
decolonization and set in motion a machinery for the framing of a new homegrown 
constitution. Tasked with an onerous responsibility of mediating between the Congress’s idea 
of India as one integrated nation with a diverse population and the Muslim League’s idea of 
India as two separate nations of Hindustan and Pakistan belonging to the Hindus and Muslims 
respectively, the Mission settled upon a proposal for a three tiered federation in a single 
sovereign state with a semblance of communal parity. Although the plan was initially accepted 
by both parties, neither of the two was fully satisfied with all of the proposals contained therein. 
While for the League, the basic problem was that this constitutional arrangement diverged 
sharply from its demand for a separate Pakistan that was equal in status to its Hindu counterpart, 
what Congress found most contentious was the requirement of a compulsory grouping of Hindu 
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majority provinces and Muslim majority provinces which could in effect impinge upon the 
sovereign character of the newly created Constituent Assembly. 
 
So even as elections were held for the constitution making body and an interim government 
was established later on in accordance with the plan, the brief moment of detente between the 
two rival parties came to an end when Congress President Jawaharlal Nehru controversially 
remarked in a press conference that his party had made no other commitment to anybody apart 
from agreeing to participate in the Constituent Assembly. Nehru categorically stated that the 
Congress was ‘entirely and absolutely free’ to determine what it would do in the Constituent 
Assembly, and thus opened up the possibility also of changing or modifying the terms of the 
Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought best.231 Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the President of the Muslim 
League, found in this an excellent pretext to withdraw his party’s acceptance of the plan, and 
instruct its representatives to boycott the Assembly and prepare for ‘Direct Action’ for the 
creation of an independent Pakistan. What followed next was a period of intense communal 
violence, which culminated eventually in the partition of undivided India into two sovereign 
states of India and Pakistan, with separate constituent assemblies of their own as laid down 
under the Indian Independence Act of 1947. 
 
As a consequence, the Congress now came to enjoy a much stronger majority in India’s 
Constituent Assembly, and was therefore in a position to actualize its constitutional vision of 
a centralized federal state with little difficulty. But although managing to displace Jinnah and 
the question of religion from the centre of the Indian political, it had to come to terms at least 
with Ambedkar and the question of caste in order to claim legitimacy to speak in the name of 
the people as a whole. The colonial government had by that time ceased to recognize Ambedkar 
as an important player on the negotiating table, especially after his Scheduled Castes Federation 
suffered heavy defeats in the elections of 1945, albeit hampered no doubt by the denial of a 
separate electorate to the untouchables. Ambedkar never the less received a respectable 
position in the new postcolonial dispensation, which was necessary from the Congress’s point 
of view to break his developing political alliance with Jinnah. He was reelected to the 
Constituent Assembly on a Congress ticket in 1947 after losing his earlier seat as a result of 
partition, made the Chairman of its Drafting Committee and even offered a berth in the union 
cabinet as independent India’s first law minister. These favours were welcomed by Ambedkar 
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in spite of his well known antagonism with the Congress, because he understood that 
participating in the constitution making exercise was going to be crucial for the future prospects 
of the Dalit community in the country.232 After joining hands with the Congress however, 
Ambedkar could no longer persist with his demand for a separate electorate. But nor could the 
Congress reject his alternative proposal for affirmative action in its entirety. So both sides had 
to make concessions and compromises while coming together to frame a new constitution for 
postcolonial India in a spirit of mutual accommodation, since this was meant to be nothing 
short of an unequivocal expression of people’s constituent power that had purportedly been 
suppressed under two centuries of colonial rule.233 
 
These two episodes discussed herein above invariably invite attention to a confrontation 
between the homogenous universalism of nationalist thought on one hand and the heterogenous 
particularism of community allegiances on the other.234 Although such a tension has come to 
be reduced to a legally manageable rivalry between individuated citizenship and group 
entitlements under India’s formal constitution, it remains more intractable at the level of the 
material constitution, which is interpreted especially in postcolonial scholarship as alluding to 
an irresolvable contradiction between the universal history of bourgeois rights and abstract 
labour ‘posited by capital’, and particular histories of community that do not belong to capital’s 
own ‘life process’.235 Implicit here is an argument most thoughtfully developed by Sudipta 
Kaviraj about India’s alternative trajectory of modernity, which did not entail a transition from 
ascriptive gemeinschaftlich to contractual gesellschaftlich associations as had been stipulated 
in contemporary European social theory expounded by the likes of Henry Maine and Ferdinand 
Tonnies, but instead involved a move away from a fuzzy unenumerated sense of community 
to a fixed enumerated one.236 It can further be inferred from Dipesh Chakrabarty’s insightful 
theorization that even though this fixed and enumerated sense of community identity was 
sought to be sublated here within the institutional form of the nation state operating in the 
empty homogenous time of abstract capital, such a totalizing project was interrupted and 
resisted by heterotemporalities of collective subaltern subjectivities and their different counter 
hegemonic practices.237 
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In other words, critical postcolonial theorists of the material constitution regard the tension 
between homogeneity and heterogeneity as an irreconcilable one, and present it as a distinctive 
feature of the Indian experience which is in effect incommensurable with the working of the 
archetypal modern European state. Their starting premise is that in European constitutional 
imagination, political unity is largely understood as dependent upon the creation of a social 
homogeneity within the constitutional order. Although a similar connection between unity and 
homogeneity is acknowledged even in respect of India’s nationalist thought, they never the less 
harp upon the ineliminability of a resilient social heterogeneity from its body politic. In Partha 
Chatterjee’s estimation in fact, no available historical narrative of the nation can help resolve 
the resulting contradictions between the utopian homogeneity of undivided popular 
sovereignty and the real heterogeneity of a congeries of populations.238 
 
But if we look beyond the civil society-community problematic of the material constitution 
and focus instead on the symbolic constitution of political unity, it would be clear that far from 
being unique to the formation of the constitutional subject in postcolonial India alone, this 
antinomy has in one way or another come to be recognized today as a central feature in the 
intellectual history of the sovereignty concept across the globe. As historian David Gilmartin 
has shown by drawing upon a wide cross-section of scholarship ranging from the work of J.R. 
Heesterman on the ‘conundrum of the king’s authority’ in ancient India, and Azfar Moin on 
the ‘millennial sovereign’ in the Muslim Safavid and Mughal empires, to Ernst Kantorowicz 
on the ‘king’s two bodies’ in medieval Europe, the multiple articulations of sovereignty in 
different jurisdictional contexts have commonly been attributed to an insoluble paradox of state 
power, grounding legitimate rule in a space simultaneously and contradictorily imagined as 
both outside and within worldly society. What this basically means is that sovereign rulers 
everywhere across the globe have generally projected themselves as embodying their whole 
community as a political unity by transcending everyday immediate politics, while at the same 
time being also required to manage the divisions and conflicts immanent to the mundane 
political world as effective agents of order and governance.239 Thus the paradox of India’s 
postcolonial constitution allowing full play to the ordinary politics of caste and religion in spite 
of its political unity being premised upon an individuated conception of citizenship comes 
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across in a reading like that of Gilmartin as nothing but a specific manifestation of a wider 
global problematic of sovereignty under twentieth century conditions of popular democracy.  
 
I would however take such a formulation as my point of departure in the remainder of this 
chapter, as contrary to a commonly shared presupposition of both postcolonial theory as well 
as global history paradigms, the conflict between homogenous universalism and heterogeneous 
particularism is not all that there was to the working of the Indian political and the shaping of 
its constitutional subject. While sticking to the postcolonial emphasis on India’s alternative 
trajectory of political modernity, I shall seek to establish that the constitutional debates on 
separate electorates and affirmative action were in fact anchored in two competing articulations 
of this tension, which can in turn be traced to a more fundamental incompatibility between the 
social and political conceptions of law and subjectivity, or that between dharma and dhamma 
respectively. It is here that the Indian political comes across as most distinctive and diverges 
categorically from the global model of sovereignty at the level of the symbolic constitution. 
2   The own and the strange in colonial and anticolonial constitutional imagination 
 
In order to establish the distinctiveness of India’s constitutional engagement with the question 
of homogeneity and heterogeneity, I must first dissociate this dyad from the framework of civil 
society and community enunciated in postcolonial theory, by attempting to connect it instead 
with readily available juridical discourses of the common law and the civil law. A complete 
convergence would of course be impossible to discern, for even if the two major legal 
languages of the world may have been in wide circulation over here, their deployment was 
dependent on reasons that were entirely internal to the different projects of subverting or 
upholding the Indian political. But what this would at least enable me to do is to prepare the 
ground for recontextualizing the dyad within the two more primordial categories of collective 
intentionality, that is of the own and the strange, which are at the root of structuring any 
multitude into a political unity. 
 
We saw in the previous section how postcolonial theory sought to challenge the hegemony of 
a capitalist civil society by counterposing it with a resistive narrative of community which 
capital could never overcome, especially in a non-European setting like that of colonial India. 
What it also emphasized was that far from acting as a neutral third party in respect of this 
conflictual relationship, the state was rather inextricably intertwined with interests of colonial 
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civil society, which were invariably prioritized over those of indigenous communities. There 
is little to disagree with in such a reading, but instead of connecting it to neo-Marxian and 
Foucauldian perspectives on the perils and possibilities of liberal governmentality as has 
usually been the case in the critical scholarship produced thus far, I would prefer to adopt a 
more nominal approach and attribute this mutual entanglement to the legal culture of common 
law that was transferred to India during colonial rule. It must be pointed out that institutions of 
civil society including economic production and markets, police and corporations, and private 
law and administration of justice have been understood as separate from and outside the public 
oriented governing institutions of the state only in the legal imagination of continental Europe. 
In contrast, British common law generally regarded the political authority of the state as a 
fundamental institution of civil society, and thus as much more embedded in the structures of 
everyday life than its abstract theorization in the civil law tradition.240 This symbiosis of state 
and civil society received further impetus with the suppression of the seventeenth century 
Leveller discourse on people’s constituent power premised upon conditions of public and 
private autonomy, and its subsequent absorption into the doctrine of the absolute authority of 
the Crown-in-Council-in-Parliament to speak for the nation as a whole.241 Such a common law 
driven constitutional state bolstered by a Hobbesian conception of sovereignty is what 
prevailed in colonial India as well, and hence the absence over here of a state-civil society 
distinction should not surprise, at least when examined strictly from a juridical point of view. 
 
There was however one major difference which separated the metropolitan state from its 
colonial counterpart in India. While sovereignty was instituted in the former context through a 
heuristic social contract, which constituted a multitude afraid of each other in the state of nature 
into a commonwealth that was exclusively represented in a sovereign leviathan, in the latter 
context, it was acquired by force, and depended upon an act of submission on the part of the 
conquered out of fear not of themselves but of the conqueror.242 Even though Hobbes suggested 
that the same rights and consequences followed in the two cases, since instituted and acquired 
forms of sovereignty were both ultimately founded upon a preference for life over death, we 
have seen in chapter one how the operationalization of constitutionalism in India’s colonial 
setting ended up diverging so fundamentally from its career in the contemporary metropole. 
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While the exercise of ordinary and extraordinary governmental authority at home was 
interpreted as a reiteration of the national people’s sovereign selfhood, the resort to coercion 
and domination, or even simply adhering to constitutional restraints in the colonial field could 
not be justified amidst an alien population except by drawing upon the two antipolitical 
ideologies of improvement and protection specifically developed in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. There was thus a clear bifurcation in British constitutional imagination 
between a space designated as its own, comprising the colonial state and civil society nexus, 
and a strange space inhabited by the diverse population of India’s indigenous society. As it was 
constitutively influenced by the onset of an abstract modernity, this distinction became more 
pronounced with time and in turn created conditions for the emergence of an anticolonial 
discourse on constituent power, which superficially bore greater resonance with the juridical 
experience of the continental world. 
 
When common law presuppositions were grafted onto the categories of the own and the strange 
in colonial India, the resulting outcome brought it peculiarly close to the continental 
constitutional tradition, and the distinction made therein between the public and the private 
respectively. In order to explain how this convergence came about, I borrow from Hannah 
Arendt who observed in her work on the modern age of expansionist imperialism that the 
British proved adept not at pursuing the ‘Roman art of empire building’ but instead at following 
the ‘Greek model of colonization’ while competing with other major European powers for 
economic and political supremacy across the world. Rather than attempting to assimilate or 
integrate all dependencies under a single jus and imperium as the French had sought to do in 
Roman style, English colonists settled down in their newly acquired territories as members of 
the same British nation with a common law and a common past, which they refrained from 
imposing upon the conquered peoples. These subjects were in fact left to their own devices in 
respect of law, religion and culture, under the management of a supposedly humane and 
culturally sensitive mechanism of indirect rule.243 In India more specifically, the British strove 
to create a colonial public by codifying various aspects of procedural and substantive civil and 
criminal law, ranging from crime and evidence to contract, transfer of property, trusts, 
easements and so on, while at the same time permitting the multitude of local natives occupying 
the private domain of culture some degree of liberty in matters of religion, caste and family, 
where they were purportedly governed in accordance with their respective personal laws. 
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Postcolonial scholars have of course emphasized that this state policy of non-interference was 
hardly a benign enterprise, for even if direct intervention in its affairs may have been mostly 
avoided, a distinct cultural domain was first sought to be produced afresh through different 
forms of colonial knowledge, and then regulated all the same without compromising upon the 
priorities of the ruling regime. According to them, what happened as a result was that a complex 
social terrain comprising a radically diverse multitude came to be reduced to a more simplified 
population legible enough for governmental purposes, while its concrete customary norms of 
behaviour were converted into increasingly abstract formulations of a rationalizing 
modernizing common law legality. 
 
I would like to suggest however that the colonial situation was not particularly unique at least 
in this respect, as it merely replicated a general feature of European legal theory in which the 
distinction between public law and private law was envisaged as a public one.244 But unlike in 
Europe where the public and the private came together in a unified political whole, the own 
and the strange in colonial India remained incommensurably severed from one another, and 
could never be brought together as a constitutional unity by an antipolitical public sphere. 
 
It is this colonial imagination of a bifurcated space of the own and the strange which was carried 
forward into debates on the issue of representative government during the first decades of the 
twentieth century, albeit under conditions of a limited franchize. The idea of territorial 
constituencies for the general population familiar from the working of the first-past-the-post 
system of elections in the metropole had to be supplemented in India by a scheme of special 
representation for minority communities identified on the basis of religion and caste, a 
constitutional policy somewhat akin to how different intermediary corporate interests lying 
between civil society and state were sought to be accommodated politically through the system 
of proportional representation in continental Europe. Yet neither could ascriptive identities and 
choice based interests be thought of as equivalent categories, nor were contemporary European 
nation states particularly successful in according constitutional protection to their respective 
minority populations, a failure in fact which eventually culminated in the barbarity of the 
Jewish holocaust. The British policy of special legislative representation in India was therefore 
incomparable with European examples, at least in so far as it was premised upon the 
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constitutive necessity of maintaining a virtual distance between the state and civil society nexus 
as the sphere of the own on the one hand, and an abstract construction of indigenous society as 
a society of strangers unbridgeably divided into different communities on the other. It is on the 
basis of this hierarchical distinction that self government for the native population was 
indefinitely deferred to an unspecified future, that is until they underwent a sufficiently long 
period of colonial tutelage in liberal civilizational values. 
 
By way of a response, nationalist thought rejected such a characterization of India as an 
agglomeration of communities, and harped upon an already existing culture of civilizational 
unity in the name of which political sovereignty was eventually acquired in 1947, and sought 
to be institutionalized under the republican constitution of 1950. It thus inverted the prevailing 
legal imagination of the own and the strange, by striving to disrupt the ‘what are Indians’ 
question of sameness and difference asked by the colonial regime in the process of governing 
a diverse population, with the ‘who are we’ question of selfhood and alterity asked by the 
people themselves in their united capacity.245 While such interruptions of extant forms of 
constituted power by novel articulations of constituent power have been common to other 
modern revolutions and constitution making enterprises as well including those in the wider 
postcolonial world, what set late colonial India apart was that even though the Congress did try 
to dominate the national movement over here by claiming to be the only authentic 
representative of the entire people, it could not prevent the formation of multiple parties with 
rival constituent possibilities struggling for supremacy in the constitutional field at the time of 
decolonization and beyond.246 As must be clear from the previous section, Jinnah’s Muslim 
League and Ambedkar’s Dalit politics emerged as its most formidable opponents in the project 
of reconstructing India’s constitutional identity. But rather than conveniently reducing these 
conflicting positions to a simple binary tension between homogeneity and heterogeneity or 
universalism and particularism for the constitution to negotiate provisionally, I shall now 
proceed to argue in parts three and four that they produced two contrasting imaginations of 
unity in diversity, which sought to fashion the constitutional subject either in the social domain 
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of familiarity or in the political domain of contract governed by the competing logics of dharma 
and dhamma respectively. 
3   The social familiarity of self and other in nationalist thought 
	  
Although India’s anticolonial movement had largely remained a nonviolent struggle for 
emancipation from colonial rule, its independence and partition was tragically accompanied by 
an immense violence, with different factions of a supposedly united people killing each other 
in an unprecedented fashion. This was possible because, as Shruti Kapila has explained, unlike 
the centrality of the distinction between the friend and the foe in the Schmittian understanding 
of the political that so influentially circulated across the globe in the twentieth century, it was 
the issue of fraternal enmity which equipped the political in modern India.247 However empty 
of meaning his two categories may otherwise have been, the foe was for Carl Schmitt at least 
a solely public enemy which existed whenever a fighting collectivity of people potentially 
confronted another similar collectivity in a relationship of public hostility, and not a private 
adversary towards whom one was inimically or hatefully predisposed.248 In India however, a 
more primary distinction between the own and the strange informed the working of its legal 
order much more than what was at best a secondary division between public and private, 
enforced and administered here ultimately with a view to advance the good of the colonial 
regime. As a result, anticolonial thinkers did not rest content merely with the transformation of 
their indigenous society hitherto defined in private terms into a rival conception of public alone, 
but instead sought to invert the colonial construction of the own and the strange altogether, by 
counterposing an inner domain of collective selfhood against an alien liberal constitutionalism 
operational in the outer domain of state and civil society. But contrary to Schmitt who used the 
stranger as a synonym for the other and reduced it to an enemy,249 the phenomenon of enmity 
in late colonial India was, to borrow from Ashis Nandy’s psychoanalytically inflected 
language, rather ‘intimate’ in nature, where far from being equatable to the stranger, the other 
was present both as a temptation and a possibility for the own self.250 In such a context 
therefore, the fratricidal violence of partition became a ruptural event for the self to try and 
cleanse itself of the other with which it was ordinarily so closely intertwined, whilst at the same 
time also being able to bid a gracious farewell to the departing colonial stranger. 
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So in contradistinction to the Schmittian categories of public friendship and public enmity, 
familiar relations of fraternal intimacy prevailing in the indigenous anticolonial society 
provided the starting point for discussions of the Indian political, or at least of what I have been 
referring to as its dharma based social model. The connection between dharma and intimacy 
in intellectual imaginations of the political can most revealingly be traced in modern 
commentaries on the Bhagavad Gita and the central dilemma posed therein by the warrior 
Arjuna to his divine charioteer Lord Krishna, that being whether to kill or not to kill his 
kinsmen on the battlefield.251 There emerged various contemporary interpretations of Krishna’s 
advice persuading Arjuna to fight in the civil war, chief among which was Bal Gangadhar 
Tilak’s take on the ethicality of desireless action (nishkam karma) as the core of the Gita, and 
its absolute prioritization therein over the pursuit of knowledge and devotion harped upon in 
other such commentaries.252 In thus predicating the political upon the possibility of brothers 
within a house converting into enemies on the eve of war, Tilak was able to anticipate how 
violence would not only be foundational to India’s constitution of state, but also remain a 
persisting internal feature of its body politic, which could neither be crushed by declaring an 
emergency nor be tamed within formal legal instruments of legitimized coercion and 
domination, as has arguably been the case in the archetypal modern European state.253 
 
Unlike Tilak, Gandhi read the Gita as allegorically eluding to the eternal struggle of dharma 
with adharma, and drew from it the central message of performing ethically right action under 
all circumstances, which in turn provided the basis for his generative politics of satya and 
ahimsa, or truth and nonviolence.254 But rather than sublating the aforementioned intimate 
enmity into the abstract mediation of modern constitutionalism, the syncretic communal 
harmony of premodernity, or the invisibilizing assimilation of the other into the self as under 
ethnic nationalism, he sought to recast it as a relationship of everyday neighbourliness by 
encouraging the self to preserve the otherness of others and lovingly offer unconditional 
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sacrifices for their sake as a matter of ethical duty.255 Objecting to interdining and intermarriage 
as models of miscibility appropriate for national unification, he suggested that ‘the true beauty 
of Hindu-Mahomedan Unity lies in each remaining true to his own religion and yet being true 
to each other.’ Hindu Muslim unity was for him instead dependent on the two communities 
‘having a common purpose, a common goal and common sorrows’, without necessarily 
approving everything that they were required to tolerate in each other’s manners and 
customs.256 Distinguishing himself from social reformers of the past such as Kabir and Guru 
Nanak who attempted to fuse the Hindus and the Muslims by showing the basic unity of all 
religions, Gandhi observed that   
 
‘the effort today is not for uniting the religions, but for uniting hearts while maintaining 
the separateness of religions. … . The effort is to see how the orthodox Hindu, while 
remaining staunchly Hindu, can respect and sincerely wish prosperity to an orthodox 
Muslim. True, this attempt is altogether new, but its spirit is there at the roots of Hindu 
dharma.’257 
 
Gandhi’s uncompromising commitment to a politics of asymmetrical recognition of the other 
was best demonstrated in his refusal to make Hindu participation in the Khilafat movement 
contingent upon Muslim reciprocation on the issue of cow slaughter.258 He urged Hindus to 
dutifully co-operate with their Muslim neighbours in what was a ‘morally just’ campaign 
launched in the immediate aftermath of the First World War to have the British government 
honour its ‘broken pledge’ and retain the titular authority of the defeated Ottoman Sultan as 
Caliph of the Islamic world, without in any way obliging them to return the gesture by 
abstaining from killing the cow considered holy in dominant strands of Hindu imagination. 
Declining any bargain on the Khilafat question, he stated thus:  
 
‘I consider myself to be among the staunchest of Hindus. I am as eager to save the cow 
from the Mussulman's knife as any Hindu. But on that very account I refuse to make 
my support of the Mussulman claim on the khilafat conditional upon his saving the 
cow. The Mussulman is my neighbour. He is in distress. His grievance is legitimate and 
it is my bounden duty to help him to secure redress by every legitimate means in my 
power even to the extent of losing my life and property. … . The nobility of the help 
will be rendered nugatory if it was rendered conditionally. That the result will be the 
saving of the cow is a certainty. But should it turn out to be otherwise, my view will 
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not be affected in any manner whatsoever. The test of friendship is a spirit of love and 
sacrifice independent of expectation of any return.’ 259 
 
This Gandhian idea of converting intimate enmity into neighbourly friendship by respecting 
the absolute difference between the self and the other not only extended to the cultural domain 
of religious freedom alone, but also informed his lifelong espousal of ‘indivisible India’ as an 
‘article of faith’ and eventual coming to terms with its partition into two sovereign nation states 
at the moment of decolonization. It is true that in insisting upon the prior achievement of 
independence for India as a whole before getting down to settle the Pakistan question, Gandhi 
only appeared to be endorsing the official Congress position giving precedence to the 
acquisition of political power by a national unity over issues relating to its division and 
distribution which were to be resolved later on under a formal constitution enacted by the 
Constituent Assembly. Unlike the Congress however, he did not seek to tame the Hindu-
Muslim antagonism through the mediation of an abstract civic nationalism, and merely 
envisioned the coming together of the self and the other in a common struggle for the ouster of 
the colonizing stranger without in any way giving up on their distinct collective identities. 
 
Rather than positing the Congress as a natural successor to the colonial regime, Gandhi was 
astonishingly open about the possibilities for the future of free India without the British:  
 
‘Thus assuming that the British leave, there is no government and no constitution, 
British or other. Therefore there is no Central Government. Militarily the most powerful 
party may set up its rule and impose it on India if the people submit. Muslims may 
declare Pakistan and nobody may resist them. Hindus may do likewise, Sikhs may set 
up their rule in territories inhabited by them. There is no end to the possibilities. And 
to all this idle speculation let me suggest one more addition. The Congress and the 
League being the best organized parties in the country may come to terms and set up a 
provisional government acceptable to all.’260  
 
But such a popular government based on mutual cooperation was never to be established, 
especially in the presence of the British as the third party outsider to whom rival indigenous 
parties looked for support and sustenance, rather than having to rely upon each other for 
retaining their power. So Gandhi finally wrote to the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten in May 1947 
suggesting that the colonial government should transfer its power to an interim government 
constituted entirely by a single party:  
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‘Meantime the Interim Government should be composed either of Congressmen or 
those whose names the Congress chooses or of Muslim League men or those whom the 
League chooses. The dual control of today, lacking team work and team spirit, is 
harmful for the country. The parties exhaust themselves in the effort to retain their seat 
and to placate you.’261  
 
Even if partition had become inevitable, he stated that the British should not preside over it and 
instead leave this for the Indians to decide upon themselves through nonviolent or violent 
methods:  
 
‘Whatever may be said to the contrary, it would be a blunder of the first magnitude for 
the British to be party in any way whatsoever to the division of India. If it has to come, 
let it come after the British withdrawal, as a result of understanding between the parties 
or of an armed conflict’.262  
 
All this while, Gandhi was well aware that the immediate departure of the British would likely 
plunge India into ‘anarchy or chaos’ marked by ‘no rule in the initial stage’, since victory was 
gained by ‘moral force’ and not the ‘force of arms’. Yet risking such an eventuality was 
necessary, for ‘we would still go through the fire no doubt, but that fire would purify us.’263 
 
As Faisal Devji has shown, while the Congress, the League and the British were driven by the 
threat and fear of violence when they came to agree upon the partition of India, Gandhi was 
even ready to risk a civil war that could have brought Hindus and Muslims into a direct and 
unmediated conflict with one another, for the possible emergence of a genuine nonviolence if 
only enough people were willing to sacrifice their lives in demonstrating its reality. But with 
little active support for his proposal from within the Congress establishment, a thoroughly 
disillusioned Gandhi gave into the inevitability of partition, and dedicated himself to working 
for ‘heart unity’ between Hindus and Muslims in India, and between the neighbouring people 
of India and Pakistan, notwithstanding the newly drawn territorial borders separating them. 
This was until his assassination on 30th January 1948, by an ethnic Hindu nationalist deeply 
anxious about exorcising the other from the self through its forcible assimilation within a nation 
defined purely in terms of blood and soil.264 
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4   A political contract between non-national strangers 
 
I have focused thus far on the inextricably intertwined Hindu-Muslim relationship with 
reference to a categorial distinction between the self and the other. But this distinction does not 
suffice to capture the whole picture about India’s collective constitutional subject in all its 
complexities, especially after we introduce into the mix the figure of the untouchable Dalit, 
which destabilized a dualistic politics of religion with a crosscutting politics of caste in the 
colonial period, and went on to supplant it as the basic template of counter hegemony in the 
postcolonial period. What made the Dalits so generative for constitutional politics was the 
invitation they offered to move beyond the tension between self and other in the inner domain 
of social familiarity, and fashion a new political law and subjectivity in the outer domain of 
anticolonial society occupied not by brothers, kinsmen or neighbours, but by a more distant 
figure of the stranger. Although a possible yet tragic and only partially accomplished solution 
to the problematic of intimate enmity between self and other was the extrication of the Muslim 
from the Hindu by being converted into a foreigner, such an option was not available to the 
Dalit as stranger, who was not reducible to a foreigner and was in fact sought to be integrated 
into India’s own national selfhood. Let me now turn to the contested contours of such 
integration by focusing for one final time on the Gandhi Ambedkar debate. 
 
The estrangement of Dalits from the Hindu social order was implicitly recognized even by 
Gandhi, in a curious analogy that he would often make between what colonial rule had done to 
the people of India and what Hindus had wrought upon the untouchables. Quoting from the 
moderate nationalist Gopal Krishna Gokhale, he suggested that in suppressing the 
untouchables, the Hindus had themselves become depressed, and that their status as ‘pariahs 
of the empire’ was the ‘retributive justice meted out to us by a just God.’265 Furthermore, 
writing in 1921 about his abandonment of the belief that he was a citizen of the empire, Gandhi 
stated thus:  
 
‘I can take no pride in calling the empire mine or describing myself as a citizen. On the 
contrary, I fully realize that I am a pariah untouchable of the empire. I must therefore 
constantly pray for its radical reconstruction or total destruction, even as a Hindu pariah 
would be fully justified in so praying about Hinduism or Hindu society.’266 
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While we can say that Gandhi had transitioned from arguing for the ‘radical reconstruction’ of 
empire to wishing for its ‘total destruction’ by the Quit India Movement of 1942, never in life 
did he cease to have faith in the spiritually generous Hinduism of his imagination to be 
entertaining any thought of calling for its complete overhaul. Unlike the colonizing stranger 
who had to be removed from India, the alienation of estranged Dalits was to be overcome by 
including them within the own sphere of Hindu society and not just that of the nation alone. 
Gandhi’s unyielding conviction in the possibility of such an inclusion was at the crux of his 
vehement opposition to Ambedkar’s advocacy of separate electorates, which he challenged 
precisely in such terms at the Second Round Table conference:  
 
‘Let this Committee and let the whole world know that today there is a body of Hindu 
reformers who are pledged to remove this blot of untouchability. We do not want on 
our register and on our census untouchables classified as a separate class. Sikhs may 
remain as such in perpetuity, so may Mohamedans, so may Europeans. Will 
untouchables remain untouchables in perpetuity?’267  
 
So the untouchable was not the intimate other who had to be accorded asymmetrical 
recognition by the self, but remained an integral part of the Hindu family notwithstanding their 
legitimate resentment against the abominable practice of untouchability. In Gandhi’s words,  
 
‘my  intimate acquaintance  with  every  shade  of  untouchability convinces me that 
their lives, such as they are, are so intimately mixed with those of the caste Hindus in 
whose midst and for whom they live, that it is impossible to separate them. They are 
part of an indivisible family. Their revolt against the Hindus with whom they live and 
their apostasy from Hinduism I should understand. But this so far as I can see they will 
not do. There is a subtle something—quite indefinable— in Hinduism which keeps 
them in it even in spite of themselves.’268 
 
It is this attempted enfolding of the estranged Dalit within the sphere of the intimate own which 
Ambedkar was most indignant about. But rather than merely refusing integration within a 
preestablished culture of nationalism, he more fundamentally challenged the very nationalist 
credentials of what according to him was an exclusively caste Hindu conception of collective 
selfhood. 
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We must remember here that most mainstream protagonists of the anticolonial movement had 
a strong tendency to presuppose India as an already existing national unity, notwithstanding 
whatever obligations the self may have owed to the other therein. As Gandhi himself observed 
in Hind Swaraj,  
 
‘India cannot cease to be one nation because  people belonging  to  different religions  
live  in  it. The introduction of foreigners does not necessarily destroy the nation; they 
merge in it. A country is one nation only when such a condition obtains in it. That 
country must have a faculty for assimilation. India has ever been such a  country. … . 
The Hindus, the Mahomedans, the Parsis and the Christians who have made India their 
country are fellow countrymen, and they will have  to  live  in unity, if only for their 
own interest. In no part of the world are one nationality and one religion synonymous 
terms; nor has it ever been so in India.’269  
 
Ambedkar’s constitutional politics was premised upon a persistent questioning of this very 
presupposition by raising the issue of caste, which in his understanding had prevented India’s 
transformation into a national unity for much of its recorded history.  
 
Responding to those patriots who claimed that India was a nation because underlying its 
apparent diversity there was a fundamental unity that marked the life of Hindus across the 
country having similar habits and customs, thoughts and beliefs, Ambedkar argued that all of 
these features did not suffice to constitute a multitude into a society of commons. More than 
the parallel performance of similar activities, what bound men into a society was their sharing 
and participation in common activities so that the same emotions of success and failure could 
be aroused in them that were animating the others. This transformation of joint action from the 
aggregative ‘we each’ into the integrative ‘we together’ was inconceivable in India with its 
ancient order of caste: ‘The caste system prevents common activity; and by preventing 
common activity, it has prevented the Hindus from becoming a society with a unified life and 
a consciousness of its own being.’270 
 
When Ambedkar stated that India was not yet a nation, what he meant was that it was actually 
a society of strangers, not in a geographical sense as alluding to a distinction between the 
domestic and the foreigner, for the Hindus occupied the same physical territory and possessed 
similar cultural practices, but in a more primordial sense as alluding to a conceptual and 
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psychological distinction between the inside and the outside, the own and the alien, since they 
did not share a fraternal ‘feeling of fellowship’ with one another which could bind them 
together into a common political unity in spite of their myriad economic and social differences. 
This order of estrangement was juridically enforced through the hierarchical, inegalitarian and 
non-fraternal social law of Hindu dharma, which according to his historical mythography had 
displaced the then reigning political law of Buddhist dhamma broadly contained in the 
principles of nibbana (liberty), samata (equality) and maitri (fraternity), and remained 
hegemonic in India ever since the triumph of Brahminism over Buddhism around the second 
century BC. Therefore, in order to make sense of the nature of estrangement underpinning 
India’s disunited society, it is necessary to briefly turn to his narrative about the decline of 
Buddhism and the subsequent ascendency and eventual entrenchment of Brahminism on the 
seat of political power. 
 
Ambedkar noted that ancient Indian history was marked by several generations of virulent 
fratricidal wars of extermination fought between Aryans and non-Aryans, Brahmins and 
Kshatriyas, and especially after Buddha’s radical denunciation of the fourfold Hindu 
chaturvarna system, there also arose a mortal conflict between Hinduism and Buddhism. 
Buddhism defeated Hinduism and became the state religion during the rule of the Mauryan 
Empire (322 BC to 185 BC), with the Emperor Asoka going on to prohibit animal sacrifice and 
thereby depriving the officiating Brahmins of their chief source of livelihood. Pushyamitra, the 
Brahmin commander in chief of the Mauryan army, revolted against this suppression by 
assassinating the ruling monarch Brihadratha and in turn founding the Sunga dynasty, with a 
view to destroy Buddhism and make Brahmins the sovereign rulers of India. 
 
So contrary to the French Revolution wherein the decapitation of Louis XVI inaugurated 
political modernity, and in the formulation of Claude Lefort opened up the empty space of 
symbolic power previously occupied by the corpus mysticum of the monarch, in Ambedkar’s 
understanding, the Mauryan regicide in ancient India stood for the victory of social law over 
political law and foreclosed any possibility of symbolic unity, with a narrow sectional 
Brahminism incapable of looking at society as a whole except through the prism of its own 
caste interests coming to be firmly entrenched on the seat of sovereignty.271 This sovereignty 
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was expressed in a virulent and violent persecution of Buddhism verging on its complete 
annihilation, and in the promulgation of the post-facto justificatory legal code of Manusmriti 
which validated the Brahminical transgression of Aryan law by recognizing their right to 
become kings, their right to take up arms and their right to commit rebellion and massacre if 
necessary for the preservation of dharma, and conferred upon them various other privileges 
and immunities in respect of teaching the Vedas, performing sacrifices, receiving gifts, 
freedom from taxation and exemption from certain forms of punishment for criminal offences. 
It further went on to transform the flexible pre-Buddhist chaturvarna system of social 
intercourse into a more rigid caste system by making status and occupation hereditary and 
prohibiting interdining and intermarriage among individuals belonging to different caste 
groups. Although the sole intention of these restrictive provisions was to prevent non-Brahmins 
from undertaking united action for the purpose of overthrowing Brahminism, they ended up 
effecting a complete dismemberment of society which could no longer come together as a 
national unity even when faced by external aggression from a foreign nation.272 
 
The Gita which was received as the ur-text in nationalist thought for enabling clear thinking on 
the question of intimate enmity in ethico-political terms, came to be interpreted in Ambedkar’s 
corpus as nothing other than a puerile philosophical defence for the counter revolution of 
Hinduism against Buddhism. Rather than enjoining desireless action or ethically right action 
in a generalized form, he read Krishna exhorting Arjuna to fight on the battlefield as an 
insistence on the detached performance of one’s particularistic caste duties, and thus as merely 
attempting to uphold the doctrinal sanctity of chaturvarna increasingly under threat from 
Buddha’s message of nonviolence and social equality.273 More than the problematic of intimate 
enmity, what the caste system and its graded inequality represented for Ambedkar was the 
exclusion of Shudras and Atishudras from the sphere of sovereignty, and their conversion from 
erstwhile enemies into estranged objects condemned to varying degrees of juridical violence. 
He speculated that this was brought about in the case of Shudras by denying them the sacred 
thread (upanayana), and most perniciously in the case of Atishudras by transforming them 
from ‘broken men’ into ‘untouchables’ after their turn to Buddhism and subsequent refusal to 
give up on beef eating even when the cow had become a totemic figure for Brahminical 
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Hinduism in the fifth century AD.274 Therefore the perpetration of lawlessness against the 
untouchables by the touchables was paradoxically deemed lawful in Hindu society because 
neither of them could meet each other as individuals alone, but only as ‘strangers’ belonging 
to two altogether different groups whose relations were governed by war or negotiation and 
not by law:  
 
‘The relationship resembles the relationship between different clans in primitive 
society. In primitive society the member of the clan has a claim, but the stranger has no 
standing. He may be treated kindly, as a guest, but he cannot demand "justice" at the 
hands of any clan but his own. The dealing of clan with clan is a matter of war or 
negotiation, not of law; and the clanless man is an 'outlaw', in fact as well as in name 
and lawlessness against the strangers is therefore lawful. The untouchable not being a 
member of the group of touchables is a stranger. He is not a kindred. He is an outlaw. 
He cannot claim justice. He cannot claim rights which the touchable is bound to 
respect.’275 
 
I would argue that Ambedkar’s constitutional project was at its most ambitious an attempt to 
convert the aforementioned estranged intercommunal relationship grounded in ‘status’ into a 
collective selfhood based on ‘contract’. Although comparisons can be made here with the social 
contract tradition, it must be emphasized that this estrangement was constituted through the 
symbolic order of Hindu dharma, which could therefore be confronted only by resorting to an 
equally powerful counter symbolic order of Buddhist dhamma. In other words, instead of 
containing social divisions within a contractual language of distributive justice, he was more 
interested in anchoring them afresh in a distinctly political language of shared sovereignty.276 
This possibly entailed at least until India’s independence, different minorities defined in terms 
of caste and even religion coming together against a dominant Hindu majority under the banner 
of a non-sectional political unity. 
 
There was a strong resonance here with the contemporary politics of the Muslim League, at 
least in so far as it sought to convert the intimate enmity between Hindus and Muslims into a 
more formal constitutional relationship grounded in a political contract. The League was in 
fact powerful enough to provide leadership to this emerging minoritarian alliance, but it 
increasingly began to insist upon the recognition of Muslims as a separate nation and not as a 
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mere minority, especially after the perceived betrayal of the Congress in the provincial 
elections of 1937. The two nations theory eventually culminated in the partition of India, in the 
aftermath of which Ambedkar provisionally joined hands with the Congress for the purpose of 
framing a new republican constitution with backwardness as its chief political concept. In the 
final section, I provide a brief historical sketch of this momentous yet non-revolutionary non-
constitutionalist transformation of the constitutional field. 
5   From minority to backwardness 
 
When Jinnah was joined by groups as diverse as the Dalits, the non-Brahmin Justice Party and 
the Hindu Mahasabha in organizing a ‘deliverance day’ to celebrate the Congress resignation 
from provincial governments in 1939 and calling for an enquiry into its alleged atrocities, 
Gandhi wrote him a congratulatory message for bringing all minorities together in a pact, even 
if this involved an opposition towards the policies and politics of the Congress. For Gandhi, 
the Congress majority was ‘made up of a combination of caste Hindus, Muslims, Christians, 
Parsis and Jews’, and could thus be legitimately opposed only by a political formation like the 
minorities pact, which purported to be equally representative of all classes, and could ‘one day 
convert itself into a majority by commending itself to the electorate.’277 In other words, what 
he seemed to be envisaging for India was a Westminster style Parliamentary democracy where 
‘mainly two parties’—that is ‘the Congress’ and ‘non-Congress’ or ‘anti-Congress’—
competed with one another’s ‘body of opinion’ to occupy the seat of governmental authority 
by nevertheless claiming to speak on behalf of a jointly shared national unity. 
 
Although the liberal constitutionalist in Jinnah had indeed been invested in converting India’s 
permanent communal majorities and minorities into changeable political ones in the earlier part 
of his career, a growing disgruntlement with Congress’s ‘Hindu Raj’ and a suspicion towards 
other minorities eventually compelled him to abandon the thought of actualizing this 
possibility, and espouse the two nation theory instead. Thus contrary to Gandhi, he interpreted 
the alignment of different minorities on deliverance day not as an alternative expression of 
national unity, but as a ‘case of adversity’ bringing ‘strange bedfellows’ with ‘common 
interests’ together in justice. There were otherwise no longer any illusions on his part about 
India’s national character: ‘I have no illusions in the matter, and let me say again that India is 
not a nation, nor a country. It is a subcontinent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims 
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being the two major nations.’278 However, this was not accompanied by an unequivocal and 
unambiguous demand for the creation of a separate sovereign state altogether, for even after 
the famous Pakistan Resolution of 1940, the League did reluctantly come to accept the Cabinet 
Mission Plan in 1946, provided it could be interpreted as a scheme for a lose bi-national 
federation constituted through a political contract between two different people-subjects of 
constituent power belonging to the Hindu and Muslim provinces respectively.279 It was only 
after Nehru hinted that the intention of Congress was to enter the Constituent Assembly and 
frame a new constitution by drawing constituent power from a single people-subject, and thus 
dissolve the proposed federation into a federal state with central and provincial governments 
and no intermediary structure of authority, that the League withdrew its support to the plan and 
agitated for India’s division into Hindustan and Pakistan. Yet even as an independent Pakistan 
came into existence, Jinnah continued to deploy the idea of contract while going on to hail the 
occasion as an ‘unprecedented cyclonic revolution’, for having brought a ‘mighty sub-
continent with all kinds of inhabitants’ to agree upon a ‘titanic, unknown, unparalleled’ plan 
for the partition of India and subsequent establishment of two independent sovereign 
dominions in its place, and achieving this ‘peacefully and by means of an evolution of the 
greatest possible character.’280 
 
After such a resolution of the Pakistan question, it was possible to infer that India imagined as 
a pre-existing nation of social familiars could now proceed to give to her territorially curtailed 
selfhood a new constitutional document without having to face any further encumbrances of a 
constitutive nature. At least this is what Nehru had hoped for in his famous ‘tryst with destiny’ 
speech announcing formal independence on the midnight of 15th August 1947. The speech in 
fact turned out to be an archetypal iteration of modern constituent power, in which the past of 
India’s ‘unending quest’ since the ‘dawn of history’ and the future inauguration of a new 
history of ‘greater triumphs and achievements’ were brought together in the present moment 
of waking up to ‘life and freedom’ after enduring a long, painful and sorrowful period of ‘ill 
fortune’. In this inaugural constituent moment, he urged the members of the Constituent 
Assembly to ‘take a pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still 
larger cause of humanity’, and made an appeal to the people to join them ‘with faith and 
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confidence in [the] great adventure’ of ‘build[ing] the noble mansion of free India where all 
her children may dwell.’ As if to distinguish his position from the politics of Muslim separatism 
and Hindu majoritarianism, Nehru went on to caution that communalism and narrow-
mindedness could not be encouraged in any nation aspiring to be great, and made it clear that 
all the people of India were equally her children, with equal rights, privileges and obligations, 
regardless of whichever religion they may belong.281 
 
Nehru was however silent on the question of caste and the constitutive challenge it could pose 
for his presumed national unity. As discussed in the previous section, this issue was rather 
Ambedkar’s lifelong intellectual preoccupation and in fact at the core of his engagement with 
the political. Even while entering the Constituent Assembly with support from the Muslim 
League, he had maintained that the caste question could be addressed only by supplementing 
parliamentary democracy with the institutionalization of additional safeguards to prevent the 
communal majority of caste Hindus from converting itself into a permanent political majority 
and depriving the Dalits of their legitimate share in state sovereignty. He thus made a proposal 
to abolish the system of elections introduced by the Poona Pact, as reserved seats invariably 
returned candidates most favoured by the caste Hindus rather than reflecting the electoral 
choices of the Dalits themselves, and called for its substitution by a system of separate 
electorates for minority communities on grounds of the prevailing social discrimination faced 
by them.282 Although partition left him with no option but to give up on the demand for separate 
electorates and align with the Congress instead, Ambedkar remained antagonistic to the major 
premises of nationalist thought even in this brief moment of rapprochement with its chief 
protagonists, as can be gaged from his very final speech on the floor of the Assembly after 
successfully accomplishing the task of drafting a new constitution for postcolonial India. As 
has usually been the case with any theorist of modern constituent power, the principle of 
fraternity was in Ambedkar’s scheme an essential precondition for a political regime of equal 
liberty for all, since without fraternity, liberty and equality ‘will be no deeper than coats of 
paint’, and by failing to ‘become a natural course of things’, they ‘would require a constable to 
enforce them’. Fraternity could be a fact only when there was a nation, and India could not be 
thought of as one so long as the difficulties arising out of the anti-national institution of caste 
were not overcome. He was of the opinion that ‘we are cherishing a great delusion’ in believing 
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that ‘a people divided into several thousands of castes’ could be called a nation, and that the 
sooner it was understood that ‘we are not as yet a nation in the social and psychological sense 
of the word, the better for us’, for only then shall we ‘realize the necessity of becoming a nation 
and seriously think of ways and means of realizing the goal.’283 
 
In order to explain how precisely this Ambedkarite formulation of constituent power 
envisaging India as a nation in the making differed from its Nehruvian explication based on 
India’s recognition as a pre-existing nation, I must first point out the commonalities which 
brought them together in the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing a new 
postcolonial constitution. The two worldviews collaborated with one another to abolish 
untouchability in all its forms, set aside income and educational qualifications that had 
regulated the limited franchize granted by the colonial constitution of government, and put in 
place a regime of universal adult suffrage or mass democracy under conditions of large scale 
poverty and illiteracy in the country. The postcolonial constitution of state unprecedentedly 
managed to convert peasants into citizens overnight so to speak, without requiring them to 
undergo any formal or informal pedagogic training at least in this regard.284 This was 
accompanied by the continuation and expansion of the affirmative action programme initiated 
during the colonial period, but which had to be rooted now in normative justifications 
appropriate for the changed context of political sovereignty, wherein an older language of state 
and civil society came to be challenged increasingly by a newer legitimizing vocabulary of 
nation and community. 
 
In a momentous break from colonial constitutional practice, the Constituent Assembly 
abolished separate electorates and replaced them with a joint electorate for elections to central 
and provincial legislatures, but social differences were sought to be accommodated temporarily 
through the reservation of seats for a period of ten years. During the first phase of deliberations 
which ended in August 1947, legislative quotas either by way of election or Presidential 
nomination were provided for minority communities, that is, Anglo Indians, Indian Christians, 
Sikhs, Muslims, Scheduled Caste Dalits and Scheduled Tribe Adivasis. At the drafting stage 
however, reservations on the basis of religion were abandoned, leaving only Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes to benefit from the policy. Framing of provisions dealing with 
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reservations in public employment followed a similar trajectory, except that no time limit was 
stipulated in this case. Initially, they were permitted for all classes, which in the opinion of 
government were not adequately represented in its services. This included religious minorities 
as well, whose claims were to be taken into consideration while making appointments, 
consistently with the maintenance of administrative efficiency. Subsequently however, 
reference to them was omitted from these provisions, and substituted by Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, as reservations came to be restricted to backward classes only. Thus in other 
words, India’s constitutional regime of affirmative action was eventually formulated on the 
basis of backwardness, rather than the original scheme favouring minority status.285 
 
Although there was a nominal convergence between Nehru and Ambedkar on the issue of 
changing the basis of affirmative action from minority status to backwardness, they came to 
this policy outcome separately for political reasons which were in a deeper sense mutually 
incompatible with one another. As has been indicated herein above, Nehru’s constitutional 
project was situated in a nationalist problematic where any kind of political mobilization 
around communal majorities and minorities alike was perceived as detrimental to the idea of a 
composite India imagined as an already existing nation of social familiarity. Partition did not 
result in the transformation of this national selfhood into a denominational Hindu state, but 
whatever trace there remained of a violent or nonviolent encounter with the intimate other, 
came to be sublated within the constitutional language of religious group rights in the domain 
of culture, and that of formal equality and non-discrimination in the domain of politics. There 
was no space for religion based affirmative action under such a conception of national unity, 
and so when the proposal regarding reserved seats in legislatures for religious minorities was 
withdrawn in 1949, Nehru welcomed the move as a ‘historic turn in our destiny’, confessing 
that he had never been convinced about retaining any measure in the constitution which was 
likely to promote separatism in the body politic:  
 
‘Reluctantly we agreed to carry on with some measure of reservation … . but always 
there was this doubt in our minds, namely, whether we had not shown weakness in 
dealing with a thing that was wrong. … . doing away with this reservation business is 
not only a good thing in itself—good for all concerned, and more especially for the 
minorities—but psychologically too it is a very good move for the nation and for the 
world. It shows that we are really sincere about this business of having a secular 
democracy.’286 
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Nehru was uncomfortable with reservations even for the Scheduled Castes, but brought himself 
to come to terms with them for a limited period of ten years. To borrow his own words once 
again,  
 
‘Frankly I would like this proposal to go further and put an end to such reservations 
that still remain. But … I realise that in the present state of affairs in India that would 
not be a desirable thing to do … in regard to the Scheduled Castes. … . I do not look at 
it from the religious point of view or the caste point of view, but from the point of view 
that a backward group ought to be helped and I am glad that this reservation will also 
be limited to ten years.’287  
 
Put differently, he conceded Scheduled Caste reservations only because these were justifiable 
on grounds of backwardness of the beneficiary communities. Unlike group identities which 
were deemed to be fixed and immutable, backwardness was in his understanding a purely 
empirical condition describable in social scientific terms, which could be overcome with time 
through ameliorative governmental intervention. The reservations scheme was viewed as one 
among various other developmental programmes specifically designed to cater to this 
objective, and could be terminated once the problem of socio economic backwardness was 
rectified and the former untouchables were sufficiently integrated into the mainstream national 
fold. 
 
In contrast, Ambedkar could find in backwardness a more appropriate anchor for his 
constitutional project of forging India into a nation through a political contract between non-
national strangers who were hitherto bound together only by way of their legal subjection to a 
hierarchical and inegalitarian caste order. He was neither fully satisfied with the minoritarian 
politics of late colonial India, nor with the counter nationalism of the Muslim League, as both 
of these responses to the perceived danger of Hindu Raj under a de facto Hindu majority 
remained closely aligned to the self-other problematic within which Indian nationalism 
continued to be imagined by its chief protagonists. Without jettisoning this problematic 
altogether, it was not possible to move beyond commonly shared material interests on the one 
hand and religious difference on the other, and institute a radically new politics around material 
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deprivation, physical vulnerability and social stigma associated with caste oppression in 
general and the phenomenology of untouchability in particular.288 
 
Ambedkar had remained sceptical of exclusive constitutional safeguards for the Muslims in 
colonial India, as they were in all respects a much stronger political community when compared 
with the Dalits. Yet he also supported the League in recognizing the Muslims as a separate 
nation, and was in fact among the first to make a philosophical argument in favour of creating 
Pakistan if they truly and deeply so desired.289 This espousal of the two nation theory was 
however not motivated by some heartfelt need for a real external enemy against which the 
contrastive self identity of a truncated India could be fashioned, as was arguably the case with 
proponents of an ethnic Hindu nationalism. He was rather more anxious about the immanent 
possibility of Muslim elites converting their intimate enmity with caste Hindus into a fraternal 
contractual relationship under a single constitutional order, which would in effect have 
eliminated the Dalit question altogether from the purview of the Indian political.290 
 
Even while endorsing the Pakistan idea, Ambedkar also made it clear that partition was in his 
opinion a ‘worse than useless’ remedy for the problem of Hindu hegemony.291 He strongly 
believed that Hindu Raj had to be prevented at any cost, for it was a menace to liberty, equality 
and fraternity, and thus incompatible with democracy. But the only effective way of burying 
its ghost was the abolition of a communal party like the Muslim League, and the formation of 
mixed parties of Hindus and Muslims based on agreed programmes of social and economic 
regeneration. The issue of backwardness came in here as a possible ground on which the lower 
castes in Hindu society could be aligned with the majority of the Muslim population, as had 
arguably been demonstrated from 1920 to 1937:  
 
‘There are many lower orders in the Hindu society whose economic, political and social 
needs are the same as those of the majority of the Muslims, and they would be far more 
ready to make a common cause with the Muslims for achieving common ends than they 
would with the high caste of Hindus who have denied and deprived them of ordinary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 This point is also made by Anupama Rao, but grounded in an alternative interpretation of the minority principle 
itself. See Rao (2009: 118-162 at 133-136). 
289 Ambedkar's provocative thesis on partition was laid out in 'Pakistan, or the Partition of India', first published 
in 1944 and revised in 1946. Republished in Ambedkar (1990/1946, Vol. 8). 
290 This anxiety could for instance be gaged from Ambedkar protesting the ' secret negotiations' between Gandhi 
and Jinnah 'for a settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims'. See the 1944 resolution on the 'Political 
Demands of the Scheduled Castes', republished as an appendix to 'What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the 
Untouchables'. Ambedkar (1990/1946, Vol. 9). 
291 Ambedkar (1990/1946, Vol. 8: 361-362). 
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human rights for centuries. To pursue such a course cannot be called an adventure. The 
path along that line is a well trodden path. Is it not a fact that under the Montagu-
Chelmsford Reforms in most Provinces, if not in all, the Muslims, the Non-Brahmins, 
and the Depressed Classes united together and worked the reforms as members of one 
team from 1920 to 1937? Herein lay the most fruitful method of achieving communal 
harmony among Hindus and Muslims, and of destroying the danger of a Hindu Raj.’292 
 
This insistence on mixed parties of Hindus and Muslims may paradoxically appear to have 
brought Ambedkar’s position in close alignment with the broad church of Congress 
nationalism. It is true that unlike the League which stood for two different people-subjects of 
constituent power sharing a common federation or divided into separate nation states, both him 
and Congress imagined India as ‘one integral whole, its people a single people living under a 
single imperium derived from a single source.’293 But contrary to Gandhi and to a lesser extent 
even Nehru, who were at the most willing to accommodate rival interpretations of the single 
subject of people’s constituent power, what interested Ambedkar more was to pose a 
fundamental challenge to the very hegemony of nationalist thought that these interpretations 
would nevertheless claim to represent. He therefore gave impetus to a radically new counter 
hegemonic politics around the category of backwardness, which was understood here not 
merely as a developmental hindrance on the path to an inclusive constitutional society, but 
instead as supplying to different kinds of strangers oppressed under the caste system an 
alternative basis for constituting themselves into a lasting political unity.294 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to move beyond the antinomies of homogenous universality 
and heterogenous particularity influential in global discussions of the sovereignty concept, and 
instead situated the intellectual history of the making of the collective constitutional subject in 
late colonial and early postcolonial India within a distinctive narrative of the Indian political. 
By focusing on the intellectual imagination of different proponents of social law and political 
law in terms of their competing approaches towards the self, the other and the stranger, the 
chapter has indicated why these thinkers could not arrive at any substantial consensus on how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Id., at 359. 
293 Ambedkar made this remark while defending the draft constitution in the Constituent Assembly. Ambedkar 
(CADs, Vol. VII: 4 November 1948). 
294For a different view, see Bajpai (2011: 116-170). I disagree with Bajpai in so far as she situates this transition 
from minority to backwardness within a singular framework of a hegemonic nationalist ideology. In my 
understanding, the Ambedkarite politics of backwardness did not merely attempt to remould nationalist 
hegemony, but provide a more radical ideational challenge through a counter hegemonic narrative of its own.  
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India’s constitutional subject was to be fashioned at its so called founding moment. What did 
bring them together, was their mutual appreciation for the principle of unity in diversity as the 
basis of the Indian political at the broadest level of generality. But such a nominal convergence 
could not overcome a more fundamental incompatibility between two antagonistic articulations 
of this constitutional principle anchored in social familiarity and political contract respectively. 
In the aftermath of India’s partition, the concept of minority was displaced by backwardness 
as the new antagonistic fault line around which a non-national politics of a-legality could come 
to be freshly organized. While minoritarian politics in colonial India was associated with the 
legislative system of separate electorates and weighted representation, the federation of Hindu 
and Muslim majority provinces, and the two nation theory, the politics of backwardness in 
postcolonial India has resulted in the continual expansion in the scope and beneficiaries of 
affirmative action policies initiated both by central and provincial governments. As if to 
normalize what was regarded in nationalist thought at best as an exceptional provision, the 
Constitution is amended every ten years to extend the temporal limit of legislative reservations 
for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Furthermore, reservations are now 
provided in public employment and education not merely to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes, but also to a much larger section of the lower caste population officially designated as 
the Other Backward Classes, including even some Muslim communities identified as socially 
and educationally backward. All of this was in a way a response to an enormous democratic 
upsurge that the postcolonial constitution had itself triggered in the country, the normative and 
institutional implications of which I shall go on to discuss in the next two chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 
CHAPTER IV 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECT OF INDIA’S COLLECTIVE SELF 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed how the contentious intellectual debates pertaining to the 
making of the constitutional subject in India witnessed two antagonistic articulations of unity 
in diversity, grounded either in dharma or dhamma oriented logics of social familiarity and 
political contract respectively. But howsoever irreconcilable these starting premises may have 
turned out to be, most political actors at least converged with one another in insisting that the 
normative point of their joint action in setting up a constitutional society was the collective self 
transformation of the Indian people. This emphasis on transforming the social distinguished 
India’s constitutional experiment from the negative model of constitutionalism associated with 
the guarantee of bourgeois liberal entitlements under a limited government, and instead 
connected it with the positive model of constitutionalism envisaging a more interventionist 
governmental apparatus of rule geared towards the refashioning of society as a whole.295 Even 
though the new constitution could not be interpreted as a successful institutionalization of a 
thoroughly revolutionary enterprise, it did bear a marked resonance with the French Jacobin 
rather than the American constitutional project for attempting to find a political solution to the 
problem of material insufficiency and inequality arising out of two centuries of colonial 
exploitation. In addition, the constitution makers also confronted and sought to respond to a 
radically diverse living tradition stretching back into precolonial nonmodernity with its 
resilient lifeforms and millennial histories of injustice. Their confident constitutionalization of 
the social question in India was meant to be accomplished by putting in place what has come 
to be termed in postcolonial scholarship as a regime of transformative constitutionalism.296 
 
When translated into the text of the new republican constitution, this institution of 
transformative constitutionalism took the form of a preambular commitment to ‘justice, social, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 For the distinction between negative and positive forms of constitutionalism in European constitutional 
imagination, see Loughlin (2015: 1-25). 
296 For an insightful theoretical account situating India in the French rather than the American constitutional 
tradition, see Mehta (2010: 15-27); on transformative constitutionalism, see generally Klare (1998: 146-188), 
Langa (2006: 351-363), Viljoen, Vilhena and Baxi eds. (2013), Dasgupta (2014), and Bogdandy (2017). 
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economic and political’, whose contours were principally elaborated in Parts III and IV, dealing 
successively with ‘Fundamental Rights’ and ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’. But the two 
parts were separated from one another through the incorporation of a crucial distinction in the 
constitutional document: while fundamental rights were declared justiciable in courts of law, 
directive principles were held judicially unenforceable.297 As a result, only the former came to 
be perceived as facets of constitutional law properly so called, enacted for the purpose of 
limiting the government and in some instances even non-governmental entities. It was true that 
the latter were acknowledged as fundamental in the governance of the country, so much so that 
the government was duty bound to apply them in the making of laws, but they did not seem to 
be commanding any legal significance in the ordinary course of the constitution.298 Due to this 
partial suspension of justiciability therefore, the idea of juridifying the national programme of 
social transformation which undoubtedly marked a critical departure from the colonial past, 
appeared to have been unexpectedly interrupted at the founding moment itself by a novel 
scheme of bifurcation not anticipated in anticolonial constitutional imagination until very 
recently.299 
 
The constitutionally enshrined division between Parts III and IV was initially construed in light 
of the famous distinction between negative and positive liberties, with fundamental rights 
regarded mainly as a set of civil and political entitlements imposing upon others a negative 
obligation of non-interference, and directive principles construed predominantly as a list of 
social and economic rights necessarily requiring positive action for their full realization. But 
rather than hinting at the inferiority or superiority of one over the other as has usually been 
thought to be the case, such a perspective merely indicated that directive principles had to 
depend more on legislative and executive branches of government for their actualization, and 
not the judiciary which was instead vested with the primary responsibility of giving effect to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Contrast Art. 13 with Art. 37, Constitution of India, 1950. 
298 For a critique of such a legalistic approach towards the Directive Principles in the early years, see Tripathi 
(1954: 7). 
299 As is well known, the Constitutional Advisor Sir B.N. Rau recommended the separation of Fundamental Rights 
and Directive Principles by drawing upon a somewhat similar distinction between Fundamental Rights and 
Directive Principles of Social Policy in the 1937 Irish Constitution, as well as that between rights meant to be 
enforced by ordinary courts and rights incapable of or unsuitable for such enforcement drafted in Hirsh 
Lauterpacht’s International Bill of Rights of Man, 1945. Rao (1967, 2:33-36). It was in the Sapru Committee 
Report of 1945 that a distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable rights came to be mooted in India for the 
first time specifically with reference to the question of minority entitlements. Sapru Committee Report (1945: 
256-257). 
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fundamental rights.300 Nevertheless, it did presume an untenable disjuncture between the legal 
and political dimensions of the constitution, one that was however set aside subsequently both 
in theory as well as in practice. What made this possible was a growing international 
appreciation of the point that there was no categorical difference between negative and positive 
entitlements, and that all rights in fact entailed a complex set of corresponding or correlative 
duties to see to it that they were respected, protected and fulfilled.301 To add to their undeniable 
conceptual entanglement, many provisions in Part III also extended to the social sphere and 
authorized an interventionist government in the same way as Part IV did, meaning thereby that 
fundamental rights could not be easily dissociated from directive principles in the constitutional 
text either.302 Finally, the judiciary started reading many directive principles into the 
fundamental right to life and personal liberty, and went to the extent of recognizing the 
harmonious interpretation of both parts taken together as an essential feature of the 
constitutional basic structure. 
 
It is clearly evident then that fundamental rights and directive principles have been equally 
central to the shaping of India’s postcolonial constitutional society. But their precise 
relationship is still construed either in terms of the functionalist or the normativist styles of 
public law thought circulating across the globe in the twentieth century. For decisionist scholars 
on the one hand,  fundamental rights are subservient to the constitutional welfare state, and can 
thus be infringed if necessary in pursuit of the larger goals enshrined in the directive 
principles.303 On the other hand, normativist scholars view directive principles as providing the 
underlying framework of values that are to guide rather than be superimposed upon what is in 
substance regarded as a moral activity of rights based constitutional interpretation.304Although 
these positions may differ with one another in their attitude towards the instrumental use of 
constitutional law, they share a mutual disinterest in an intellectual engagement with the 
concept of constituent power, which makes the tension between them politically meaningful in 
the first place. In this chapter therefore, I will approach the Indian career of transformative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 A view most famously articulated by Granville Austin, who distinguished between fundamental rights and 
directive principles on the lines of the Berlinian distinction between negative and positive liberties, and yet called 
them both the ‘Conscience of the Constitution’. Austin (1966: 50-51).  
301 This widely used formulation can be traced to Henry Shue’s trifurcation of the kinds of duties that every right 
involves—the duty not to violate it, the duty to prevent third parties from violating it, and the duty to ensure its 
enjoyment. Shue (1980). 
302 For example see Arts. 15(2), 17, 23 and 24, Constitution of India, 1950.  
303 For the functionalist linking of directive principles with justice as equity, see Mukherjee (2010: 181-218). 
304 Bhatia (2016); see also Khaitan (2018: 389-420), who argues that directive principles were incorporated into 
India’s liberal democratic constitution for the instrumental reason of securing the consent of ideological dissenters. 
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constitutionalism from the prism of constituent power, and endeavour to establish that the 
conflict between functionalism and normativism at the level of its formal and material 
constitution can more appropriately be attributed to two fundamentally irreconcilable 
imaginaries of sovereignty anchored in the symbolic lifeworlds of dharma and dhamma, and 
in turn finding expression in the juridical languages of social duties and political rights 
respectively. 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections. In section one, I begin with the Gandhian discourse 
of social duties anchored in the self abnegating satyagrahi, and show how it came to be 
modified substantially in the Nehruvian imagination of India as a welfare state with a relatively 
open democracy. Section two argues that the early postcolonial politics of constitutional 
exceptionalism was nothing but an extension of Nehru’s vision of national sovereignty, 
represented exclusively by the institutional supremacy of Government in Parliament in the 
project of transformative constitutionalism. I next move to Ambedkar’s critique of social duties 
for their presupposition of an immutable subject how so ever defined, and his rival formulation 
of the discourse of political rights based on the notion of an impermanent subject. This enabled 
him to speak of state socialism under Parliamentary democracy guaranteeing effective 
representation to the most marginalized, and rethink the idea of sovereignty itself from the 
position of those who were a part that ordinarily had no part in the political community. The 
final section moves from the founding moment of postcolonial sovereignty to trace the 
continuation of this irreconcilable conflict between social duties and political rights even in the 
contemporary age of constitutional populism, in which the real and the imaginary threaten to 
overwhelm the symbolic dimensions of the Indian political. 
 
1   Social duties 
 
When Mohandas Gandhi was asked to contribute a philosophical essay on the idea of human 
rights in 1947, he declined the invitation and instead wrote a brief response emphasizing upon 
the primacy of human duties. ‘I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother’, Gandhi replied, ‘that 
all rights to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done. Thus the very right to live 
accrues to us only when we do the duty of citizenship of the world.’305 This prioritization of 
duties over rights was by no means a late formulation and in fact went as back as Hind Swaraj 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Gandhi (1947, Vol. 95: 96). 
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published in 1909, wherein he lamented the ‘farce of everybody wanting and insisting on his 
rights, nobody thinking of his duty.’306 Similarly in 1940, he rejected a proposal for the framing 
of an international bill of rights, and rather made a suggestion to begin with a ‘charter of duties 
of man’, from which rights would follow as inevitably as spring followed winter. Drawing 
from his own experience, Gandhi observed that he started life as a young man by seeking to 
assert his rights, but soon discovered that he had none, as the enjoyment of rights was 
necessarily dependent upon one’s assumption of duties first. So he dedicated himself entirely 
to the performance of duties towards his wife, children, friends, companions and society, and 
found out as a result that ‘I have greater rights, perhaps, than any living man I know. If this is 
too tall a claim, then I say I do not know anyone who possesses greater rights than I.’307 
 
Gandhi was not the only constitutional thinker in the world to have harped upon the idea of 
duties from around the early twentieth century.308 Contemporaneously with his arrival on 
India’s political landscape, there emerged a discernable shift in European constitutional 
imagination from an unequivocal espousal of the metaphysical principles of subjective right 
both at the individual as well as the collective level, to a growing acceptance of a sociological 
understanding of social interdependence, suggesting the need for a more functional system of 
objective duties oriented to the promotion of social solidarity. This resulted in the replacement 
of public authority by public service as the ultimate basis of a socializing regime of modern 
public law. Grounded in general interest rather than general will, the newly emergent social 
law was also accompanied by an increasing scepticism towards the notion of sovereignty and 
a concomitant rise of governmentality in various jurisdictions across Europe.309 In India 
however, the discourse of social duties was especially distinctive given its contextualization 
within a radically contentious anticolonial movement, whose different ideational strands were 
on the whole striving in pursuit of nothing other than divergent conceptions of self-
determination. What brought them together on the same stage was their common articulation 
of a will to sovereignty as the germinal source of constitutional imagination, even as the legal 
order continued to deploy a modified version of the pre-existing mechanism of colonial 
governmentality for the realization of the national good. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 Gandhi (1909, Vol. 10: 287). 
307 Gandhi (1940, Vol. 79: 293). 
308 For a short sketch on the global intellectual history of duties, see Moyn (2016B). 
309 The most influential representative of the ‘social law school’ was the French thinker Leon Duguit, whose ideas 
came to India via the English political theorist Herold Laski. Duguit can be said to have anticipated Michel 
Foucault’s thesis about the displacement of sovereignty by the logic of governmentality in early modern Europe. 
See Duguit/Laski (1921); Sinha (1934: 402-406); Foucault (2007).  
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That concerns of governmentality could not trump the pre-eminence of sovereignty was most 
certainly the case for the mainstream of nationalist thought, at least in so far as it was invested 
in dislodging the British and reoccupying the space of political power vacated by them. There 
is however a strong tendency to exceptionalize Gandhi in this regard, by portraying him as a 
theorist of non-sovereignty who resisted a colonial governmentality of population management 
by practicing a counter governmentality of his own, through a disciplined engagement with 
different technologies of the self such as spinning khadi, fasting, celibacy and reducing 
consumption to the barest minimum.310 By controlling bodily desires and appetites in such a 
manner, he no doubt believed that it was possible for the self to be reduced to ‘zero’ and become 
a ‘cipher’, and thereby create conditions for relinquishing the politics of domination and 
subordination of others to one’s own will. But Gandhi’s politics of self abnegation, 
indissociably connected with the precept of ‘neti neti’ or ‘not this, not this’ drawn from the 
non-dualist negative theology of Advaita Vedanta, was only alluding to the emptiness or void 
at the heart of the sovereignty concept, and not to its complete disavowal altogether.311 He 
sought to navigate an otherwise unbridgeable gap between sovereignty and governmentality, 
being and action, satya and karma, by submitting himself to the social law of dharma as 
translated into the symbolic apparatus of duties rather than rights. For a subject or soul aspiring 
union with god’s being also understood as the truth, Gandhi commended the performance of 
ethically right action without having any attachment to its fruit, and in this way accorded 
primacy to duties as action over rights as the fruit of action:  
 
‘The true source of rights is duty. … . If we all discharge our duties, right will not be 
far to seek. if leaving duties unperformed we run after rights, they escape us like a will-
o’-the-wisp. The more we pursue them, the farther they fly. The same teaching has been 
embodied by Krishna in the immortal words: “Action alone is thine. Leave thou the 
fruit severely alone.” Action is duty: fruit is the right.’312 
 
What made duties so central to Gandhi’s constitutional imagination was that unlike rights, they 
did not require any formal institution as their guardian, and could thus open up the space for 
the socially embedded individual to transform into an agent of sovereignty by rigorously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 On Gandhi as a theorist of nonsovereignty, see Skaria (2016); on Gandhi and governmentality, see Godrej 
(2017: 894-922).  
311 For three different entry points into the relationship between sovereignty and emptiness, see Lefort (1988: 213-
255); Agamben (2011); Laclau (2006: 137-147). 
312 Gandhi (1925, Vol. 30: 68). 
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observing the discipline of satyagraha. Although satyagraha travelled across the world as a 
non-violent modality of civil resistance, in India it also involved an elaborate ‘constructive 
programme’ for the regeneration of the indigenous political centred around the village as the 
exemplary site of experimentation for the nation building enterprise. The programme included 
an expanding set of social reforms, ranging from the promotion of khadi, cottage industries, 
communal unity and removal of untouchability, to items like sanitation and hygiene, status of 
women, farmers, labourers and other marginalized groups, basic and adult education, and the 
prohibition of alcohol.313 For its actualization in every locality, Gandhi envisaged a non-violent 
army of workers pursuing the ‘real politics’ of rendering service to the three hundred million 
people of India, while maintaining a principled distance from the ‘politics of power’ associated 
with the Congress and the participation in elections and municipal bodies.314 During his final 
days in fact, he called for the Congress to be disbanded ‘in its present shape and form .. as a 
propaganda vehicle and a parliamentary machine’, and to be reconstituted as a ‘Lok Sevak 
Sangh’ or an organization in service of the people, striving for the ‘social, moral and economic 
independence’ of the seven hundred thousand villages in the country. This proposal did not 
mean to reject the constituted power of governmental authority as is implicitly presupposed in 
antistatist accounts of Gandhi’s constitutional thought, but to interruptively supplement it with 
the constituent power of self-sacrificing satyagrahis standing inside and outside the legal order 
at the same time, and ungrudgingly and wisely serving the ‘whole of India’ as their ‘master’.315 
 
Like Gandhi, India’s Constituent Assembly also found itself drawn to the discourse of social 
duties, as can perhaps be best glimpsed from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s famous ‘tryst 
with destiny’ speech delivered at the moment of independence on the midnight of 15th August, 
1947. Inviting attention to the challenge of a new future of immense possibilities that beckoned 
the nation at the end of a long period of ill fortune, Nehru urged his compatriots to take the 
pledge of rendering ‘service to India’, which meant ‘the service of the millions who suffer’, 
and ‘the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.’ He 
invoked Gandhi and iterated that the ambition of ‘the greatest man of our generation’ was to 
‘wipe every tear from every eye’. Even though this may have been beyond them at present, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Gandhi (1941, Vol. 81: 354-374). 
314 For the distinction between 'real politics' and the 'politics of power', see Gandhi (1940, Vol. 77: 370-375). 
315 Gandhi (1948, Vol. 98: 333-335). 
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Nehru made it clear that ‘so long as there are tears and suffering, so long our work will not be 
over.’316 
While going on to institutionalize an elaborate constitutional framework for social 
transformation, the Assembly however made one critical departure from Gandhi’s 
constitutional thought by setting aside the figure of the satyagrahi from the space of 
sovereignty created in the anticolonial movement. Satyagraha was in fact equated with other 
violent methods of insurrection and revolution, and treated essentially as an instrumental means 
for the acquisition of political sovereignty from a foreign colonizer, which could have little or 
no place in the government of a centralized nation state. Instead it came to be displaced by the 
Parliament, or rather the Government in Parliament, as the new agent of people’s constituent 
power. The Government in Parliament was specifically tasked with the responsibility of giving 
effect to the social provisions in the constitutional text, and especially those enshrined in the 
Directive Principles of State Policy envisaged as the laws of lawmaking appropriate for India 
as a postcolonial democracy.317 
 
Defending their inclusion in the Constitution, B.R. Ambedkar analogized these judicially 
unenforceable directive principles to the ‘Instruments of Instructions’ that were previously 
issued to colonial governors by the British Crown under the Government of India Act, 1935. 
He went on to construe them in the changed postcolonial context as instructions sourced now 
from the Indian people, and delivered through the Assembly to legislatures and executives of 
the day for implementing action. Although the government ‘may not have to answer for their 
breach in a court of law’, Ambedkar expected that ‘[it] will certainly have to answer for them 
before the electorate at election times.’318 
 
This scheme of transformative constitutionalism administered by a responsible government 
was sought to be legitimized by India’s constitution makers through their confident and 
unprecedented institutionalization of universal adult suffrage under conditions of mass poverty 
and illiteracy. It was in the open competition for power enabled by the procedure of electoral 
democracy that they located the emptiness of the principle of popular sovereignty. Since 
sovereignty resided in the nation as a whole, no individual or group could singularly come to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 Nehru (CADs, Vol. V: 14 August 1947). 
317 Mukherjee (2010: 189). 
318 Ambedkar (CADs, Vol VII: 4 November 1948). 
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occupy the space of power, by appropriating power for their own ends or incorporating it into 
themselves.319 
That the chief protagonists of the national movement appreciated the enormous threat posed 
by ideologies of fascism and totalitarianism to the idea of the political by fully occupying its 
space of power, is clear from an essay titled ‘Rashtrapati’ or President, penned by Nehru 
himself under the pseudonym of Chanakya in 1937. Worried by his growing populist image 
among the people, ‘Chanakya’ wrote about ‘the most extraordinary of popular welcomes’ 
which Nehru received while travelling across the vast land of India, as though he were ‘some 
triumphant Caesar passing by, leaving a trail of glory and a legend behind him.’ ‘Men like 
Jawaharlal’, the author warned, ‘are unsafe in democracy. He calls himself a democrat and a 
socialist, and no doubt he does so in all earnestness, … . [but] A little twist and Jawaharlal 
might turn a dictator sweeping aside the paraphernalia of a slow-moving democracy.’ So even 
though the people had a right to expect good work from Nehru, they ought not ‘spoil him by 
too much adulation and praise. His conceit is already formidable. It must be checked. We want 
no Caesars.’ 320 
 
Several years later, it was this commitment to an open democracy which prevented the 
Constituent Assembly from declaring socialism to be an official ideology of the new 
constitutional state. While Nehru hoped that ‘India will stand for socialism’, this aspiration 
could not be referred to in the text of the objectives resolution because otherwise, ‘we would 
have put in something which may be agreeable to many and may not be agreeable to some and 
we wanted this Resolution not to be controversial in regard to such matters.’321 Similarly, 
Ambedkar justified the Assembly’s decision to enact a broadly worded chapter on directive 
principles by arguing that there were several ways in which the constitutional ideal of 
‘economic democracy’ could be brought about—individualism, socialism or communism—, 
and that it was not proper to specially single out either of them in a ‘political democracy’ 
antithetical to the ‘perpetual dictatorship of any particular body of people’. Thus rather than 
being fashioned as fixed and rigid precepts, enough room was deliberately left in the language 
of these directives, so as to enable people with different ways of thinking to strive and persuade 
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the electorate that theirs was indeed the best means for the realization of economic democracy 
in the country.322 
 
But paradoxically enough, India’s Parliamentary democracy, bolstered by Nehruvian economic 
developmentalism in the early postcolonial period, is precisely what created the conditions for 
a politics of constitutional exceptionalism, whose trajectory I shall now go on to trace in the 
next section of this chapter. 
 
2   Constitutional exceptionalism 
 
In an important essay, the political theorist Uday Singh Mehta has argued that it is not Gandhi 
but Thomas Hobbes who must be recognized as the ‘largely unacknowledged mentor of Indian 
constitutionalism’. Being conservatively and pragmatically oriented to ethical forms of 
everyday life as it already existed, Gandhi was in Mehta’s reading one of the foremost thinkers 
of the autonomy of the social, which did not require to be supplemented or supplanted by the 
political in any way. On the contrary, India’s founding framers were according to him much 
like Hobbes, in their deep commitment to the establishment of an autonomous political domain 
in the country through the setting up of a new constitutional state, where all social questions of 
necessity and diversity could eventually come to be subsumed under the ‘absolutism of 
politics’.323 
 
However, as I showed in the previous section, the mainstream of nationalist thought had a close 
affinity with Gandhi at least in so far as both connected sovereignty and governmentality by 
invoking a commonly shared discourse of social duties. What distinguished them more clearly 
was the centrality of satyagraha or constructive work for Gandhi’s constitutional thought on 
the one hand, and the pre-eminence of parliamentary democracy for India’s constitution makers 
on the other. Even then, Nehruvian economic developmentalism was not averse to 
collaborating with the Gandhian movement for sarvodaya (universal uplift) in the early 
postcolonial period, provided that the government continued to be recognized as the ultimate 
bearer of responsibility for social reconstruction, with other entities cast only in the supporting 
role of complementing its various efforts and activities.324 But by thus absorbing and co-opting 
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Gandhi, the new nation building exercise paved the way for his subsequent neutralization and 
depoliticization. What came about instead, was a politics of constitutional exceptionalism in 
pursuit of the nonviolent social revolution which it purported to have initiated in the country. 
In order to make sense of postcolonial India’s politics of constitutional exceptionalism, we 
must look past Hobbes, who was no doubt among the most insightful modern theorists of state 
and sovereignty, but not necessarily so of the postrevolutionary phenomenon of democratic 
constituent power. Hobbes had basically envisaged the modern state as a persona ficta, which 
constituted the multitude in the state of nature into a people through a heuristic social contract, 
and came to be represented exclusively in the figure of the sovereign leviathan. Consequently 
therefore, it is the leviathan who got to determine the terms of state sovereignty, with a 
relatively passive people left to bear the burden of a potentially authoritarian culture of 
constitutional legality. 325 These Hobbesian premises have taken scholars in India only as far 
as treating the idea of a people authored constitution as a legal fiction incontestable in a court 
of law.326 While formal constitutionalists appreciate such an unfalsifiable presupposition for 
providing necessary stability to the entire juridical system, materialist sceptics of the formal 
constitution perceive it as nothing other than a chimera deployed for the purpose of facilitating 
a smooth transfer of authority from colonial elites to their nationalist counterparts. Both of 
these intellectual positions offer us an incomplete picture: whereas the former fails to take into 
account the active agential role assumed by the people in managing the constitutional law and 
politics of postcolonial India, the latter cannot look past the vast swathes of coercion and 
domination underpinning the legal landscape, and engage more seriously with the notion of 
people’s constituent power at the symbolic centre of the Indian political. 
 
More pertinent for the Indian context is the constitutional theory of the German jurist Carl 
Schmitt, who in spite of being profoundly influenced by Hobbes, viewed him as an antipolitical 
thinker.327 In contrast with Hobbes’s purely juristic conception of the state based on the 
bourgeois ideology of the rule of law, Schmitt focused on the existential idea of a dynamically 
emerging political unity grounded in the friend-enemy distinction, and maintained if necessary 
by the sovereign resorting to exceptional decisions departing from the precepts of liberal 
legalism.328 Unlike Schmitt, Nehru’s understanding of the political was neither dependant upon 
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the friend-enemy distinction, nor did it require a führer-like dictator to be at the helm of India’s 
constitution of state. It was rather anchored in the symbolic externality of social law, which 
conferred upon Parliamentary democracy the paramount duty to provide for the welfare of the 
people. While undertaking this responsibility however, Nehru did not mind carving out a zone 
of constitutional exceptionality which empowered the legislative and executive establishment 
against the judiciary on one hand and extralegal revolutionaries on the other as its chief 
antipolitical opponents. 
 
The most contentious issue for constitutional politics in the early postcolonial period was 
centred around the question of compensation for land acquisition, involving a clash between 
the right to property and the goal of egalitarian redistribution contained in Parts III and IV of 
the Constitution respectively.329 Even though the right to property was incorporated in the 
fundamental rights chapter without much controversy, it had to be circumscribed considerably 
in order to enable the enactment of land reform legislations at the provincial level, especially 
those purporting to overhaul a colonially sanctioned semi-feudal regime of agricultural 
production governing property relations in rural India. A majority of the founding framers were 
mindful of the pro-property leanings of the contemporary culture of legal formalism, and 
therefore in particular concerned about saving these laws from judicial scrutiny at least on 
grounds that the compensation being provided herein was not just, fair, or equitable. So after 
several rounds of debates and discussions in the Constituent Assembly, it was the legislature 
which came to be put in charge of specifying either the amount or the principles of 
compensation while framing the law authorizing the expropriation of property for any public 
purpose. Furthermore, a carte blanche protection from judicial review was extended to land 
acquisition laws already introduced or passed in different provincial legislatures before the 
commencement of the Constitution and assented to by the President.330 
 
Nevertheless, the courts did intervene in the land question by invalidating a few of such laws 
as unconstitutional, for failing to offer an equivalent or adequate compensation to those who 
had been deprived of their proprietorial entitlements.331 Nehru reacted strongly to the judicial 
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vetoing of socially beneficent legislation, and observed that it was as though  ‘this magnificent 
Constitution’ had been ‘kidnapped and purloined by lawyers’.332 While judicial interpretations 
of the constitutional text were to be ordinarily accepted, he asserted that if courts only saw an 
inherent contradiction between Parts III and IV, ‘it [was] up to the Parliament to remove the 
contradiction and make the Fundamental Rights subserve the Directive Principles of State 
Policy.’ He argued that full compensation may have to be paid in ordinary land acquisition 
cases, but not necessarily so in exceptional schemes of social engineering, for if this were to 
be done, the ‘haves’ would remain ‘haves’, and ‘have-nots’ as ‘have-nots’.333 So all judicial 
decisions appearing to negate the social revolution were in course of time nullified by 
Parliament through extraordinary constitutional amendments enacted in the exercise of its 
constituent power, with a view to clarify the lexical priority of directive principles over 
fundamental rights, and restore the institutional supremacy of the legislative organ in the 
democratic enterprise of transformative constitutionalism.334 
 
Notwithstanding its revolutionary rhetoric however, the land reform programme merely sought 
to curtail the scope of the right to property, without effecting any structural changes for a more 
thorough emancipation from the institution of private property altogether. The various 
legislative schemes implementing this programme were no doubt meant to eliminate the worst 
forms of exploitation in the agricultural sector by abolishing the zamindari system of rent-
seeking absentee landlordism and regularizing tenancy entitlements, but they did not proceed 
further to bring about a large scale socialization of land ownership in the countryside by 
supporting the practice of cooperative farming or the transfer of land to the tiller. Rather on the 
contrary, extra-parliamentary social movements making such radical demands and even 
rebelling against the establishment were forcibly controlled by infringing civil liberties and 
deploying the same preventive detention measures invoked until very recently for suppressing 
the anticolonial national movement.335 
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These executive actions were no doubt facilitated by an extensive list of constitutionally 
permissible restrictions in the fundamental rights chapter, which according to the communist 
Somnath Lahiri seemed as though it had been drafted from the perspective of a police 
constable:  
‘I am constrained to say that these are fundamental rights from a police constable’s 
point of view and not from the point of view of a free and fighting nation. Here whatever 
right is given is taken away by a proviso. Does Sardar Patel want even more powers 
than the British Government, an alien Government, an autocratic Government—which 
is against the people—needs to protect itself?’336  
 
However, there was nothing to be suspicious about the emergent culture of constitutional 
exceptionalism, or so argued the Congressman Brajeshwar Prasad and many others like him, 
since independence had resulted in the replacement of a colonial regime with a popularly 
elected national government:  
 
‘It is wrong to regard the State with suspicion. Today it is in the  hands of those who 
are utterly incapable of doing any wrong to the people. It is not likely to pass into the 
hands of the enemies of the masses. … . If you want to prevent the political reactionaries 
from gaining political power and ascendancy, the rulers of the land must be vested with 
large discretionary powers.’337  
 
In other words, the implication here was that the project of social transformation could only be 
pursued through the governmental apparatus of the formal constitution, albeit one that came to 
be legitimized now in the name of a democratic constituent power. 
 
While in the nationalist rendering, India’s postcolonial constitutional moment is hailed for 
opening up the possibility of actualizing a long cherished collective aspiration for liberation 
and freedom, other more critical voices have justifiably remained largely sceptical of this 
celebratory assessment. For Marxian and neo-Marxian thinkers in particular, the claim of the 
constitutional text to be representative of the whole of the people essentially gestured to a 
spurious hegemony, one which was premised upon the preservation of property based class 
interests of a dominant coalition made up of big land owning farmers, industrialists, and 
managerial elites, and the concomitant subordination of peasants, workers, and other subaltern 
communities.338 But even if the dynamism of the anticolonial movement came to be sublated 
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within an institutional form appropriate for what was at best a passive revolution, the discourse 
of sovereignty that it inaugurated cannot be reduced entirely to the class prerogatives of those 
who held positions of governmental authority under the new nation state. The problem over 
here stems from sovereignty itself being generally regarded as a property belonging to the 
highest bearers of juridical authority or political capacity. It was instead conceived by the 
founding framers as a more relational category bringing the two competing dimensions of 
legality and popularity together in a provisional settlement, and doing just enough to inscribe 
the constitutional engagement with the property concept in the symbolic language of social 
duties. As the jurist Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyyar observed while siding with Nehru in the 
debate on the property clause:  
 
‘Our ancients never regarded the institution of property as an end in itself. Property 
exists for dharma. Dharma and the duty which the individual owes to the society form 
the whole basis of our social framework. Dharma is the law of social well being and 
varies from yuga to yuga [age to age]. … . The sole end of property is yajna [sacrifice] 
and to serve a social purpose, an idea which forms the essential note of Mahatma 
Gandhi's life and teachings. In the fervent hope that the amendment will further social 
progress of the teeming millions of the agricultural population of this country, I accord 
my wholehearted support to the proposition as put forward by the Honourable the Prime 
Minister.’339 
 
The hegemony of social duties may have appeared to be a spurious one especially when 
approached from the prism of a radical emancipatory politics, but what made the crucial 
difference was the transition from a colonial to a postcolonial context, and the accompanying 
change in reference to a democratic constituent power as the ultimate source of legitimacy. 
This in effect meant that it could not be resisted merely by galvanizing plebeian subjectivities 
against elite domination, unless their sociological mobilization was also intellectually backed 
up by another counter-hegemonic discourse staking a claim to constituent power. Precisely 
such a challenge was posed by Ambedkar in the symbolic language of political rights, which I 
will now endeavour to investigate in the next section. 
 
3   Political rights 
 
One may find a convenient explanation for Ambedkar’s discomfiture with the symbolic 
language of social duties in his fierce opposition towards the Hindu dharmik order, wherein 
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each particular community was customarily assigned a different function to perform, 
depending upon its specific position inside or outside the caste hierarchy. But I would argue 
that his opposition ran much deeper, extending also to the contemporary culture of spiritual 
nationalism which entailed an entirely modernist reworking of the concept of duties in the 
register of ethics and morality. As a result of this primacy of duties in fact, he apprehended that 
the idea of sovereignty could no longer remain as an empty enough a place of power, with the 
responsibility for action being always imputed to an immutable subject, irrespective of whether 
it was otherwise defined in terms of caste or nation or even as a satyagrahi for that matter.340 
 
Although Ambedkar converged with his nationalist counterparts in drawing upon the law of 
karma to suggest a cause-effect relationship between acts and their consequences, he broke 
away from the mainstream by adopting its theorization in the Buddhist tradition of dhamma 
which rejected the distinctly Hindu notions of Atman (soul) and Brahman (divine reality), and 
also harped upon the inexistence of a permanent subject more generally. Influenced by the 
negative theology of Sunnyata (emptiness), he interpreted the Buddha as having moved beyond 
the perennial tension between eternalism and nihilism to fashion an impermanent subject that 
was neither immortal nor altogether non-existent. The Buddha was for Ambedkar an 
annihilationist only as far as the soul was concerned, since he did not believe in its rebirth or 
transmigration, but not so in respect of material energy, which according to him continued to 
regenerate after the death of the physical body by joining the general mass of energy playing 
about in the universe.341 In articulating the impermanence of the subject through the formula 
‘being is becoming’, Ambedkar sought to break the connection linking the responsibility for 
action in the past and future to the living individual at present, a doctrinal understanding of 
karma which incidentally supplied the theological basis for the perpetuation of caste oppression 
in Brahminical Hinduism. His constitutional project was rather aimed at preventing the 
collective subjectivity of state and society from escaping responsibility for the condition of the 
poor and lowly, who in fact were to be made equal partners in India’s newly acquired national 
sovereignty through the invocation of a rival symbolic language of political rights.342 
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Before proceeding any further, it is pertinent to ask how Ambedkar’s constitutional 
imagination could come to be centred so much around political rights, in spite of him having 
started with the core objective of destabilizing the notion of the immutable subject. The 
discourse of rights after all generally presupposes an already existing subject, be it the man 
endowed with reason under the prepolitical natural law, or the citizen receiving political 
recognition under the positive law of the nation state. Let me respond to the question by 
showing how his work moved beyond these competing presuppositions of natural law and 
positive law, and yet ended up developing a rights based model of sovereignty anchored in an 
impermanent subject. 
 
Ambedkar did not present political rights as a mere concretization into the constitutional order 
of the more abstract prepolitical human rights drawn from the natural law tradition. Although 
he was averse to dictatorship of any kind for the threat it posed to the development of a 
nonviolent culture of civil liberties, his objections were couched in theologico-political terms 
and evinced a deeper concern for the dangerous implications such a regime might come to have 
on the egalitarian and fraternal arrangement of sovereignty in the country. Even while being 
an integral part of the constitution making oligarchy as the Chairman of the Constituent 
Assembly’s Drafting Committee, he had thus warned on the floor of the house:  
 
‘In India, bhakti, or what may be called the path of devotion or hero-worship, plays a 
part in its politics unequaled in magnitude by the part it plays in the politics of any other 
country in the world. Bhakti in religion may be the road to the salvation of a soul. But 
in politics, bhakti or hero-worship is a sure road to degradation and to eventual 
dictatorship.’343 
 
This critique acquired a much sharper overtone after Ambedkar resigned from the cabinet and 
dissociated himself from the Congress government in 1951. It was now specifically directed at 
Prime Minister Nehru and his practice of amending the constitutional text from time to time to 
deal with unfavourable judicial decisions on the property question:  
 
‘… there is a dogma in the working of the British Constitution … that the King can do 
no wrong. If any wrong is done in the working of the Constitution, the person 
responsible for the wrong is the Prime Minister and his colleagues. But the King can 
never be wrong and can never do wrong. We too in this country have adopted 
practically, with slight modifications, the British Constitution. But unfortunately the 
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working of our Constitution is governed by a dogma, which is just the opposite of the 
dogma adopted by the British people. In our country the dogma on which we proceed 
is that the Prime Minister can do no wrong and that he will do no wrong. Therefore, 
anything that the Prime Minister proposes to do must be accepted as correct and without 
question. This devotion in politics to a personality may be excusable in cases, but it 
does not seem to me excusable where the fundamental rights are being invaded.’344  
 
Ambedkar was aware that contrary to his understanding of fundamental rights as carrying out 
the very objectives of the Constitution as laid down in its Preamble, the Congress regarded 
them merely as ‘a kind of ornament which the Indian people should have’. Yet even this attitude 
had undergone a significant change, with fundamental rights now being looked upon ‘as an 
iron chain which ought to be broken, whenever occasion arose for it’. Such a contemptuous 
treatment of fundamental rights by the party in power, as though their frequent infringement 
was a matter of no moment at all, could in his opinion easily lead to dangerous consequences 
in the future.345 
 
It must be born in mind over here that Ambedkar as Law Minister had himself piloted the first 
constitutional amendment, which made the initial incursions on the scope of the right to 
property in the name of a legislatively authorized social revolution. He no doubt appreciated 
that providing full compensation in lieu of property acquisitions was neither possible nor 
desirable, but also believed that persons deprived of their instruments of earning a living must 
at least be compensated in accordance with a law enacted by Parliament. What therefore 
compelled him to oppose the fourth amendment in particular was its positing of the executive 
organ of government as the sole determinant of the quantum of compensation if any, without 
being bound by even the most minimal precepts of constitutional legality.346 
 
I am not suggesting that Ambedkar uncritically espoused a bourgeois regime of private 
property for independent India, although he did certainly embrace the possibility it had opened 
up for the stigmatized community of untouchable Dalits to claim their space on the grid of 
capitalist modernity. In a pamphlet entitled ‘States and Minorities’ submitted to the Constituent 
Assembly, he had in fact proposed a most audacious plan for the constitutionalization of the 
social question, which specifically entailed the nationalization of key and basic industries 
including agriculture. It was clear to him that the consolidation of holdings and the enactment 
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of tenancy legislations could not solve the problem of the sixty million untouchables, most of 
whom merely toiled away as landless labourers. He therefore insisted that the state must 
acquire agricultural lands from private individuals in return for an appropriate compensation, 
and put in place a collectivized method of intensive farm cultivation financed by its own 
resources within ten years of the coming into force of the Constitution.347 
Apart from enshrining the standard set of fundamental rights which were to be found in other 
contemporary democratic constitutions, Ambedkar also wanted India’s constitutional text to 
lay down the shape and form of the economic structure of society as a whole. He observed that 
the dominant tendency in existing constitutions was to prescribe the form of the political 
structure of society, whilst leaving its economic structure entirely untouched. This arrangement 
eventually resulted in the setting at naught of what remained a political democracy merely in a 
formal sense, by the material domain of social economy where private interests continued to 
reign supreme. So it was necessary that late comers to constitution making like India did not 
copy the faults of other countries, and rejected the antiquated notions of old time constitutional 
lawyers who focused exclusively on institutionalizing politics at the cost of ignoring the 
economy altogether. Only by extending the democratic principle of ‘one man, one value’ to the 
economic sphere through ‘the law of the Constitution’ could individual liberties be actually 
safeguarded from other individuals, and a permanent state socialism be established under a 
nondictatorial Parliamentary democracy.348 
 
There is a deep connection between Ambedkar’s work as a transformative constitutionalist and 
his more theologically inflected writings on Buddhism as a political religion. He in fact went 
on to combine Marx with Buddha to hold that private property brought power to one class and 
sorrow to another, but insisted on its abolition without resorting to violence and dictatorship.349 
While Marxism and Buddhism both shared a common end which was the removal of misery 
and exploitation from society, they adopted radically divergent means for the purpose of its 
realization. According to the Marxian creed on the one hand, communism could be established 
only by breaking up the existing system through the force of violence, and continuing with the 
new system through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Buddha’s gospel of dhamma on the 
other hand, sought to ‘convert a man by changing his moral disposition to follow the path 
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voluntarily’.350 Far from rejecting violence in an absolute sense, the Buddha simply insisted 
upon the regulated use of ‘force as energy’, such that other valuable ends were not destroyed 
in achieving the abolition of private property.351 Furthermore, although Ambedkar understood 
that a temporary dictatorship may be good and a welcome thing even for making democracy 
safe, he nevertheless proceeded to ask thus: ‘Why should not Dictatorship liquidate itself after 
it has done its work, after it has removed all the obstacles and boulders in the way of democracy 
and has made the path of Democracy safe.’ Finding an appropriate exemplar in the Buddhist 
Emperor Asoka who had famously renounced violence after battling the Kalingas, he remarked 
that ‘If our victors today not only disarm their victims but also disarm themselves there would 
be peace all over the world’.352 The Buddha himself came across in Ambedkar’s reading as a 
thorough democrat who had nothing to do with dictatorship, an ordinary bhikku who seemed 
at the most like a Prime Minister among members of a Cabinet, and a follower of dhamma 
which was taken to be the supreme commander of the Sangh.353 Implicit in this denunciation 
of dictatorship was a clear preference for the Parliamentary form of government based on ‘the 
duty to obey the law and the right to criticize it’, a regime where each man was morally trained 
in such a way that ‘he may himself become a sentinel for the kingdom of righteousness’.354 He 
admired the French Revolution for aspiring to found human society in accordance with the 
postulates of liberty, equality and fraternity, but criticized its bourgeois order of liberty for 
failing to produce equality. This equality was no doubt produced by the wonderful 
achievements of the Russian Revolution, but at the heavy cost of sacrificing liberty and 
fraternity. It seemed to him that the three could coexist only if one followed the way of the 
Buddha.355 
 
We may be tempted to infer from all this that Ambedkar the theorist of collective political 
sovereignty supplanted or superseded Ambedkar the theorist of constitutional fundamental 
rights. In his understanding after all, rights did not simply inhere in human nature, and were in 
fact conceived as ‘gifts of the law’ which the state granted and could even qualify in the interest 
of national sovereignty.356 What concerned him more was not the lack of rights as such, but 
rather the possibility of their non-actualization in society in spite of being recognized by the 
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positive constitutional law of the state. Positive law by itself was no substitute for the social 
and moral conscience of society when it came to securing and safeguarding rights effectively. 
To put this in his own words,  
 
‘If social conscience is such that it is prepared to recognise the rights which law 
proposes to enact, rights will be safe and secure. But if the fundamental rights are 
opposed by the community, no Law, no Parliament, no Judiciary can guarantee them in 
the real sense of the world. … . What is the use of Fundamental rights to the 
Untouchables in India? As Burke said, there is no method found for punishing the 
multitude. Law can punish a single solitary recalcitrant criminal. It can never operate 
against the whole body of people who choose to defy it. Social conscience … is the 
only safeguard of all rights, fundamental or non-fundamental.’357   
 
It was precisely this perceived absence of a social conscience in India which made Ambedkar 
speak about the challenges of working the constitution:  
 
‘However good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are 
called to work it, happen to be a bad lot. However bad a Constitution may be, it may 
turn out to be good if those who are called to work it happen to be a good lot. The 
working of a Constitution does not depend wholly upon the nature of the 
Constitution.’358  
 
The solution he found both for himself as well as the Dalit community was their conversion to 
and owning up of Mahayana Buddhism, which at least had the potential of instituting the good 
society that was needed for the purpose of giving force to India’s republican constitution. 
 
Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism was in fact a continuation of his larger constitutional 
project aimed at the annihilation of subalternity at least, if not at the annihilation of caste itself. 
What created the conditions of possibility for annihilating subalternity was no doubt his claim 
to a share in nation state sovereignty, but one which was in turn articulated in the language of 
political rights, alluding more germinally to the right to have rights or the right to politics. The 
right to politics did not have any fixed or determinate subject, as it was performatively enacted 
by those who were a part that ordinarily had no part in the political community. Rather, its 
process of subjectivization produced an impermanent subject who came to be defined by the 
interval between the social identity of caste and the juridical identity of legal personhood, 
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whilst presuming to speak and act as though participating in an order of sovereignty from which 
he or she had hitherto been excluded or disqualified.359 
 
To be more particular, Ambedkar initially conceived this right as the ‘right to effective 
representation’, and expressed it in terms of his various demands for political safeguards on 
behalf of the governmental category of Depressed Classes or Scheduled Castes, so that the 
institutional apparatus of the formal constitution could be made to cohere with the social reality 
of the material constitution.360 Such a view was supplemented later on by a materialist reading 
of Buddhism, wherein Buddha the enlightened parivrajaka or wandering mendicant was 
presented as a marga data (path giver) rather than a moksha data (salvation giver), who not 
only renounced his own Sakya Republic but also refused to draw support from the kings of 
Kosala or Magadha, and instead established a fraternal community of monks and laity anchored 
in the symbolic sovereignty of the political law of dhamma.361 The Dalit community of 
converted Buddhists was urged to emulate precisely this example, especially when exercising 
the right to partless participation in India’s constitutional order, given their ambivalent position 
inside and outside its national framework of sovereignty.362 
 
The reason why Ambedkar’s subsequent conversion to Buddhism turned out to be so 
momentous was that it came in the wake of a constitutional text which had originally prioritized 
social duties over political rights, and thereby departed fundamentally from what he had first 
set out to achieve in the Constituent Assembly. While the directive principles were aimed at 
setting up a social order oriented to the promotion of popular welfare and especially of the most 
disadvantaged, they did not proceed to institutionalize a state socialism under parliamentary 
democracy in the way he had envisaged. Furthermore, although provisions were made for the 
reservation of seats in legislative bodies as well as in public employment, they either had a 
limited life of ten years from the inception of the constitution, or were framed as responsibilities 
of government rather than as rights held by marginalized communities themselves. 
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Notwithstanding these shortcomings however, Ambedkar could not give up on the constitution 
altogether, for the hope of an open democracy which its electoral regime of universal adult 
franchize represented. Yet he clung on to the view that the politicization of the social question 
was crucial for the prospects of democracy in India, and worried about the ‘life of 
contradictions’ facing the country, with political equality on the one hand and socio economic 
inequality on the other. He sternly warned that if social equality was denied for long, ‘those 
who suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this 
Assembly has two laboriously built up.’363 
 
It may seem to us in hindsight that Ambedkar’s apprehensions were somewhat far fetched, 
with the constitution managing to survive well enough for nearly seventy years now. But in 
spite of the discourse of social duties remaining hegemonic for much of India’s postcolonial 
history, its legitimacy has persistently been contested by the competing discourse of political 
rights, especially so in the aftermath of the fresh possibilities opened up by the growing 
democratization of the constitutional field. In the final section, I will argue that it is this 
irresolvable rivalry between the two discourses traceable to the founding moment which has 
continued to sustain the project of transformative constitutionalism even in the contemporary 
age of populist reason. 
 
4   Populist reason 
 
The deeply intertwined relationship between India’s constitutional imagination and its newly 
acquired political sovereignty sketched out in the previous sections received a fresh 
recontextualization as the country entered the global age of populist reason in the final decades 
of the twentieth century. Theorizing the implications of this turn to populism, Partha Chatterjee 
has influentially argued that while the postcolonial constitutional order was founded as a liberal 
democratic republic,  
 
‘(its) space of politics effectively became split between a narrow domain of civil society 
where citizens related to the state through the mutual recognition of legally enforceable 
rights and a wider domain of political society where governmental agencies dealt not 
with citizens but with populations to deliver specific benefits or services through a 
process of political negotiation.’364  
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For Chatterjee, the politics of civil society more dominant in the early post-founding period 
was in a sense only a continuation of the anticolonial national movement, with its commitment 
to the normative precepts of dharma emphasizing upon self sacrifice, faith, and dedicated 
service to the nation. But in the aftermath of the national emergency (1975-1977), as the will 
of the subjects shifted from an engagement with sovereignty to a concern for governmentality, 
dharma began to be punctuated or supplemented by the ethical principles of niti covering the 
mundane details of administrative policy and procedures of governance.365 This paved the way 
for the politics of political society, where different moral communities of disadvantaged 
populations demanded the provision of welfare entitlements even if it required the carving out 
of illegal exceptions in the normal application of the law. It was in their negotiated settlements 
with governmental authorities involving the temporary suspension of the rule of law that he 
saw a new and potentially richer development of democracy in a postcolonial society like 
India.366 
 
Chatterjee’s narrative tracing the move away from a dharma oriented civil society to a niti 
oriented political society has no doubt been extremely generative, but it proceeds on the basis 
of a binary distinction between democracy and constitutionalism which seems rather 
unpersuasive for the Indian context.367 Although the constraining limitations of 
constitutionalism could not be squared easily enough with the unfettered exercise of democracy 
in postcolonial India, both of these features had nevertheless come together from the very 
inception of the new constitutional order in their simultaneous dedication to the collective self 
transformation of society. Since the national community over here was transtemporally unified 
at least in respect of this normative point of joint action, democracy and constitutionalism did 
not share as tenuous a relationship with each other as they arguably did in the archetypal Euro 
American constitutional state of the contemporary period. Thus even if the recent turn to 
populism in India may well be indicative of a general impatience with constitutional procedures 
and institutions, no governmental regime could claim legitimacy for itself without continuing 
to pursue the project of transformative constitutionalism inaugurated by the founding framers. 
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While attempting to distinguish between constitutionalism and democracy or civil society and 
political society, Chatterjee though did not do much to move beyond the analytical treatment 
of duties and rights essentially as correlative concepts. But as we saw above, it was rather their 
mutual incompatibility that in a way defined the fault lines of the project of India’s collective 
self transformation. So has been the case under constitutional populism, with the persistence 
of an unceasing struggle for hegemony between the rival languages of social duties on the one 
hand and political rights on the other. What has changed in the new context however, is that 
the real and imaginary now threaten to overwhelm the symbolic dimensions of the 
fundamentally irreconcilable conflict between these two lifeworlds at the heart of the Indian 
political. 
 
India’s symbolic constitution came under stress after Nehru’s death in 1964, and the subsequent 
Prime Ministership of his daughter and powerful mass leader Indira Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi was 
able to garner political power by purporting to radicalize the Nehruvian legacy of the welfare 
state, but ended up breaking away from him categorically in her attitude towards constitutional 
democracy. Apart from subordinating the Congress party and its local bosses to the central 
government, she sought to bypass the Supreme Court which had barred any amendment of the 
fundamental rights chapter, and struck down a few of her socialist initiatives including bank 
nationalization and withdrawal of privy purses.368 In order to do so, she made a direct appeal 
to the people with vague populist slogans like ‘garibi hatao’ or ‘eliminate poverty’, and 
managed to win a landslide victory in the plebiscitary election of 1971. While the Parliament 
and judiciary were locked in a compelling battle to determine the nature and scope of amending 
power, the Allahabad High Court invalidated Mrs. Gandhi’s own election to the lower house 
of Parliament on grounds of electoral malpractices, prompting her eventually to declare a state 
of national emergency in 1975. This enabled her to suspend the already diluted provisions on 
civil liberties contained in the constitutional text, and make full use of a repressive apparatus 
of rule against dissenters of all hues.369 She then positioned herself in the liminal zone of 
indistinction between a commissarial and a sovereign form of dictatorship, and enacted the 
most sweeping constitutional amendments in the history of independent India.370 The 
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Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act of 1976 attempted to fashion India as a self 
professedly socialist and secular republic, and in particular accorded absolute primacy to all of 
the directive principles over the fundamental rights to equality, freedom and property. It 
complemented the responsibilities of government by incorporating an altogether new section 
enlisting the fundamental duties of the citizen, but one which could not match up to the political 
salience of the directive principles in due course of time. 
 
This imposition of emergency rule faced strong resistance from the Jaya Prakash Narayan lead 
social movement calling for a ‘Total Revolution’ against the incumbent establishment, and 
came to an end after the Janata Party defeated the Congress in the general election of 1977. 
The new government enacted the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act in 1978, which 
undid much of the forty second amendment, held the right to life and personal liberty without 
legal authorization to be inviolable even during an emergency, and reduced the status of the 
right to property from a fundamental right to an ordinary constitutional right. Fundamental 
rights were no longer viewed by the judiciary as antithetical to directive principles, with the 
Supreme Court in fact going on to construe their harmonious relationship to be an essential 
feature of the basic structure of the constitution.371 But far from remaining committed to the 
priorities of a welfare state, this harmony was, at least since the beginning of the 1990s, being 
increasingly aligned to the concerns of a neoliberal political economy. 
 
Yet in the midst of all these changes, the generation of political power only became more 
dependent upon an appeal to constitutional populism in one form or another. The Congress 
though could no longer remain at the forefront of populist politics, given its declining social 
base and preoccupation with institutions of governmental authority. Its place was gradually 
taken up by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), acting as the narrow political wing of a much 
broader social movement of Hindutva or Hindu nationalism. While its major ideologues were 
initially critical of the Western derivation of the Indian Constitution, the BJP has been able to 
win elections and form governments both at the central as well as the provincial levels from 
the 1990s and beyond, precisely by taking advantage of the constitutional institution of a 
relatively open democracy in the country. The Hindu nationalists in fact did not find the 
democratic element of the constitution to be as problematic as the background presupposition 
of India’s composite culture within which it was meant to be operationalized. So they fought 
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for the restoration of democracy during the emergency, and participated in politics with the 
objective of inscribing Hindu culture at the centre of the Indian political. What made the 
populist turn especially conducive for the BJP’s ethno cultural conception of nationalism, was 
the gradual disentanglement of the democratic field from the symbolic externality of people as 
an empty signifier, and the concomitant possibility of its redefinition in contrast with the real 
externality of unassimilable religious minorities in general and Muslims in particular. 
Coalition governments headed by the BJP never resorted to the large scale suspension of civil 
liberties unlike Mrs. Gandhi, but this is primarily because the state of exception has 
increasingly come to be absorbed into the normal constitution itself in the post-emergency 
period. Just like the Congress in fact, the BJP also accorded priority to duties over rights, both 
while espousing Gandhian socialism in its earlier phase, or the championing of neoliberal 
developmentalism in more recent times, particularly so after the massive electoral mandate of 
2014 under the leadership of Narendra Modi and his ‘vikas purush’ or ‘development hero’ 
image. So even if these duties no longer require the implementation of welfare through the 
crafting of egalitarian redistributive policies, they do involve the rendering of ‘seva’ or 
‘service’ to cater to the basic needs of at least the most disadvantaged in the social sphere. 
More specifically for the BJP of today, service essentially takes the form of the private 
provision of local public goods such as education and health, with support from a wider family 
of socio cultural organizations working in the parental care of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh (RSS). Only by unconditionally offering social services to the least well off has an 
otherwise elitist, upper caste, upper class party been able to win over the votes of a growing 
number of poor and marginalized subalterns, albeit without necessarily giving up on the 
conservative capitalist policy preferences of its core constituencies.372 
 
With the augmentation of the transformative constitutional enterprise however, subaltern actors 
have begun to look beyond the limited role of supplying legitimacy to either of the two 
dominant national parties, and are instead taking the more radical step of mobilizing on the 
basis of caste and property to participate in politics on their own terms. Chatterjee may not be 
entirely off the mark in observing that these mobilizations in political society are meant to resist 
the juridical norms of civil society, although he does not proceed further to appreciate how they 
often counterpose the hegemony of the established order to the rival hegemony of another 
political legality. What comes in his way is a somewhat attenuated understanding of political 
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society as a domain associated exclusively with the ‘politics of the governed’, and not so much 
as an arena where the politics of sovereignty could also be played out.373 Such an understanding 
therefore does not suffice to capture the totality of India’s experience as a postcolonial 
democracy, where concerns of governmentality remain inextricably interlinked with concerns 
of sovereignty, even more so in the absence of a stable source of symbolic mediation under 
conditions of constitutional populism. Therefore while thinking about the participation of 
subaltern groups and communities in politics today, we must recognize the difficulty of 
disentangling their interest in negotiating with agents of governmentality from their claim to a 
share in political power itself, whose origins can ultimately be attributed to the founding 
moment of postcolonial sovereignty. Emphasizing upon the deeply imbricated relationship 
between governmentality and sovereignty is not to take away from the distinctiveness of 
political society as such, but to prepare the ground for its fresh reconceptualization in the 
language of political rights, which as discussed earlier has been striving to challenge the 
supremacy of the discourse of social duties more widely familiar to Indian constitutional 
practice thus far. 
 
Such a reconceptualized political society is best exemplified in the democratic upsurge of the 
lower castes from the late 1980s and beyond. Although their ever increasing participation in 
electoral democracy was at one level enabled by the institutional mechanisms of universal adult 
franchize and special safeguards, it has at another level contributed to the expansion of the 
constitutional project by forcing the conversion of the reservations policy from a governmental 
responsibility into a question of political entitlements. The watershed episode here was 
undoubtedly the decision of Prime Minister V.P. Singh’s National Front government to 
implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission, pursuant to which a certain 
percentage of seats came to be reserved in public employment at the centre for a deliberately 
broad category of ‘Other Backward Classes’. Adding to the constitutional provision of 
reservations for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, this measure extended the 
benefits of the policy to those socially and educationally backward castes which did not 
otherwise face a history of untouchability. It in turn created conditions for the greater 
democratization of the constitutional order, with lower caste politicians coming to dominate 
State Legislatures in North India, and also acquiring political power under Lalu Prasad Yadav 
in Bihar, and Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayavati in Uttar Pradesh. With the anti-Brahminical 
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Dravidian movement having already succeeded in reshaping the political culture of the South, 
caste emerged as a truly nationwide currency of mass politics and could no longer be ignored 
or taken for granted by other established rivals. In a radical departure from its conventional 
rightwing and leftwing variations, this novel form of populism treated caste neither as a fixed 
ethnic identity nor as a pregiven material interest, but rather as an empty signifier provisionally 
unifying the disparate and often contradictory demands of the subaltern populous, and inviting 
India to an alternative democratic imaginary beyond the familiar trope of a secular or 
communal politics of development.374 
 
The politics of development has surprisingly found another counter response in the 
politicization of the property concept, even though it is no longer recognized as a fundamental 
right under the Constitution. We have seen how land reforms were initially pursued in the name 
of popular sovereignty by restricting, suspending and eventually repealing what was 
predictably interpreted as a liberal, elitist and aristocratic right to property. In more recent times 
however, it is property which has appeared on the grid of constitutional populism, in spite of 
sharing a much closer affinity with political economy than with political sovereignty. This is 
especially after land acquisition became an instrument in service of neoliberal 
developmentalism, leaving no option for local, tribal and farming populations apart from 
resorting to the property argument to protect themselves from displacement and dispossession. 
They have been agitating with varying degrees of success against different aspects of the 
construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada river, as well as in favour of the right 
of forest dwellers to forest land and resources, and the right to fair compensation, relief and 
rehabilitation under the new land acquisition law of 2013. A more striking instance of the 
blurring of the distinction between property and sovereignty occurred in 2007-2008, when the 
Left Front government of West Bengal invoked its eminent domain power to acquire farmlands 
for large industrial developments in the Special Economic Zones of Singur and Nandigram. 
This expropriation of peasant property resulted in violent clashes involving villagers, police 
and party cadre, culminating in the historic 2011 electoral defeat of the Left after 34 years in 
government, and their replacement by the subaltern populism of the Trinamul Congress leader 
Mamata Banerjee. The lands acquired have subsequently been returned back to their respective 
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owners, with Banerjee now busy preparing herself to take on the Hindu nationalist and 
developmentalist populism of the BJP, both in Bengal as also at the centre.375 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to complicate the story of India’s experience with 
transformative constitutionalism by connecting it with the intellectual history of legal and 
political dissensus shaping the constitutional enterprise as a whole. Although most 
constitutional actors nominally agreed that the normative point of their joint action was the 
collective self transformation of society in India, they came to share a profound disagreement 
in respect of how such a task was to be precisely pursued. This disagreement has produced two 
incompatible discursive modalities of social duties and political rights, which remain as 
irreconcilable with one another in the contemporary age of populist reason, as had been the 
case around the founding moment of postcolonial sovereignty. But while their battle was 
previously waged in the symbolic languages of social law and political law, in more recent 
times it is increasingly being played out in the register of the real and the imaginary. 
 
Moving away from a common understanding of duties and rights as correlative concepts, I 
have dealt with them separately as constitutive elements of two rival lifeworlds, and examined 
the implications of prioritizing one over the other for the Indian political. Although the 
discourse of social duties has acquired a near hegemony on the constitutional field, it continues 
to face an ever intensifying challenge from the counter hegemony of the discourse of political 
rights. I believe that only in the persistence of this unresolvable conflict can the autonomy of 
the political be preserved today, especially given the ascendancy of a threateningly all 
subsuming neoliberal developmental nationalism in the country. Another potential source of 
trouble for India’s autonomous political however stems from an equally all pervasive culture 
of judicializing politics under its activist Supreme Court, to which I now turn in the final 
chapter of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
LEGAL THEOLOGY AND THE SUPREME COURT AS AN AGENT OF 
CONSTITUENT POWER 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed how different visions of collective self transformation that 
had been circulating around the founding moment of postcolonial India and extending up to 
the more contemporary period of populist reason came to be expressed in either of the two 
fundamentally irreconcilable discursive languages of social duties or political rights, which 
were in turn drawn from the rival symbolic lifeworlds of social law and political law 
respectively. But my investigation proceeded on the basis of an originalist expectation about 
the legislative and executive organs of government being at the forefront of authoritatively 
mediating between the various social and political movements proliferating in the country on 
the one hand, and the normative point of joint action of the collective constitutional subject on 
the other. Since the 1970s and 1980s however, even the higher judiciary has emerged as an 
active agent in the constitutional order, by assuming upon itself the task of articulating, 
enforcing and monitoring the project of transformative constitutionalism. I therefore turn to the 
rise of juristocracy and in particular examine its implications for the autonomy of the Indian 
political in this final chapter of the thesis. 
 
The last few decades have seen a considerable expansion in the constitutional role of India’s 
Supreme Court, with an ever increasing variety of governmental and non-governmental 
activities coming to be subjected to the rigours of judicial scrutiny. Apart from seeking to 
uphold fundamental rights and adjudicating upon issues of legislative and executive 
competence, the Court directly intervenes in matters as broad ranging as the provision of 
welfare, good governance, environment protection, transparency and accountability of public 
institutions, and the appointment of judges and their transfers. Its jurisdiction is no longer 
limited to the striking down of illegal and unconstitutional actions, and participation in 
conventional and creative interpretive exercises alone, but also extends to the formulation of 
administrative policies, enactment of ordinary legislations, and most remarkably even to the 
determination of validity of constitutional amendments. No wonder then that it is widely 
recognized as one of the most powerful constitutional courts in the world today. 
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Notwithstanding a general acknowledgment of the Supreme Court’s growing prominence 
however, there is little scholarly consensus on how precisely to make sense of the concomitant 
judicialization of different aspects of social and political life in the country. Constitutional 
lawyers usually emphasize upon the Court having shifted from a formalist reading of the 
Constitution in the early years of independence, to a more structuralist style of interpretation 
after the late 1960s.376 While individual constitutional provisions were initially construed as 
mutually exclusive, they came to be approached later on in an integrated manner as deeply 
interlinked with one another, a move which then paved the way for the subsequent activism of 
the judiciary from the 1970s and 1980s. The Court is appreciated by proponents of this view 
for orienting particular constitutional laws to the higher values embedded in the constitutional 
text, and is also criticized whenever its decisions fail to evince any engagement with precepts 
of public reason. 
 
In contrast, political scientists believe that the resort to normative principles does not suffice 
to explain the so called phenomenon of ‘judicial sovereignty’, as its legitimacy is ultimately 
dependant upon the empirical or sociological acceptance of the people in a democratic 
society.377 They understand the Court not so much as an expounder of the constitutional text 
or binding precedents of the past, but more as a sovereign meaning creator, instrumentally 
deploying the legal form to arrive at a substantive compromise between competing concerns 
and interests without provoking a significant backlash from other representative institutions. 
This move from public reason to reason of state thinking in assessments of the judicial role no 
doubt offers a better approximation of the ground reality than is possible under the thick 
prescriptivism of a purely normative approach. However such a view runs the risk of equating 
law with pure efficacy, and as a consequence overlooking its constitutive role in fashioning a 
collective constitutional imagination for postcolonial India. 
 
I would instead take as my starting point a third view which seeks to connect the emergence of 
judicial activism to the Supreme Court’s assumption of an extraordinary jurisdiction of 
reviewing Parliamentary exercises of constituent power by asserting what Upendra Baxi has 
called a concurrent constituent power of its own as a co-ordinate authority in respect of 
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constitution making.378 Much akin to Paul Kahn’s richly illuminating account of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the Supreme Court of India no longer speaks merely in an 
adjudicative, executive or even legislative voice, but is in fact increasingly claiming to speak 
in the constituent voice of the people themselves.379 Their anchoring in sovereignty is best 
manifested in a commonly shared culture of power and authority, which is markedly distinct 
from the culture of principled justification associated with the constitutionalization of 
administrative law and the administratization of constitutional law accompanying the post-
sovereign European and global standard of proportionality review.380 Besides this nominal 
convergence however, little else is similar in the engagement of both courts with constituent 
power, for unlike in Kahn’s story, it is difficult to establish a directly equivalent relationship 
between the languages of popular sovereignty and rule of law in the Indian context. We can 
rather discern over here an unbridgeable gap between the voice of law and the voice of the 
people, owing essentially to the irresolvable rivalry between the two conflicting hegemonic 
formations of social law and political law that have been separately seeking to bring them 
together in a tighter fusion with one another. In order to make sense of the judicial engagement 
with their irreconcilable contradictions however, I must begin by first connecting the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court with the reason of the Indian political. 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. Part one traces the theological antecedents of the basic 
structure doctrine introduced in the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973) to the essential practices 
doctrine enunciated in the early jurisprudence on freedom of religion. It complicates the easy 
constitutionalist rendition of the Supreme Court as committed to the autonomy of law and legal 
formalism in the initial years, and establishes that the judiciary had also aligned with other 
organs of the government during this period to pursue a commonly shared goal of social reform, 
by interpreting law as revelation in line with law as command and law as reason. With a view 
to persuade religious communities about the need for reform, the Court ended up offering them 
internal reasons from within their own tradition, a phenomenon which in turn supplied an 
appropriate template for the subsequent sacralization of the constitution itself. Part two argues 
in a similar vein that basic structure limitations on the constituent power of Parliament came 
to be legitimized only on the touchstone of the internal reason of the Indian political. This 
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implied that the Court was no longer able to talk about the transcendentality of fundamental 
rights, and had to instead resort to the founding vision of social transformation under an open 
democracy in all of its power generating judgments of the 1970s and 1980s. The constituent 
power thus generated by speaking and acting in the name of the people paradoxically equipped 
it to even move beyond the limitations of ordinary constitutional legality in public interest 
litigation cases. But rather than supporting a proceduralist and normativist critique of this 
exercise, I engage with it in more substantive and political terms, and in part three finally turn 
to the judicial response to the repoliticization of religion and caste from the 1990s onwards. 
My contention is that the judiciary has managed to portray itself as a successful agent of 
constituent power, by negotiating with these developments and their inherent contradictions in 
the rival incompatible languages of social reason grounded in the positive theology of being 
on the one hand, and political reason grounded in the negative theology of becoming on the 
other. 
 
1   The theological antecedents of basic structure constitutionalism  
 
In the 1973 case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, a thirteen judge bench of the 
Supreme Court set out to ascertain whether there were any inherent or implied limitations on 
the constituent power of Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article 368. Put briefly, 
Article 368 had laid down that most constitutional provisions could be amended by a two thirds 
supermajority in both Houses of Parliament, except those provisions dealing with federal 
arrangements which additionally required ratification from at least ten State Legislatures. By a 
seven to six majority, the Court famously decided that as long as these procedural prescriptions 
were being followed, Parliament was authorized to amend each and every provision of the 
constitutional text, without however altering the essential features of its basic structure. The 
wide sweep and amplitude of amending power could not have the effect of abrogating the basic 
structure of the existing constitution, as this tantamounted to destroying its very identity. As 
explicated in H.R. Khanna, J.’s holding opinion,  
 
‘The word "amendment" postulates that the old Constitution survives without loss of 
its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subjected to 
alterations. As a result of the amendment, the old Constitution cannot be destroyed and 
done away with; it is retained though in the amended form. What then is meant by the 
 157 
retention of the old Constitution? It means the retention of the basic structure or 
framework of the old Constitution.’381  
  
This basic structure was read into the constitutional text even though no explicit limitations 
had been imposed on the scope of amending power by the founding framers. The legitimacy 
of the new doctrine, and the identification and interpretation of its essential features therefore 
remain open questions, which have unsurprisingly attracted considerable scholarly attention in 
the last four decades or so. There exists a broad agreement among supporters of the doctrine 
that the essential features of the constitutional basic structure refer to systematic principles 
underlying and connecting the various provisions of the constitution and making it a coherent 
document. However, two completely different strands of opinion have emerged about the 
nature of the basic structure within this expansive field of constitutionalist consensus. 
 
While the first view considers the doctrine to be mirroring the continental European experience 
in pointing to constitutional principles as imperatives of optimization with standards admitting 
of some flexibility, the second commends a distinctly common law technique for discovering 
these principles through a structural and multiprovisional reading of the constitutional text.382 
On the contrary, critics associate the doctrine with the counter majoritarian difficulty of judicial 
review and worry about its impact on the functioning of democracy as a whole.383 They also 
remind us that India’s constitution makers had categorically rejected strong entrenchment 
provisions, and so the Kesavananda judgment could only signify a break from rather than a 
continuation of the original vision of transformative constitutionalism.384 
 
My problem with the former approach is that it seeks to theorize constitutional practice in India 
by drawing from global models of normative constitutional theory, and not from within the 
internal point of view of the Indian political, which remains a necessary precondition for any 
new intervention to garner legitimacy in the final analysis. Although the second approach 
purports to take the internal point of view seriously, it either reduces democracy and constituent 
power to participatory institutions of government, or refuses to countenance the possibility of 
a judicially sponsored augmentation of the original constitutional vision of the founding 
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framers. I would therefore move beyond both of these positions, and instead treat the basic 
structure doctrine as a judicial innovation internal to the Indian political, whose antecedents 
can in fact be traced back to the Supreme Court’s development of the essential practices 
doctrine in its 1950s and 1960s jurisprudence on the freedom of religion. 
 
1.1  Religious freedom and social reform 
 
It is convenient to present the constitutional history of early postcolonial India as one involving 
a perennial tension between an activist legislature and a formalist judiciary. Such may certainly 
have been the case in respect of land reform and affirmative action, but not necessarily so when 
it came to the question of social reform, which had in fact brought the two organs closer 
together from the very beginning of the constitution. This is because the judiciary shared the 
legislative interest in reforming the Hindu religion, even if it required infringing upon the 
autonomy of religious denominations. My contention will however be that the theological 
voice of persuasion adopted by the Supreme Court in freedom of religion cases later cleared 
the path for a similar exercise aimed at convincing the Government in Parliament in cases 
dealing with constitutional amendments. 
 
The right to freedom of religion guaranteed to individuals and communities under Articles 25 
and 26 of the Constitution was specifically made subject to public order, morality, health, and 
other provisions of Part III pertaining to fundamental rights. It could further be curtailed by 
laws enacted for the purpose of regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or 
secular activity associated with religious practice, or providing for social welfare and reform 
or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and 
sections of Hindus. By vesting such an enormous competence in governmental authorities over 
matters of religion, India’s constitutional text in effect prepared the ground for its thorough 
depoliticization, without conclusively determining whether secularism or some other ideology 
was at all required to fill in the void thus created. Not even did the judiciary contest this 
constitutionally enshrined supremacy of government over religion in the name of group rights, 
but the manner in which it came to portray itself as an ally of social reform holds instructive 
lessons for the future course of constituent power in the country. 
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One of the earliest instances of judicial deference towards the legislative programme of social 
reform was the Bombay High Court decision in State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali.385 This 
case involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of a law criminalizing bigamous 
marriages among the Hindus of Bombay, on grounds of violating the right to equality and the 
right to freedom of religion under Articles 14, 15 and 25 of the Constitution. It was argued by 
a convict under this law that the legislature could not regulate the sacramental institution of 
Hindu polygamous marriages, especially so without subjecting Muslim men contracting 
polygamous marriages to a similar prohibition. The Court rejected his objections by holding 
that religious freedom could not come in the way of a social reform measure promoting 
monogamy, enacted into law by a legislature composed of the ‘chosen representatives of the 
people’.386 Such a measure did not become unconstitutional only because Muslims were 
excluded from its purview, as the legislature ‘may rightly decide to bring about social reform 
by stages and the stages may be territorial or they may be communitywise.’387 Muslim family 
law permitting polygamy did not become void at the inception of the constitution for the reason 
of discriminating against women, as uncodified personal law did not fit the definition of ‘law’ 
and ‘laws in force’ under Article 13, and was thus by itself deemed unamenable to fundamental 
rights review. Only customary and statutory forms of law were believed to have been brought 
under the jurisdiction of Part III, and not so the personal laws of different religious 
communities, which although administered by courts in India, ultimately derived their origin 
from a divine rather than an earthly source: ‘The foundational sources of both the Hindu and 
the Mahomedan laws are their respective scriptural texts.’388 So the constitutional scheme in 
respect of personal laws was to leave them largely unaffected, barring a few exceptions relating 
to the abolition of untouchability and the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions. It was 
not for the judiciary to strike down personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights, but 
for the legislature to improve, modify or abolish them, and eventually fulfil the constitutional 
directive of securing for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.389 
 
As various legislatures continued to pursue their constitutionally prescribed social reform 
agenda by intruding into different aspects of Hindu personal law, the Supreme Court began 
engaging more carefully with the freedom of religion argument, and developing a theologically 
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inflected essential practices doctrine to justify these interventions. A more convenient 
alternative for the Court would have been to authorize such legislative enactments by reading 
into the constitutional text a Protestant distinction between belief and action familiar from 
colonial jurisprudence, and extending the protection of religious freedom to the former in the 
private sphere, whilst strictly regulating the latter in the interest of public welfare wherever 
necessary.390 In the Shirur Mutt case, it instead opted to emphasize that this right not only 
guaranteed the freedom of religious opinion alone, but the freedom to practice religion as well:  
 
‘A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it 
might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are 
regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend 
even to matters of food and dress.’391  
 
This expansion in the scope of the right at one level was however accompanied by a greater 
curtailment at another level, such that it gradually came to be restricted merely to those 
practices which were deemed integral or essential to a particular religion. What is more, these 
essential practices were to be determined not so much by the faithful themselves, but by the 
Court assuming upon itself the priestly responsibility of deciding on behalf of every single 
community contesting social reform.392  
 
Among the more effective expositions of this theological voice in the first two decades of the 
Supreme Court was the judgment of P.B. Gajendragadkar, CJ. In Sastri Yagnapurshdasji v. 
Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya or the Satsangi case.393 The satsangis were followers of the 
religious teacher and saint Swaminarayan (1780-1830), and claimed exemption from the 
Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worship (Entry Authorization) Act 1956 on grounds that their 
sect did not form part of the Hindu religion. This legislation had opened up Hindu temples in 
Bombay for the ‘Harijans’, that is the Dalit community of former untouchables, to worship in 
the same manner and to the same extent as other Hindus. In order to prevent non-satsangi 
Dalits from entering their temples, the satsangis presented themselves as a distinct 
denomination separate from the Hindus, on the basis that they worshiped Swaminarayan as 
supreme God, established temples for his worship and not of any traditional Hindu idols, 
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propagated the ideal that worship of any God other than Swaminarayan was a betrayal of his 
faith, and admitted new devotees through a procedure of initiation called diksha. 
Gajendragadkar could have followed the model of a previous decision on temple entry in which 
the Court sought to balance and harmoniously interpret the two apparently conflicting 
constitutional provisions on the right of religious denominations to manage their own affairs 
in matters of religion and the governmental duty to carry out social reform.394 However in this 
case, he proceeded further to hold that satsangis belonged to the Hindu religion itself and were 
therefore not entitled to protection from social reform in the name of special denominational 
rights. 
 
In Gajendragadkar’s opinion, the Swaminarayan sect was included within the broad ambit of 
Hinduism, interpreted not so much as a narrow religion or creed, but more as an expansive way 
of life: 
 
‘Unlike other religions in the world, the Hindu religion does not claim any one prophet; 
it does not worship any one God; it does not subscribe to any one dogma; it does not 
believe in any one philosophic concept; it does not follow any one set of religious rites 
or performances; in fact, it does not appear to satisfy the narrow traditional features of 
any religion or creed. It may broadly be described as a way of life and nothing more.’395  
 
Its enormous heterogeneity was understood to be unified in the different philosophies of 
monistic idealism, one of which was the Visishtadvaita or qualified monism of Ramanuja, 
whose teachings Swaminarayan approved and followed. What unambiguously brought 
Swaminarayan within the Hindu fold was his ‘acceptance of the Vedas with reverence, 
recognition of the fact that the path of bhakti or devotion leads to moksha, and insistence on 
devotion to Lord Krishna.’396 He was in fact proclaimed to be a Hindu saint and religious 
reformer, who fought the irrational and corrupt practices that had crept into the religion, and 
gave birth to a new sect with its distinct tenets which were ultimately grounded in Hindu 
theology and philosophy. Gajendragadkar went on to observe that the satsangi apprehension 
about Dalit entry in their temples was ‘founded on superstition, ignorance and complete 
misunderstanding of the true teachings of Hindu religion and of the real significance of the 
tenets and philosophy taught by Swaminarayan himself.’397 As if to commend itself to the 
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collective selfhood of the Hindus, the judgment contextualized the temple entry issue within 
the transformative changes taking place on India’s constitutional landscape, and concluded on 
this expectant note:  
 
‘While this litigation was slowly moving from Court to Court, mighty events of a 
revolutionary character took place on the national scene. The Constitution came into 
force on the 26th January, 1950 and since then, the whole social and religious outlook 
of the Hindu community has undergone a fundamental change as a result of the message 
of social equality and justice proclaimed by the Indian Constitution. … . In conclusion, 
we would like to emphasise that the right to enter temples which has been vouchsafed 
to the Harijans by the impugned Act in substance symbolises the right of Harijans to 
enjoy all social amenities and rights,, for let it always be remembered that social justice 
is the main foundation of the domestic way of life enshrined in the provisions of the 
Indian Constitution.’398 
 
This judgment shows how the judicialization of religion paradoxically resulted in the 
theologization of the judicial function, so much so that the Supreme Court did not mind 
occasionally indulging in scriptural exegesis for the purpose of isolating and sanctifying the 
essential features of a religion purified of all corrupt, irrational and superstitious accretions. It 
is easy to be critical of such an exercise from a purely normative point of view for moving 
beyond constitutional principles of adjudication, and also from a sociological point of view for 
prioritizing doctrinal interpretations of classical Hinduism over messy details of lived 
experience and social reality.399 I would however emphasize that this development was very 
much a plausible explication of the anticolonial movement and its irresistible attraction for the 
theologico political. So even if the judicial entanglement with religion may have deviated from 
constitutional secularism and resulted in coercion and domination over customary forms of 
life, what is important for my argument is that its justifications were framed in the persuasive 
voice of national sovereignty offering Hindu religious communities reasons internal to their 
own cultural imagination for reforming themselves in consonance with India’s evolving 
constitutional imagination. Only after deriving legitimacy from this pro-governmental 
intervention in the religious life of the country could the Court subsequently branch off into 
other areas, extending even to the domain of constitutional amendments and constituent 
power.400 
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1.2  Law as revelation, law as command, law as reason 
 
We may now link the jurisprudence on freedom of religion with constitutional amendments by 
drawing upon the three conceptions of law which were available to different actors in these 
constitutional debates—law as revelation, law as command, and law as reason. When couched 
in such terms, it is not difficult to explain why the judiciary sided with the legislature and 
upheld the constitutionality of social reform over concerns of religious freedom. This was 
largely because the legislative law as command and judicially elucidated law as reason were 
both equally interested in sublating the influence of divine law as revelation on the 
constitutional culture of the Indian political. But inter-institutional conflicts became 
unavoidable as soon as positive law and natural law confronted each other on opposite sides of 
the constitutional divide, in the tension between land reform and the right to a just 
compensation, and that between affirmative action and the right to formal equality. As courts 
started invoking fundamental rights to strike down governmental interventions in the property 
question and the imposition of caste based quotas in public education, the Parliament responded 
by amending the constitutional text in order to overturn such judicial decisions which failed to 
persuade its nationalist imagination. In particular, it inserted into the Constitution Article 15(4) 
authorizing special measures for ‘socially and educationally backward classes’, Article 31-A 
enabling the legislative abolition of Zamindari, and Article 31-B creating the Ninth Schedule 
for the purpose of according a blanket protection to laws specified therein from fundamental 
rights review. The constitutional tussle did not end over here however, and was only transferred 
from the ordinary domain of constituted power to the more foundational and extraordinary 
domain of constituent power itself. 
 
While initially in Sankari Prasad401 and Sajjan Singh,402 the Supreme Court conceded that 
constitutional amendments enacted in exercise of ‘sovereign constituent power’ could not be 
subjected to substantive judicial review, it later opined in I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab that 
the amending power of Parliament was merely a species of legislative power, and could not be 
deployed to abridge fundamental rights which had been accorded a ‘transcendental position 
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under the Indian Constitution’.403 After oscillating between upholding constitutional 
amendments as supreme positive law and protecting fundamental rights as supreme natural 
law, the Kesavananda Bharati Court unanimously overruled Golaknath by endorsing the 
validity of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act 1971, which had declared that 
constitutional amendments were not included within the definition of ‘law’ under Article 13. 
Kesavananda did not seek to restore the status quo of the pre-Golaknath position, but to 
entrench only those features which could be regarded as essential for sustaining the ‘identity’ 
of the constitution. Starkly reminiscent in fact of the various judicial pronouncements on the 
essential practices of religion, two judges in Kesavananda had this to say about the nature of 
the constitutional basic structure:  
 
‘Our Constitution is not a mere political document. It is essentially a social document. 
It is based on a social philosophy and every social philosophy like every religion has 
two main features, namely, basic and circumstantial. The former remains constant but 
the latter is subject to change. The core of a religion always remains constant but the 
practices associated with it may change. Likewise, a Constitution like ours contains 
certain features which are so essential that they cannot be changed or destroyed. In any 
event it cannot be destroyed from within. … . The personality of the Constitution must 
remain unchanged.’404 
 
Thus in effect, Kesavananda Bharati can be seen as having prepared the ground for the 
sacralization of the constitution in subsequent years, a crucial point which often gets 
overlooked in the burgeoning literature on the judgment. The theological dimension of basic 
structure constitutionalism has been mostly neglected so far because of a widely prevalent 
tendency in constitutional scholarship to reduce its legitimacy either to legal and moral 
normativity on the one hand, and sociological efficacy on the other. Looking beyond these two 
positions, I shall instead continue my analogy with the freedom of religion, and argue that just 
as religious denominations were given reasons internal to their own cultural tradition to pursue 
social reform, the rise of juristocracy similarly drew its legitimacy from reasons of persuasion 
which could in the final analysis be regarded as internal to the Indian political. 
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2   Reason of the Indian political 
	  
My thesis about the theologization of constitutional identity in India invites attention to a 
germinal controversy relating to the idea of the constitution itself. If we briefly borrow from 
the famous inter-War German debate on the subject, the constitution can be understood either 
as an abstract order of legal unity, or else as a concrete order of political unity, as was to be 
found in the conflicting intellectual positions of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt respectively. 
While Kelsen viewed the constitutional system as a hierarchical arrangement of legal norms 
unified by the presupposition of a grundnorm or basic norm,405 Schmitt in contrast equated the 
constitution with the political conditions of a pre-established or dynamically emerging 
collective unity which the practice of legality could itself not guarantee.406 These competing 
legal and political conceptualizations of the constitution in fact determined for the two thinkers 
which institutional agent was to be regarded as its chief guardian, that being the constitutional 
court in Kelsen’s scheme, as opposed to the executive president in Schmitt’s account.407 
 
In India’s case however, I would argue contra Kelsen that the sacralization of the formal 
constitution derived legitimacy from the collective imagination of the Indian political, and 
contra Schmitt that the Supreme Court managed to claim a share in its guardianship by speaking 
in the constituent voice of the people themselves. But inscribing the judiciary in a political 
constitution throws up another complicated paradox, that unlike Schmitt’s political theology 
which was premised upon the Heideggerian dictum that ‘existence precedes essence’, the 
Indian Supreme Court appeared to be protecting the constitution from legislative and executive 
incursions precisely by harping upon its ‘essential features’ as a normative court of 
superlegality.408 It is this conundrum that I seek to address by connecting the constitutional 
jurisprudence on basic structure with the counterlegality of public interest litigation in this 
section. 
2.1 Democracy and the legitimization of Keshavananda Bharati 
 
That the judicial innovation of basic structure constitutionalism could not have been anticipated 
by India’s constitution makers is hardly deniable. Nevertheless, we must also remember that 
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this doctrine emerged only as a distinctive response to two contrasting concerns which had 
very much been part of its founding constitutional imagination. As can be gaged from the initial 
few cases on constitutional amendments, the Court had an unenviable task of negotiating 
between the governmental assertion of unlimited constituent power and the non-governmental 
defence of unamendable fundamental rights, with both sides purporting to be equally anchored 
in competing concerns of the founding framers pertaining to the prevention of 
extraconstitutional revolution at one end and anticonstitutional dictatorship at another. After 
aligning either with the government or the opposition in the first three cases, it enunciated the 
basic structure doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati to arrive at a provisional reconciliation 
between the two positions, an outcome which has ever since been able to withstand the test of 
ordinary and extraordinary constitutional time. 
 
It may be suggested with the advantage of hindsight that Kesavananda Bharati has remained 
salient in India’s constitutional jurisprudence because of the Court’s willingness to disown the 
Golak Nath ratio about the sanctity of fundamental rights. Although a majority of seven judges 
unprecedentedly did strike down one part of the Constitutional (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act 
1971 inserting Article 31-C into the constitutional text, their action was aimed not at reversing 
its authorization of legislative measures giving effect to directive principles laid down under 
Articles 39(b) and 39(c) even by denying the right to equality, freedom and property, but rather 
at ensuring the availability of judicial review of legislative declarations proclaiming to be in 
compliance with these directives. In Khanna’s opinion, natural rights were positivized and 
made subject to statutory and constitutional amendments:  
 
‘It is up to the state to incorporate natural rights, or such of them as are deemed 
essential, and subject to such limitations as are considered appropriate, in the 
Constitution or the laws made by it. But independently of the Constitution and the laws 
of the state, natural rights can have no legal sanction and cannot be enforced. … . 
[These] rights, having been once incorporated in the Constitution or the statute, can be 
abridged or taken away by amendment of the Constitution or the statute.’409  
 
This determination had the specific effect of decentering the right to property from judicial 
imagination, although the fate of other fundamental rights was still left unambiguously 
undecided. What it did succeed in anticipating, was that the judges would from then on, cease 
to argue about the unamendability of fundamental rights in general, and instead debate as to 
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whether particular fundamental rights were part of the basic structure or only their core and 
essence. 
 
The basic structure doctrine was legitimized in the very first case of its judicial application, 
requiring the Supreme Court to connect the rule of law not with the contentious issue of rights 
or essence of rights, but with the more uncontestable postulate of democracy which had 
nominally unified most of the different voices of consensus and dissensus at the founding 
moment. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain410 came up for adjudication during the national 
emergency (1975-1977), and involved a constitutional challenge to the Constitution (Thirty-
ninth Amendment) Act 1975. Put briefly, this constitutional amendment had voided an 
Allahabad High Court decision invalidating Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s election to the 
lower House of Parliament in 1971, and had further withdrawn the election of the Prime 
Minister from the purview of judicial review. 
 
A majority of four out of the five judges on the Constitution Bench struck down the new Article 
329A(4), which was in effect enacted only for the purpose of preventing Mrs. Gandhi’s 
removal from the office of Prime Minister. While M.H. Beg, J. partially differed with the 
majority and read the impugned provision in such a way that it did not oust the jurisdiction of 
courts, even he remained committed to the sovereignty of the constitution rather than that of 
any governmental organ:  
 
‘All constitutional and “legal” sovereigns are necessarily restrained and limited 
sovereigns. . . particularly as the dignitaries of State, including Judges of superior 
Courts, and all the legislators, who have to take oaths prescribed by the Third Schedule 
of our Constitution, swear “allegiance” to the Constitution as though the document 
itself is a personal Ruler. This accords with our own ancient notions of the law as “The 
King of Kings” and the majesty of all that it stands for.’411  
 
In the majority were voices like that of K.K. Mathew, J., who problematized the constituent 
exercise of a judicial function without enacting an enabling law as an act of ‘irresponsible 
despotic discretion’:  
 
‘A sovereign in any system of civilized jurisprudence is not like an oriental despot who 
can do anything he likes, in any manner he likes and at any time he likes. That the 
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Nizam of Hyderabad had legislative, judicial and executive powers and could exercise 
any one of them by a firman has no relevance when we are considering how a pro-
sovereign—the holder of the amending power—in a country governed by a constitution 
should function. Such a sovereign can express ‘himself’ only by passing a particular 
kind of law; and not through sporadic acts. ‘He’ cannot pick and choose cases according 
to his whim and dispose them of by administering ‘qadi-justice’.412  
 
Related with this rule of law argument was the argument of procedural democracy most 
forcefully articulated by Khanna, who held Article 329A(4) to be violative of the principle of 
‘free and fair elections’ for failing to provide a machinery for the resolution of an electoral 
dispute:  
 
‘Democracy can indeed function only upon the faith that elections are free and fair and 
not rigged and manipulated, that they are effective instruments of ascertaining popular 
will both in reality and form and are not mere rituals calculated to generate illusion of 
deference to mass opinion. … . To confer an absolute validity upon the election of one 
particular candidate and to prescribe that the validity of that election shall not be 
questioned before any forum or under any law . . . [on grounds of] improprieties, 
malpractices and unfair means . . . is subversive of the principle of free and fair election 
in a democracy.’413  
 
These powerful pronouncements notwithstanding, what became immediately significant for 
the ruling regime was that all five judges unanimously upheld Mrs. Gandhi’s appeal against 
the High Court decision on merits by validating the retroactive amendments made to the 
ordinary election law, and thus allowing her to stay on as Prime Minister. Except in Khanna’s 
judgment, the basic structure doctrine was after all deemed applicable only to constitutional 
amendments, and therefore as a result, that which could not be accomplished by resorting to 
constituent power, was curiously permitted under legislative power itself. But far from 
producing an anomalous situation, such an attempt at combining strong persuasive opinions 
with a relatively weak decisional outcome provided the Supreme Court a useful template to try 
perfecting in subsequent years, in order to enhance its own credibility vis-à-vis other 
institutional actors on the constitutional field. 
 
Emergency rule ended two years later, after fresh elections in early 1977 deposed Mrs. 
Gandhi’s Congress government and replaced it with the coalition government of the Janata 
Party. But this was not before the passage of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 
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1976, unarguably the most extravagant constitutional enactment in the history of independent 
India. Among its other far reaching clauses was Section 4, which amended Article 31-C to 
provide for the absolute primacy of all the directive principles over the fundamental right to 
equality, freedom and property, and Section 55, which amended Article 368 to declare that 
there were no limitations what so ever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend any 
provision of the Constitution. These changes to the constitutional text in effect sought to nullify 
the ratio in Kesavananda Bharati and dispense with the basic structure doctrine altogether. As 
a result, the very survival of the doctrine was at stake when the Forty-second Amendment came 
up for judicial scrutiny in the post-emergency period, albeit only after the Janata government 
had enacted the Forty-fourth Amendment Act 1978, repealing the right to property from the 
chapter on fundamental rights and converting it into an ordinary constitutional right instead. 
 
Minerva Mills v. Union of India414 was a five judge Constitution Bench decision, in which 
Sections 4 and 55 of the Forty-second Amendment Act were struck down as unconstitutional, 
on the basis that a limited amending power and a harmonious relationship between fundamental 
rights and directive principles were both essential features of the constitutional basic structure. 
Writing on behalf of himself and three other colleagues, Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ. who had 
previously rejected the idea of a basic structure now fervently propagated in the spirit of a 
convert:  
 
‘The theme song of the majority decision in Kesavananda Bharati is: Amend as you 
may even the solemn document which the founding fathers have committed to your 
care, for you know best the needs of your generation. But, the Constitution is a precious 
heritage; therefore, you cannot destroy its identity.’415  
 
Rather than insisting on prioritizing one over the other, he spoke about balancing and 
harmonizing the ‘means’ contained in Part III with the ‘ends’ of Part IV, which when read 
together constituted the ‘core’ and ‘conscience’ of the Constitution. Since the controversial 
right to property was no longer in contention, he was able to make a more eloquent case in 
favour of pursuing directive principles by adhering to the discipline of equality and liberty:  
 
‘Three Articles of our Constitution, and only three, stand between the heaven of 
freedom into which Tagore wanted his country to awake and the abyss of unrestrained 
power. They are Articles 14, 19 and 21. Article 31C has removed two sides of that 
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golden triangle which affords to the people of this country an assurance that the promise 
held forth by the Preamble will be performed by ushering an egalitarian era through the 
discipline of fundamental rights, that is, without emasculation of the rights to liberty 
and equality which alone can help preserve the dignity of the individual.’416 
 
This abstract formulation of balance and harmony between Parts III and IV was not merely 
intended to limit governmental action alone, but implicitly also gestured to a growing judicial 
confidence in finally willing to own up to the concrete conditions of the Indian political. A 
more explicit expression of faith in the continuing legacy of the founding constitutional 
imagination followed in Chandrachud’s qualified validation of Article 31-A, Article 31-B and 
the unamended Article 31-C in Waman Rao’s case, which was actually decided at the same 
time as Minerva Mills.417 After quoting from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s Parliamentary 
speeches in defence of the First and Fourth Amendments, Chandrachud acknowledged that  
 
‘these amendments, especially the 1st were made so closely on the heels of the 
Constitution that they ought indeed to be considered as a part and parcel of the 
Constitution itself. … . They are, in the truest sense of the phrase, a contemporary 
practical exposition of the Constitution.’418  
 
He observed that the goal of economic redistribution was very much enshrined in Articles 39(b) 
and 39(c) of the directive principles, and invoking the collective singular perspective of 
constituent power, retrospectively declared that amendments aimed primarily at removing 
hurdles on the path of land reform in the agricultural sector only strengthened the constitutional 
basic structure rather than weakening it:  
 
‘We embarked upon a constitutional era holding forth the promise that we will secure 
to all citizens justice, social, economic and political; equality of status and of 
opportunity; and, last but not the least, dignity of the individual. … . [If] there is one 
place in an agriculture-dominated society like ours where citizens can hope to have 
equal justice, it is on the strip of land which they till and love, the land which assures 
to them the dignity of their person by providing to them a near decent means of 
livelihood. … . The provisions introduced by [the First and Fourth Amendments] for 
the extinguishment or modification of rights in lands held or let for purposes of 
agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, strengthen rather than weaken the basic 
structure of the Constitution.’419 
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2.2 Social activism of PIL 
 
While owning up to the Indian political may have required a considerable degree of judicial 
deference towards the legislative and executive organs of government, it also enabled the 
Supreme Court to move beyond insisting upon the autonomy of law from politics, and instead 
emerge as an autonomous agent of constituent power through a creative appropriation of the 
discourse of social transformation. The Court in particular began to make a growing number 
of directive principles indirectly justiciable, by reading them into a substantially expanding 
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. It further abandoned the 
certitude of legal formalism, relaxed the adjudicative criterion of locus standi, and instituted a 
procedurally unrestrained mechanism of public interest litigation for the realization of social 
rights. 
 
Public interest litigation or PIL can by no means be regarded as a uniquely Indian phenomenon, 
as similar procedural and substantive changes have contributed to the rise of juristocracy across 
much of the globe from the latter half of the twentieth century.420 What does distinguish India 
from the so called global model of constitutional rights however, is that its higher judiciary is 
neither interested in performing the classical countermajoritarian function of upholding 
minority entitlements, nor merely in providing a deliberative space for the participation of a 
manifold of citizens, but rather more ambitiously in presenting or representing ‘we the people’ 
as a holistic political unity.421 The longterm sustainability of this representational gesture was 
in turn dependant upon the fashioning of a convincing negotiation between the different yet 
interrelated pulls and pressures of legality and popularity, as can be gaged from perhaps the 
most well known social rights judgment of the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay 
Municipal Corporation.422 
 
Decided in 1985, Olga Tellis involved a constitutional tension between the rights of slum and 
pavement dwellers residing in the city of Bombay, and the local government’s interest in 
removing illegal encroachments from public spaces under the Bombay Municipal Corporation 
Act 1888. The petitioners had migrated to Bombay from various places in search of bare 
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subsistence, and had no option but to take shelter in slums or on pavements. They claimed that 
the forcible demolition of squatter settlements without any offer of alternative accommodation 
violated their residential and occupational rights, as well as the right to livelihood which was 
necessary to make the right to life meaningful. In response, governmental authorities contended 
that the Constitution did not grant anyone the licence to trespass upon public property, that 
municipal authorities had an obligation to remove obstructions from pavements, public streets 
and other public places, and that the impugned provisions of the BMC Act merely sought to 
facilitate the performance of this obligation. Furthermore, it was pointed out that although 
measures had been taken for the provision of housing and employment to the poor, these efforts 
were bound to be limited by the serious paucity of financial resources at the disposal of the 
government. 
 
The five judge constitution bench spoke through Chandrachud, CJ., and offered a vivid 
description of the plight of the lakhs of slum and pavement dwellers who constituted nearly 
half the population of Bombay and approached the Court for the recognition of their rights. 
With a demonstrable show of sensitivity for the petitioners, it proceeded to read the right to 
livelihood and employment provided under Articles 39(a) and 41 of the directive principles 
into Article 21 in these terms:  
 
‘The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does 
not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the 
imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure 
established by law. … . An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood 
because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. 
… . That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable 
(sic), must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life’.423  
 
However, this determination did not prevent Chandrachud from endorsing the government’s 
position by observing that  
 
‘footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the 
convenience of the general public. … . No one has the right to make use of a public 
property for a private purpose without the requisite authorization, and therefore it is 
erroneous to contend that the pavement dwellers have the right to encroach upon 
pavements by constructing dwellings thereon.’424 
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It was possible for the Court to side with the executive establishment as the Constitution did 
not put an ‘absolute embargo’ on the deprivation of life and personal liberty, and only stipulated 
that such deprivation ought to proceed in accordance with a ‘procedure established by law’. 
The judgment in fact upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 312-314 of the BMC Act 
under which evictions were legally authorized, by construing them as ordinarily requiring 
adherence to a just fair and reasonable procedure, entailing the issuance of notice and the right 
to be heard, before the removal of trespassers from public spaces could be actually initiated.425 
Since the petitioners had been given an ample opportunity to present their case before the 
judges, their eviction could no longer be deemed illegal or unconstitutional. But although no 
general remedy was granted in this case, the Court did enjoin the provision of alternative 
accommodation for one group of petitioners, whom the Government of Maharashtra had 
promised to resettle after deciding to allot some vacant land to slum dwellers in 1976. A census 
was carried out for the purpose of enumerating slum dwellers spread in about 850 colonies all 
over Bombay, and nearly two thirds of them were issued identity cards. While pavement 
dwellers censused in 1976 were to be given alternative pitches albeit not as a condition 
precedent to the removal of encroachments committed by them, slum dwellers who were thus 
censused and given identity cards had to be provided alternative accommodation before they 
could be evicted. In addition, the government was required to make good its other assurances 
by refraining from demolishing slums that had been in existence for a long period of twenty 
years or more, and had been improved and developed, except when such removal was required 
for a public purpose, and alternative sites of accommodation were provided to those who had 
been dispossessed.426 
 
By thus reading directive principles into fundamental rights, the Court managed to defuse a 
historical constitutional tension between law as command and law as reason. But rather than 
producing a new synthesis between positive law and natural law at a higher level of abstraction, 
this only enabled the judiciary to posit itself as a co-equal constitutional actor in the concrete 
context of the Indian political. While the remarkably weak remedies usually made available in 
social rights cases were indicative of the judicial willingness to afford considerable leeway to 
governmental discretion on the social question, they paradoxically also created the conditions 
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for the emergence of the Court as a strong ventriloquist of the weakest sections of society, with 
a powerful voice of legitimacy which was not as easily repudiable as it had been in the past. 
 
After prevailing over the initial divergence between the legalistic outlook of judges who had 
previously served the colonial regime, and the nationalist aspirations of politicians connected 
with the anticolonial movement for liberation and freedom, the 'Supreme Court of India' was 
in Baxi's famous words, ‘at long last becoming, after thirty two years of the Republic, the 
Supreme Court for Indians', by reorienting itself as the 'last resort for the oppressed and the 
bewildered’.427 What especially contributed to the growth of judicial power in the 1970s and 
1980s was the convenient coincidence of the socialist, communist and postcolonialist 
sympathies of the more activist judges like V.R. Krishna Iyer J. and P.N. Bhagwati J., 
happening to resonate with the aims and objectives of India as a welfare state. However, such 
a close entanglement with the prerogatives of the establishment has also meant that ever since 
the 1990s when the economy was opened up to liberalization, privatization and globalization, 
PIL was transformed from an adjunct of social activism to an instrument in service of neoliberal 
developmentalism. 
 
Critical postcolonial scholars construe this turn as signifying a clear shift in judicial emphasis, 
from previously being committed to speaking on behalf of a political society comprising non-
corporate subaltern populations, to now espousing the concerns of a civil society largely made 
up of corporate capitalist elites.428 But a more recent trend in interdisciplinary studies of the 
adjudicative enterprise is to jettison the consequentialism of the previous generation, and 
instead problematize the institutional mechanism of PIL from the very inception itself, for 
having converted the Supreme Court into a procedurally unencumbered and all powerful agent 
of antidemocratic populism.429 While sharing this scepticism for a purely consequentialist 
critique of PIL, I would nevertheless argue that the formal normativism of the new scholarship 
does not suffice to capture the dynamics of constituent power within which the judiciary sought 
to carve a role for itself as a guardian of the Indian political. 
 
We must not forget that the Supreme Court was able to arrive at a political understanding of 
the constitution in a context where sovereignty and governmentality were already deeply 
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428 See the critical essays published in Narrain and Suresh (2014); see especially Nigam (2014: 22-38). 
429 Bhuwania (2014: 314-335); a booklength version of this argument was later published in Bhuwania (2017). 
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imbricated with one another. Coupled with the absence of a neat separation between the 
legislative, executive and judicial functions of government, was the impossibility of 
establishing a clear distinction between these constituted voices and the constituent voice of 
the people themselves. No wonder then that the legal informalism of PIL equipped the Supreme 
Court to depart from the constitutional principle of non-arbitrariness, and in turn get ironically 
called out for practicing qadi or panchayati justice, a charge that it had itself levelled against 
the supreme executive while formulating the basic structure doctrine. However the Court here 
was only behaving as an archetypal agent of constituent power, seeking to assume upon itself 
the task of distinguishing between norm and decision on the one hand, and normativity and 
normalcy on the other.430 It was in fact able to acquire a surplus of legitimacy precisely by 
emulating other equally powerful constitutional actors, and even managing to operate in a 
populist register in tune with the changing political climate of the country. Constitutionalist 
apprehensions about judicial populism taking over the polity are somewhat farfetched, 
especially at a time when the ever increasing caseload of the Court has meant that it is left with 
no option but to function through a multiplicity of disaggregated benches, capable of giving 
voice merely to a dispersed rather than a unitary or quasi-dictatorial form of constituent power. 
 
I would instead suggest that a critique of the Supreme Court ought to be couched less in 
procedural and normative terms of constituted legality, and more in substantive and political 
terms of constituent power familiar to its own intellectual imagination. PIL must certainly be 
problematized for its judicialization of social rights, which had the effect of converting an 
expansive question of redistributive sufficiency into one pertaining to the minimum provision 
of bare necessities.431 This contributed substantially to India’s transition from social welfarism 
to economic neoliberalism, with  the complicity of all organs of government as well as of the 
different political forces occupying each of them. Welfare was thus depoliticized, with most 
contending parties on the right and the left gradually coming to share in the new consensus 
about the primacy of guaranteeing basic needs, rather than struggling for the structural 
transformation of the entire political economy. But the depoliticization of welfare did not result 
in the depoliticization of constitutional society as a whole. The political in fact returned back 
to its theological origins, as issues of religion and caste began to gain in prominence from the 
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431 I follow here Samuel Moyn’s scepticism regarding the judicialization of social rights in his recent book on the 
failure of the global human rights movement to respond adequately enough to the social question of welfare 
entitlements. Moyn (2018). 
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1990s onwards. Since they invariably ended up in courts in some form or another, their judicial 
determination will be my focus of attention in the final section of this chapter. 
 
3   Social reason versus political reason 
 
In order to make sense of the judicial response to the changing political climate of the 1990s 
and beyond, we would do well to start with the dissenting view in Kesavananda Bharati, and 
in particular look at the basis of its opposition to the imposition of any substantive limitation 
on the constituent power of Parliament to amend the constitutional text. ‘At bottom’, wrote 
Dwivedi J. in his minority opinion, ‘the controversy … is … whether the meaning of the 
Constitution consists in its being or in its becoming.’ He invited attention to the national 
symbols of the Hindu Upanishadic motto ‘satyameva jayate’ or ‘truth shall triumph’ and the 
Ashokan dhammachakra or the Buddhist wheel of law, as encapsulating the two constitutional 
ideals of being and becoming respectively. The Supreme Court could fulfil its oath of loyalty 
to the Constitution only by giving expression to both of them simultaneously. To put it in his 
own words,  
 
‘The chakra is motion; satyam is sacrifice. The chakra signifies that the Constitution is 
a becoming, a moving equilibrium; satyam is symbolic of the Constitution's ideal of 
sacrifice and humanism. The Court will be doing its duty and fulfilling its oath of 
loyalty to the Constitution in the measure judicial review reflects these twin ideals of 
the Constitution.’432 
 
As was made more explicit in other dissenting judgments, the movement spoken about over 
here alluded to a constitutionally authorized social revolution under the institutional 
mechanism of parliamentary democracy, envisaged either as a hypothetical grundnorm or as 
an efficacious rule of recognition accepted by the community at large.433 It was therefore 
impermissible for judicial review to come in the way of constitutional amendments 
endeavouring to ‘wipe out every tear from every eye’, and enacted by Parliament as the real 
repository of constituent power.434 
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433 Kesavananda, para 813 (as per A.N. Ray, J.) and para 1635 (as per K.K. Mathew, J.). 
434 Id., paras 2018-2019. 
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So while opposing the construal of the constitution in consonance with principles of natural 
law, the minority opinions in Kesavananda ended up conflating the normativity and facticity 
of supreme positive law with the constitution conceptualized as the fundamental law of the 
Indian political. However, this categorial confusion had to be rectified soon, as constitutional 
becoming threatened to annihilate the very being of the constitutional enterprise. Even the most 
sceptical detractors of the basic structure doctrine were now convinced about its legitimacy, 
when confronted by constitutional amendments tinkering with parliamentary democracy, 
declaring constituent power to be unlimited, and providing for the absolute primacy of directive 
principles over fundamental rights.435 But while such attempts to set at naught the constitutional 
being were successfully domesticated if not repelled comprehensively, other more intriguing 
challenges began to surface on the horizon with the fresh repoliticization of the social questions 
of religion and caste from the 1990s onwards. My contention will be that the judiciary has dealt 
with these questions by deploying the two rival incompatible languages of social reason 
grounded in the positive theology of a non-sectarian Hindu being, and political reason 
grounded in the destabilizing negative theology of lower caste becoming, which is neither 
reducible to being nor to non-being.436 Let me explicate by focusing on the changing meanings 
of secularism and equality, unarguably two of the most essential features of the constitutional 
basic structure. 
 
3.1 Hindutva 
 
That there is no clear line of separation between religion and the state has almost become an 
incontestable truism in the ever proliferating literature on Indian secularism. India did not 
become a theocratic state at the time of independence, but its preferred model of secularism 
was best articulated by the Gandhian expression ‘sarva dharma sama bhava’ or the ‘equal 
respect for all religions’. As discussed in chapter three, in M.K. Gandhi’s distinctly religious 
politics suffused with Hindu symbology, this formulation came to be translated into an ethical 
injunction requiring the asymmetrical recognition of the other in general, and of the Muslim in 
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(1985B: 64-112). Among legal scholars, contrast H.M. Seervai’s rejection of judicial review of constitutional 
amendments after Golak Nath in Seervai (1967: 1117) with his approval of the basic structure doctrine in Seervai 
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acceptance of basic structure review in Sathe (2002: 63-98).  
436 I am partially influenced over here by Peter Fitzpatrick’s formulation of legal theology. Fitzpatrick (2018/19); 
for a contrary normative account of the being-becoming distinction in constitutional identity scholarship, see 
Jacobsohn: 2010). 
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particular. The Congress under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru applied the equal respect ideal 
differently, by creating some temporary exceptions in favour of religious minorities, who were 
granted a greater degree of cultural autonomy including the freedom to follow their own 
personal laws, even as the Hindu majority was subjected to progressive social reform in 
pursuance of the goals of transformative constitutionalism.437 This momentary refusal to 
invoke constituent power in a spirit of equitable generosity towards the Muslim community 
ravaged by the heavy losses of partition, has however been interpreted by later proponents of 
Hindu ethno cultural nationalism purely as a pseudo-secular concession of minority 
appeasement. The Hindu nationalist project in brief is to displace the ‘religious neutrality’ of 
‘dharma nirpeksh’ secularism with the ‘denominational neutrality’ of ‘pantha nirpeksh’ 
secularism. What its major ideologues have sought to accomplish by substituting dharma with 
pantha in their definition of secularism, is to subsume the radical diversity of sectarian 
denominations inside and outside Hinduism under the blood and soil nationalism of Hindutva 
or Hinduness as the hegemonic social religion of the Indian political.438 
 
For understanding how Hindutva came to be legitimized by the judiciary, we must first 
appreciate that it had begun more as a social movement rather than as a purely legal one. It was 
premised upon a fine distinction between Hindu dharma as the religious beliefs and practices 
of the various orthodox and heterodox sectarian denominations among the Hindus and non-
Hindus of India, and the common cultural civilization of Hindutva or Hinduness, anchored in 
a sacred reverence for the territory of Hindustan both as fatherland (pitrabhu) and holyland 
(punyabhu).439 The conditions of possibility for its constitutional normalization were created 
by opinions of the Supreme Court such as those in the Satsangi case, which distinguished the 
plurality of Hindu sects and denominations from the essence of Hinduism envisaged as a way 
of life thought to be giving them their unity. Although Gajendragadkar J. had offered such a 
definition of Hinduism for the social domain of temple entry from the rationalist entry-point of 
Nehruvian secularism, even anti-Nehruvian Hindutva was later endorsed by the Court precisely 
in these terms as a non-sectarian non-denominational ideology entitled to be represented in the 
political domain of electoral campaigning. 
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As many as seven cases decided in 1995 dealt with the question whether appeals to Hindutva 
in election speeches violated Section 123 of the Representation of People Act 1951, in so far 
as it specifically prohibited election candidates from asking for votes and promoting enmity 
among citizens on grounds of religion. While a few of the leaders on trial were held guilty of 
corrupt practices for appealing to the Hindu religion and promoting enmity with Muslims, the 
leading opinion in Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte440 delivered by 
J.S. Verma, J. nevertheless protected Hindutva by arguing that it was a way of life which could 
not be equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry. To put this in Verma’s 
own words,  
 
‘Thus, it cannot be doubted, particularly in view of the Constitution Bench decisions of 
this Court that the words 'Hinduism' and 'Hindutva' are not necessarily to be understood 
and construed narrowly, confined only to the strict Hindu religious practices unrelated 
to the culture and ethos of the people of India, depicting the way of life of the Indian 
people. Unless the context of a speech indicates a contrary meaning or use, in the 
abstract these terms are indicative more of a way of life of the Indian people and are 
not confined merely to describe persons practicing the Hindu religion as a faith.’441  
 
He proceeded to clarify that only the mischief resulting from the misuse of these expressions 
for the promotion of communalism had to be checked and not their permissible use, and found 
it unfortunate that  
 
‘in spite of the liberal and tolerant features of ‘Hinduism’ recognised in judicial 
decisions, these terms are misused by anyone during the elections to gain any unfair 
political advantage. Fundamentalism of any colour or kind must be curbed with a heavy 
hand to preserve and promote the secular creed of the nation.’442  
 
So Verma evidently read Hindutva in sync with the earlier judicial definition of Hinduism, and 
drew upon the liberal language of free speech and expression to defend its invocation in 
electoral politics. However, his opinion was unsurprisingly celebrated by Hindu nationalists of 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and other regional outfits as a ringing endorsement of their 
struggle to fashion a socially grounded theological sovereignty in the country.443 
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Apart from legitimizing Hindutva’s discursive claim to sovereignty, the judiciary has also 
shown a propensity to affirm the specific programmatic demands which have propelled it into 
national reckoning. Two of the most controversial demands of the BJP and its Hindu nationalist 
affiliates which have come up for adjudication pertain to the securing of a uniform civil code 
and the building of a Ram temple in Ayodhya. Although the securing of a uniform civil code 
is a constitutional directive, there is no consensus about its efficacy across the religious divide 
and even in the women’s movement. Yet the courts have on occasion sympathized with this 
demand, by indulging in a stereotypical rhetoric about the inegalitarian and gender unjust 
features of Muslim personal law in particular.444 The dominant trend has however been to bring 
law as revelation increasingly in line with law as reason, and silently work towards uniformity 
across the various personal law regimes without waiting for their codification in more general 
terms.445 With the judiciary gaining in confidence in fact, a few judges are even trying to look 
beyond justificatory reasons internal to a religious community, and talk about the abstract 
reason of constitutional morality instead.446 But this move can succeed only if the institution 
of personal law is fully depoliticized, a possibility which is difficult to predict in a 
constitutional society like India where family, religion and politics are deeply entangled with 
one another.  
 
A similar ambiguity is discernable in the judicial response to the Ram Mandir issue, which 
became politically salient on 6th December 1992, after thousands of Hindutva volunteers 
unlawfully demolished the Babri Masjid, a sixteenth century mosque believed by them to have 
been built by the Mughal Emperor Babar on Lord Ram’s birthplace. In S.R. Bommai v. Union 
of India,447 the Supreme Court initially upheld the Congress dismissal of two provincial BJP 
governments under Article 356 of the Constitution, on the ground that their support for the 
Rama Janmabhumi movement was violative of the constitutional principle of secularism and 
its criterion of equal respect for all religions. But more recently in 2010, the Allahabad High 
Court treated the Hindu mythological belief about Ram’s birthplace as a fact of history, and 
prioritized it over the Muslim right to pray in mosques since this was deemed to be an 
inessential feature of Islam. By a two to one majority, the Court divided the disputed land into 
three parts, and distributed two of them to the Hindu side whilst leaving only one for the 
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Muslim claimant to the property.448 Its resolution of the title suit which is presently in appeal 
before the Supreme Court, is the most extreme illustration of how a judicial action can 
simultaneously appear to be arbitrary from one perspective, and a vindication of sovereignty 
from another. 
 
3.2 OBC reservation 
 
The secularist reaction to Hindutva’s politics of inclusion and exclusion has been to 
normatively fall back upon the tried and tested formula of state neutrality towards religion. 
What it fails to realize is that Hindu nationalists tend to thrive precisely in such an elitist 
intellectual climate, by depicting state neutrality towards religion as the indifference of the 
state towards dharma as the fundamental law of the political. But this does not necessarily 
mean that dharma nirpeksh secularism must be replaced by pantha nirpeksh secularism, or that 
the liberal constitutionalist distrust for the political must give way to enmity with the real 
externality of the Muslim other. Hindu nationalism must rather be exposed only as a 
degenerated version of the same mainstream nationalist imagination which it professes to be 
so critical of. Hindutva’s sovereign selfhood is problematic not merely because it seeks to 
replace the composite culture of civic nationalism with the Hindu culture of ethnic nationalism, 
but more germinally also because its conception of sovereignty continues to remain tethered to 
the presupposition of a fixed, immutable and permanent selfhood, how so ever defined in 
contrast with the past. If its notion of a pre-existing collective selfhood is to be destabilized, 
we must move beyond concerns of neutrality and non-neutrality, and instead focus on the 
originary challenge posed to the hegemony of Hindu dharma by the counter hegemony of 
Buddhist dhamma as the rival ethical lifeworld of the Indian political. This requires us, 
especially when examining the judicial role in the context of the 1990s and thereafter, to shift 
from an engagement with the theology of religion mediated by secularism, to an engagement 
with the theology of caste as mediated by different ideas of equality. 
 
The tension between competing conceptions of equality has featured most prominently in 
India’s constitutional jurisprudence on caste based quotas in public education and employment, 
Union and State Legislatures, and local self governing institutions. It is common for judges to 
debate whether the special provisions enabling or prescribing reservations are to be considered 
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as temporary exceptions to the norm of formal equality and non-discrimination under Articles 
14, 15(1) and 16(2), or whether they can themselves be normatively defended by resorting to 
another related notion of substantive equality. While the Supreme Court was initially inclined 
to favour the former approach, it has gradually come around to accepting the latter position 
ever since the 1970s.449 But it still continued to view formal and substantive conceptions of 
equality from the legal-moral prism of corrective and distributive justice, even as the changing 
political scenario was opening up the possibility of thinking about radical equality as a 
discursive expression of the phenomenon of lower castes claiming a share in state 
sovereignty.450 I have already emphasized in the previous chapter that such a linkage of 
equality with sovereignty is exactly what B.R. Ambedkar was striving to establish, while 
drafting a strong reservations policy into the constitutional text itself, so that members 
belonging to the Dalit community of former untouchables could come to occupy offices of 
power and authority in the new postcolonial republic. As a true reflection of his imagination of 
an impermanent Indian becoming which was neither reducible to an eternalist being nor to a 
nihilist nonbeing, this equalitarian sovereignty has not remained limited in reach to the 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) alone, and is also extended now to a much 
larger majority of socially and educationally backward castes, which have however not faced 
the historical experience of untouchability. The extension of reservations to the so called Other 
Backward Classes (OBCs) did not go uncontested, but with upper caste opponents beginning 
to lose some of their influence in the democratic arena of electoral politics from the late 1980s, 
they have increasingly tended to prefer challenging its legality and legitimacy in the 
constitutional arena of judicial politics instead. The Court has by and large repelled these 
challenges, albeit only after inserting itself as a contending regulatory agency auditing the 
entire affirmative action exercise. 
 
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India,451 which was decided by a nine judge Constitution Bench in 
1992, has in retrospect turned out to be the most impactful among all judgments delivered by 
the Supreme Court on the reservations issue thus far. This case pertained to the constitutionality 
of the executive decision of Prime Minister V.P. Singh’s National Front government to 
implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission in 1990, reserving 27% of the 
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seats in public employment under the Government of India for the OBCs, to add to the 15% 
and 7.5% reservations being already enjoyed by the SCs and STs respectively. The Court in 
brief was required to determine whether India’s liberal and secular Constitution could in any 
way authorize the government to identify the beneficiaries of affirmative action on the basis of 
a nonsecular identitarian marker like caste. A majority of six out of the nine judges held that 
caste could certainly be taken as a useful starting point in the Indian context, provided it was 
then supplemented with additional sociological data about social and educational 
backwardness, before the benefits of reservations were extended to particular groups or 
communities. What justified this relative prioritization of caste over the more secular and 
purely economic marker of poverty in the Court’s understanding, was the inextricability of the 
problem of backwardness from the inescapable social reality of an inegalitarian Hindu 
theology. Thus while talking about the background conditions of historic injustices and 
inequities against which India’s transformative constitutional project was inaugurated, B.P. 
Jeevan Reddy, J.’s leading opinion made the following observations:  
 
‘… the Hindu religion—the religion of the overwhelming majority—as it was being 
practiced, was not known for its egalitarian ethos. It divided its adherents into four 
watertight compartments. Those outside this four-tier system (chaturvarna) were the 
outcastes (Panchamas), the lowliest. … . The fourth, shudras, were no better, though 
certainly better than the Panchamas. The lowliness attached to them (Shudras and 
Panchamas) by virtue of their birth in these castes, unconnected with their deeds. There 
was to be no deliverance for them from this social stigma, except perhaps death. They 
were condemned to be inferior. All lowly, menial and unsavoury occupations were 
assigned to them. In the rural life, they had no alternative but to follow these 
occupations, generation after generation, century after century. It was their 'karma', they 
were told, the penalty for the sins they allegedly committed in their previous birth. … . 
Poverty there has been—and there is—in every country. But none had the misfortune 
of having this social division—or as some call it, degradation—superimposed on 
poverty.’452 
 
All of the majority opinions recognized that the founding framers had sought to overcome this 
degradation of the lower castes by making them equal partners in state sovereignty with their 
upper caste counterparts, principally through the constitutional device of reservations. While 
Jeevan Reddy held that Article 16(4) enabling the government to provide for the adequate 
representation of backward classes in public employment was a mechanism for the ‘sharing of 
state power’,453 Pandian, J., deplored that this ‘fundamental right’ had not yet been enforced at 
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the centre and in many states even after forty two years from the enactment of the 
Constitution.454 P.B. Sawant, J. noted that the undeniable gains made by the lower castes in 
electoral politics had not sufficed to bring about the desired social transformation, largely 
because of an unsympathetic administrative machinery still being dominated by the upper 
castes, and operating at crosspurposes with the concerns of political power. Such an 
administrative status quo had proved ‘ruinous’ for the country and therefore had to be remedied 
through appropriate action:  
 
‘One of the major causes of the backwardness of the country in all walks of life is the 
denial to more than 75% of the population, of an opportunity to participate in the 
running of the affairs of the country. Democracy does not mean mere elections. It also 
means equal and effective participation in shaping the destiny of the country. Needless 
to say that where a majority of the population is denied its share in actual power, there 
exists no real democracy. It is a harsh reality. It can be mended not by running away 
from it or by ignoring it, but by taking effective workable remedial measures.’455  
 
It was clear to Sawant that backward class reservations had to form an integral part of these 
remedial measures, in a society with a history of centuries of cent per cent reservations for the 
upper castes:  
 
‘… hitherto for centuries, there have been cent per cent reservations in practice in all 
fields, in favour of the high castes and classes, to the total exclusion of others. It was a 
purely caste and class-based reservation. … . [Instead] The [OBC] reservations are 
aimed at securing proper representation in administration to all sections of the society, 
intelligence and administrative capacity being not the monopoly of any one class, caste 
or community. This would help to promote healthy administration of the country 
avoiding sectarian approaches and securing the requisite talent from all available 
sources.’456 
 
Although the Indra Sawhney decision thus upheld the constitutionality of OBC reservations in 
public employment by connecting equality with a political conception of sovereignty, a 
differently constituted majority in the judgment also attempted to put in place a strong 
regulative regime to govern its implementation, as if in continuation with the Court’s earlier 
approach of reducing equality to the social conceptions of corrective and distributive justice. It 
laid down for instance that reservations extended only to initial appointments and not to matters 
of promotion, that their total quantum in a year including carried forward vacancies could not 
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exceed 50% under ordinary circumstances, and that a ‘creamy layer’ of advanced sections were 
to be identified from the OBCs on the basis of some socio-economic parameters and excluded 
from the purview of the policy. While these rules were broadly accepted by other political 
actors in so far as they applied to the OBCs, their collateral implication on the already 
prevailing reservations scheme for the SCs and STs continues to remain a live constitutional 
issue even today. 
 
In developments which were somewhat reminiscent of the initial inter-institutional tussle on 
the right to property, the Parliament enacted four constitutional amendments to overturn 
adverse judicial rulings on affirmative action, and restore SC/ST reservations in promotion 
with consequential seniority, exclude the carrying-forward of their unfilled vacancies to 
subsequent years from the 50% ceiling limit, and permit relaxations in qualifying marks and 
standards of evaluation in matters of their promotion, notwithstanding concerns relating to the 
compromise of administrative efficiency. All of these amendments were once again upheld as 
valid and not violative of the basic structure doctrine by a five judge Constitution Bench in M. 
Nagaraj v. Union of India decided in 2006.457 The Court reasoned that specific details of the 
governmental policy on reservations were derived from service law jurisprudence, and could 
not be elevated to the status of higher constitutional principles beyond the amending power of 
Parliament. Their insertion or deletion did not abrogate or destroy ‘width and identity’ of the 
equality code contained in Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution.458 But even though the 
amendments were not struck down, it was nevertheless declared that SC/ST reservations in 
promotion were permissible only if the government complied with the constitutional stipulation 
of identifying backwardness, establishing inadequacy of representation, and maintaining 
overall administrative efficiency, coupled with the judicial stipulation of the 50% limit and the 
creamy layer rule.459 This stipulative part of the Nagaraj opinion can by no means be regarded 
as the last word on SC/ST reservations, as the government is considering the introduction of a 
constitutional amendment to undo the difficulties arising out of its judicial application in later 
decisions of the Court. 
 
Finally, the next big episode in the affirmative action story occurred when reservations were 
extended to the OBCs in higher educational institutions including private aided and unaided 
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educational institutions and excluding minority run educational institutions in 2005. Just as in 
public employment, the total quantum of reservations in higher education now reached 49.5%, 
with SC/STs and OBCs entitled to be admitted on 22.5% and 27% of the seats respectively. 
The legislation providing for these reservations and the constitutional amendment enabling this 
legislation through the incorporation of Article 15(5) into the Constitution were both upheld as 
constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court in the Ashoka Kumar Thakur and Pramati 
Educational and Cultural Society judgments.460 Particularly in respect of the basic structure 
challenge, a majority of judges in the two cases applied the width and identity tests from 
Nagaraj, and found that the new Article 15(5) was valid as it did not entirely do away with 
other related provisions on equality and freedom such as Articles 14, 15(4), 19(1)(g) and 21. 
The Court nevertheless continued to interfere in the implementation of the policy, by insisting 
upon compliance with the creamy layer rule in OBC reservations. In this way, the judges have 
sought to transfer their liberal secularist suspicion towards the dangers of affirmative action for 
the idea of a ‘casteless classless society’ in India, from the domain of sovereignty where the 
reservations policy could no longer be questioned, to the domain of governmentality where it 
could at least be regulated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have engaged with the ever expanding role of the judiciary and argued that 
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court as an agent of constituent power is ultimately dependent 
upon its ability to give voice to the story of the Indian political and the inherent contradictions 
contained therein. My endeavour has been to show that the theological antecedents of its basic 
structure constitutionalism and subsequent social activism can be traced to the essential 
practices doctrine enunciated in the early jurisprudence on freedom of religion. Replicating the 
persuasive logic of offering internal reasons for religious communities to pursue social reform, 
the Court succeeded in convincing other constitutional actors about the nature and scope of 
their limited power only by moving beyond the transcendentality of fundamental rights, and 
instead resorting to the symbolic reason of an open democracy which could in someway be 
regarded as internal to the founding vision of the Indian political itself. This in turn required a 
more enthusiastic owning up of the transformative constitutional enterprise, with its own inner 
tension between the positive theology of a fixed, immutable and permanent being, and the 
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negative theology of a dynamic becoming, which was neither reducible to an eternalist being, 
nor to a nihilist nonbeing. The chapter has explained how the Court sought to negotiate such 
an irresolvable conflict in cases dealing with Hindutva and lower caste reservations by 
deploying the rival incompatible languages of social reason and political reason respectively. 
While there is a discernable preference in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
for social reason over political reason, it is also evident that tilting too heavily in one direction 
would likely pose a serious threat for the hard earned legitimacy of the judiciary. So in spite of 
increasingly adopting a strong interventionist posture in most cases, it has sagaciously left 
enough space open for other political forces claiming to be speaking and acting on behalf of 
the people. Perhaps herein lies the reason why only six constitutional amendments have been 
struck down so far in more than forty five years from the Kesavananda judgment, most of 
which were in fact coincidentally related with issues of judicial review and judicial 
independence. The Court has accorded Parliament considerable latitude on all constitutional 
questions of fundamental importance, but is in principle unwilling to accede to the slightest of 
intrusions on its autonomous functioning, even if no constitutional essentials are fundamentally 
abandoned in the process.461 This autonomy can however be meaningfully sustained only so 
long as it continues to remain in service of preserving, upholding and augmenting the very 
autonomy of the Indian political. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
My thesis is that the story of the Indian political, or of the imaginary institution of society in 
India, has been shaped at every juncture of its development by the constitutive antagonism 
between social law and political law, which can originarily be traced back to two fundamentally 
irreconcilable symbolic lifeworlds of Hindu dharma and Buddhist dhamma respectively. This 
has meant that there is more to the Indian career of constituent power besides a representational 
agent moving beyond ordinary constitutional legality and extraordinarily speaking in the name 
of the constitution making capacity of the people themselves. Although the specific ritual and 
comportmental content of both Indic languages of law may no longer be of much relevance for 
the postcolonial constitutional order, they continue to supply the conflicting conceptual 
frameworks of legitimacy within which constituent power is claimed and exercised by different 
governmental and non-governmental actors even today. In thus inviting attention to indigenous 
understandings of law and sovereignty, I have not sought in any way to juridically vindicate a 
celebratory narrative about an authentic nationalist self realization. Rather, the thesis has only 
translated the contradictions inherent in India’s experience of fashioning a constitutional 
society in terms drawn from its own political self imagination. 
 
While conflicts and contradictions are endemic to the human condition in general, they tend to 
play out differently in different socio-political conditions across space and time. Modern 
constitutional regimes usually respond to these conflicts and contradictions by functioning on 
the basis of some distinction between the inside and the outside, and then working out exclusive 
and inclusive strategies of annihilation, assimilation and accommodation to deal with them. 
Who is to be included in and excluded from the national community, and precisely on what 
terms, are questions that have frequently been raised in India as well just as in any other 
contemporary constitutional jurisdiction. But this inside-outside distinction has manifested 
over here in a more germinally irresolvable rivalry between a social conception of law oriented 
to the inner domain of the domestic householder, and a political conception of law oriented to 
the outer domain of the wandering ascetic (chapter one). 
 
I have shown in the thesis that this originary tension has in fact remained at the heart of the 
most crucial constitutional debates associated with the prefoundation, foundation and 
postfoundation of the modern Indian political. During the anticolonial movement leading up to 
the establishment of the new postcolonial constitution in the mid twentieth century, it had 
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particularly mutated into a rivalry between two interrelated yet distinct concepts of swaraj or 
self-rule, as competing local articulations of the globally circulating concept of constituent 
power (chapter two). Their deep entanglement was attributable to the simultaneous 
socialization of political law and politicization of social law that accompanied the processes of 
modernization, secularization and democratization in India. However, what distinguished the 
two concepts of swaraj from the tension between subjectivity and law in revolutionary and 
constitutionalist traditions of constituent power, and its provisional resolution in the relational 
paradigm, was their allusion to a profound opposition between social law and subjectivity 
intending to counter the negative externality of the colonial legal order on the one hand, and 
political law and subjectivity intending to counter the negative externality of the Hindu caste 
order on the other. 
 
The dissensus between both of these ethical lifeworlds has subsequently been reflected in most 
substantial aspects of the constitutional enterprise in postcolonial India, ranging from the 
making of the collective constitutional subject and the determination of its normative point of 
joint action, to identifying the appropriate agent which could articulate, monitor and enforce 
this normative point on behalf of the constitutional subject. While unity in diversity was 
nominally accepted as the commonly shared paramount principle of national sovereignty, its 
instantiation did not merely entail negotiating with the agonistic pulls and pressures of a 
homogenous universality and a heterogenous particularity, but also more fundamentally with 
two antagonistic iterations of the ideal as a whole, anchored either in the social domain of 
familiarity or in the political domain of contract (chapter three). Furthermore, although no 
constitutional actor could disagree with the goal of collective self transformation, the task of 
bringing together democracy and constitutionalism or sovereignty and governmentality 
necessary for its accomplishment, has been pursued over the years by resorting to two 
apparently correlative but intrinsically divergent means of social duties and political rights 
(chapter four). Finally, even as the Supreme Court joined the legislative and executive organs 
of government in implementing the founding vision of transformative constitutionalism by 
claiming to speak in the constituent voice of the people, its judicial decisions have been able 
to garner legitimacy only by acknowledging the irreconcilable tension between social reason 
grounded in a positive theology of being, and political reason grounded in a negative theology 
of becoming, which is neither reducible to being nor to non-being (chapter five). 
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After reading all of these developments together, it can be said that the persistent hegemony of 
nationalist dharma threatens the very autonomy of the Indian political. We may find here a 
superficial resonance with Hannah Arendt’s apprehensions about the damaging consequences 
for the political sphere of freedom whenever it is invaded by agents inhabiting the social sphere 
of necessity. But my difficulty is not with social subjectivities and their genuine aspirations for 
emancipation getting politicized, for constitutionalization of the social question of human 
misery has indeed been an integral part of India’s postcolonial model of transformative 
constitutionalism. The problem is more discursive in nature, with all constitutional questions 
being reproducible now in conceptual terms drawn entirely from the vocabulary of social law. 
If such a prospect were to ever eventualize, the political would end up being thoroughly 
subsumed by a social ontology of substances. That is, the collective selfhood at its symbolic 
centre would come to be identified with determinate attributes and qualities related either with 
the composite culture of civic nationalism or with the Hindu culture of ethnic nationalism, and 
no longer serve as an empty signifier of sovereignty which is so critical for India’s survival as 
an open democracy. Only when the hegemony of nationalist dharma is effectively interrupted 
by the counter hegemony of a non-nationalist dhamma has the Indian political come close to 
realizing its full potential. 
 
I must however also emphasize that if social law were to be completely subverted by a dhamma 
derived constellation of concepts, the resulting supremacy of political law would run the risk 
of destroying the very conditions of its own possibility. In other words, an all powerful political 
law would likely be entirely disconnected from the context of nationalist politics, only within 
which does it possess any coherent meaning as a resistive counter hegemony. This would 
paradoxically prepare the ground for its eventual depoliticization, and instead open up the 
possibility of producing an autonomous legality altogether denuded of the political. Much like 
in Hans Kelsen’s legal theory, the law of the constitution would then have to be sourced 
ultimately from the higher principles of pure normativity alone, irrespective of whether these 
norms themselves comply with the collective imagination of popular sovereignty in India or 
not. 
 
There is a fairly common tendency among lawyers in India to talk about the sovereignty of the 
constitution precisely in terms of the autonomy of law rather than the autonomy of the political. 
Sovereignty of the constitution is usually understood by them as referring to the sovereignty of 
the constitutional text, of its official and non-official interpretations, and especially after 
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Kesavananda Bharati, of the essential features of its basic structure, binding not just the three 
co-ordinate branches of government, but increasingly even ordinary citizens and populations, 
as well as their numerous non-governmental institutions dotting the constitutional landscape. 
However, such a view fails to appreciate that sovereignty is in the final analysis not as 
dependent on principles of legality and superlegality, as it is on the legitimacy that flows from 
the active acceptance of the people themselves conceived as a political unity. That the 
constitution has managed to become so enormously influential over the last seventy years is 
not merely because of the undeniably rich jurisprudence on each of its individual provisions 
and the document as a whole, but more importantly also because of its growing legitimacy 
across all the major ideational and ideological fault lines of political society in India. I therefore 
believe that this legitimacy can be sustained only so long as the people continue to see in the 
constitution a representation of their own image as an empty signifier of the sovereignty of the 
Indian political. 
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